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Abstract 
A fundamental difference between neoclassical and behavioural finance theory is the 
perception of information. Whilst the neoclassical finance view assumes perfect 
information and rational behaviour of market participants, behavioural finance suggests 
cognitively and emotionally biased perceptions resulting in irrational behaviour. Given 
these differences, this thesis investigates three issues in the context of M&A gains: (i) 
The expected reduction of information asymmetries due to the adoption of IFRS in the 
European Union, (ii) investor perception of information on broader industry factors, and 
(iii) the impact of investor sentiment on M&A gains. 
One of the regulators’ intentions in adopting IFRS in the European Union was to 
promote an efficient financial capital market. The wide range of national accounting 
standards was considered by some to be a significant source of information asymmetry 
across European companies. Chapter 4, therefore, examines the effect of the accounting 
harmonisation on the reduction of information asymmetries based on M&A gains. The 
overall gains show only a very small effect from the adoption of IFRS. However, the 
results based on potentially high information asymmetry characteristics, such as EU 
cross-border deals or stock payments, suggest improved transparency. Based on these 
results, the adoption of IFRS therefore contributed to an improved information 
environment within the EU markets. 
Chapter 5 analyses the impact of information on broad industry factors. For this 
purpose, the returns to acquiring companies and their industry prospects are examined. 
The aim of this study is to establish new insights on the investors’ perception of 
information on an industry level, as well as, their preferences on acquisition strategies 
 iii 
  
based on the prevailing industry prospects. A positive relationship between industry 
prospects and the acquirer’s gains is found and the effect is persistent in focused deals, 
but disappears in diversifying deals. Further tests confirm that investors appreciate 
information on industry prospects, as well as, the growth opportunities acquired in the 
transaction. 
Chapter 6 finally examines the impact of investor sentiment on M&A gains. Several 
studies link investor sentiment to various areas of finance, as well as, specifically to 
corporate finance. An irrational bias in the returns to acquiring firms would challenge 
the traditional notion of announcement returns as an indicator of the acquisition’s value 
creating effect. The results suggest a significant relationship between sentiment and the 
returns from M&A. Additional tests confirm sentiment research that investors react 
differently to information asymmetries and valuation signals during positive and 
negative sentiment changes. As a whole, the findings suggest that investor sentiment 
influences M&A gains. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Background 
Information plays a key role in the functioning of financial markets. A fundamental 
difference in finance theories lies in how information is perceived. For example, 
neoclassical finance theory assumes a rational market where prices fully reflect all 
available information (Fama 1970). According to behavioural finance, however, 
emotional and cognitive factors influence market participant’s actions on information 
(Akerlof and Shiller 2009). 
Research on information asymmetries has received considerable attention from 
theoretical works which highlight the consequences if markets deviate from 
informational efficiency. Studies on information asymmetries focus on the situation 
where one party has an informational advantage over the other. As Joseph Stiglitz 
emphasised during a press conference at Columbia University1, “Market economies are 
characterized by a high degree of imperfections… Even small degrees of information 
imperfections can have large economic consequences.“ Several seminal theories 
evolved from this line of thought. For instance, Akerlof (1970) shows, that due to 
asymmetric information between two parties, adverse selection might occur. The 
monitoring theory by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Spence’s (1973) signalling 
theory offer a solution to mitigate this problem. The significance and contribution of 
asymmetric information research has been acknowledged with two Nobel prizes in 
19962 and 20013. 
                                                                                                              
1 http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/01/10/josephStiglitz_nobel_2001.html 
2 To James Mirrless and William Vickrey 
3 To George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz 
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This thesis aims to contribute to this area by investigating different aspects of 
information and information asymmetry within the context of the gains to bidding 
companies during M&A announcements. M&A research provides an ideal setting where 
information, information asymmetry and the perception of information play a crucial 
role and is reflected in the gains. To analyse the gains, an event study methodology is 
used which measures stock price movements around M&A announcements. 
Although, price movements around announcements may be due to new information, 
a growing body of research in behavioural finance suggests they may be due to other 
factors also, particularly information asymmetry and sentiment. For example, Chae 
(2005) finds that the trading volume decreases if information asymmetries around 
earnings announcements are high as traders may perceive the adverse selection costs as 
too great. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) show that price reactions to earnings 
announcements are higher for good news in periods of increasing sentiment and lower 
for bad news during decreasing sentiment. 
M&A literature suggests that target shareholders experience positive gains around 
merger announcements4, whereas the results on the acquirers’ gains are not as clear-
cut. 5  The variation in returns to acquiring companies suggests that additional 
information other than on the pure value of the acquisition are revealed around the 
announcement (Fuller et al. 2002). Rosen (2006), for example, finds that the market 
reaction to a merger announcement is positively related to the reaction to recent M&A 
announcements. However, this ‘merger momentum’ disappears in the long-run. He 
suggests that merger momentum results from overoptimism of market participants. 
Antoniou et al. (2008) find similar results for the UK and suggest that M&A returns 
might be driven by investor sentiment. However, they do not directly test the impact of 
investor sentiment. 
                                                                                                              
4 See, for example, Wansley et al. (1983), Bradley et al. (1988), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) or Bargeron et al. (2008) 
5 See Chapter 2 for more background information on M&A factors influencing the gains to acquiring companies. 
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As recent research shows that information asymmetries play a significant role in 
M&A, clear and full information is essential for the target valuation and so information 
asymmetries significantly affect the gains to acquiring companies (Officer 2009). 
Draper and Paudyal (2008) find that due to the release of new information, a revaluation 
of acquirers with high asymmetric information occurs. The mode of payment can be 
considered in similar light regarding information asymmetries in M&A. Acquiring 
managers do not have a complete picture of the true financial position of the target firm 
before the actual acquisition. If acquiring managers feel private information is withheld, 
the payment method to target shareholders can be used to minimise the risk of adverse 
selection (Hansen 1987). Another argument suggests that acquiring managers have a 
better insight on the valuation of their own company and choose the payment method in 
a merger accordingly. Similar to Myers and Majluf’s (1984) proposed pecking order 
theory, managers choose a stock payment if they consider their equity as overvalued and 
cash payments if they perceive their stock as currently undervalued. As a result, 
investors may infer a signal of the manager’s perception of their company’s current 
valuation from the payment method. 
The importance of the market for corporate control, as evidenced by its size, makes 
M&A an excellent setting in which to examine the research issues of this thesis. Figure 
1.1 shows the M&A activity in terms of the total value of completed deals over the last 
15 years. During boom periods, the total value of takeovers reaches over US$ 1,400 
billion in the United States (Panel A) and over US$ 1,000 billion in the European Union 
(Panel B). As Figure 1.1 further illustrates, these numbers are equivalent to over 10 per 
cent of the US and the EU domestic GDPs, respectively. Even in years with less 
activity, e.g. the recent financial crisis, the total value still accounts for roughly US$ 
400 billion in each region. Further, relatively large numbers of transactions per year 
indicate that M&A is a frequently observed corporate event. Over the past 15 years, 
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3,184 companies were, on average, acquired per year in the US. This number has never 
fallen below 2,197 deals and reached 5,150 deals during ‘hot’ merger markets. The EU, 
on average, saw 2,717 targets being taken over per year. 
Figure 1.1: Characteristics of the US and EU M&A Market 
The figures show the total annual values of completed transactions in the US (Panel A) and the EU (Panel B) from 1998 to 2012. 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom comprise the EU countries. The deal data is from SDC Platinum and GDP data from the World 
Bank. Deal values and GDP data are in US$ at current prices. Deals of at least US$ 1 million are considered. 
Panel A: Annual Total Deal Values in the US 
Number of Transactions per Year: 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
5,150 4,482 4,437 2,961 2,728 2,812 2,888 3,267 3,520 3,585 2,713 2,197 2,273 2,427 2,313 
Panel B: Annual Total Deal Values in the EU 
Number of Transactions per Year: 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
3,283 3,546 3,824 2,658 2,274 2,484 2,602 3,037 3,224 3,435 2,557 1,725 2,176 2,128 1,800 
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This thesis investigates three research issues related to information, information 
asymmetry and the impact of sentiment within the context of M&A gains to 
bidding/acquiring companies:  
The first empirical study (Chapter 4) examines the gains to bidding companies prior 
to and after the adoption of IFRS to provide insights into the extent to which it achieved 
its aim of reducing information asymmetries. The adoption of IFRS in European Union 
represents the most significant regulatory accounting change within the European Union 
with the aim of contributing to the efficient and cost-effective functioning of the 
European capital markets (REGULATION (EC) No 1606/2002). Further, a consistent 
accounting standard is expected to improve the level of transparency amongst EU listed 
companies.  
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) analyses whether information relating to 
broad industry factors is of importance to M&A gains. From an M&A viewpoint, 
corporate managers have several options to react to the growth prospects of their 
industry. By means of the target’s industry, they can alter the business strategy by 
focusing or diversifying their main operations. Specifically, the study examines whether 
information relating to growth prospects of an industry is seen as important by 
investors. Using the gains to acquiring firms, the focus of this chapter is the analysis of 
the investors’ perception of information, as well as, their preferences on acquisition 
strategies based on the prevailing industry prospects.  
The final empirical study (Chapter 6) investigates whether investor sentiment has an 
effect on the gains to acquiring firms. A growing body of behavioural finance literature 
suggests that investor sentiment has a significant impact in several areas of finance. The 
monthly sentiment change index by Baker and Wurgler (2007) is used to identify the 
existence and magnitude of the impact from investor sentiment on the gains during 
M&A announcements. By examining these three research issues through the vehicle of 
Chapter 1: Introduction 6 
  
M&A gains, the thesis will provide important insights into the understanding of 
information and sentiment, as well as, M&A. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the 
research topics and identifies the contributions of the thesis. Section 1.3 outlines the 
structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Research Questions and Contributions 
By investigating the gains around M&A announcements, the thesis contributes to the 
existing body of work that examines information asymmetry and M&A. Additionally, 
the findings in this thesis also add to accounting, industry life cycle and sentiment 
literature. The research issues and main contributions of each empirical chapter are 
summarised below: 
1.2.1 Has the Adoption of IFRS had an Impact on the Bidders’ 
Gains? 
The first empirical study in Chapter 4 examines the effect of the adoption of IFRS on 
the shareholder’s wealth of European bidders. Prior to 2005, there was a range of 
national accounting standards, as well as, for some countries, a variety of possible 
interpretations. This was considered by some as a barrier to create a truly integrated 
European financial market (EC, COM 95 (508)). For this reason, all companies listed at 
a stock exchange within the European Union were required to report their financial 
statements using IFRS from the beginning of the financial year of 2005. The decision to 
undertake a policy of accounting harmonisation implies that the European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union believed that market participants struggled in 
inferring the information content in financial accounts of foreign companies. By 
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introducing common accounting standards, information asymmetries were expected to 
decrease amongst European companies and enrich the financial information 
environment in the European Union. If this is indeed the case, then the change would be 
expected to promote greater competition in the M&A market, as the valuation of 
potential targets will be improved. Specifically, if different accounting standards across 
countries create a barrier to investors in different countries, then the harmonisation 
should lead to a situation where bidders are more likely to engage bidding in for, and 
the acquisition of, targets in foreign countries.  
To examine whether information asymmetries have reduced as a result of the change, 
the returns to bidding companies from 15 European countries for the periods before and 
after the harmonisation are analysed, using data from 1989 to 2011. The results suggest 
that the adoption of IFRS had a marginal effect on the overall gains. However, evidence 
of improved transparency is found in deals that are likely to exhibit a high level of 
information asymmetries. The results indicate that the adoption of IFRS has indeed 
decreased information asymmetries of foreign targets. In addition, the findings further 
suggest a reduction in information asymmetries based on the payment method, which 
can be used to manage and spread risk between existing and target shareholders. A 
lower likelihood of stock payments after the adoption of IFRS also suggests increased 
transparency and lower perceived risks associated with the takeover.  
The findings imply that IFRS has improved transparency in potentially high 
information asymmetry deals and based on these results, the regulators’ aim to create an 
integrated European financial market has made a step forward by promoting greater 
corporate transparency across the European Union. 
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1.2.2 Do Investors consider Information on Industry Prospects 
in M&A? 
The next empirical chapter analyses whether only firm-specific characteristics are 
relevant to M&A returns, or whether information relating to broad industry factors is of 
importance to M&A gains. To be more specific, company managers have several 
options from a M&A perspective to respond to the growth prospects of their industry. 
Corporate diversification may serve as a mean to alter a firm’s business strategy. By 
focusing or diversifying the business activity, acquiring managers can alter the impact 
of the industry performance on the company’s growth rate. By investigating the gains to 
acquiring firms, this chapter intends to provide new insights into whether information 
relating to the growth prospects of an industry is seen as important by investors. The 
investors’ perception of information on an industry level, as well as, their preferences 
on acquisition strategies based on the prevailing industry prospects is analysed.  
For this purpose, Chapter 5 examines the investors’ perception and its impact of 
industry prospects on the gains to US acquirers over a period from 1980 to 2011. An 
examination at an industry-level allows for industry life cycles to be controlled for. 
Using quarterly industry P/E medians and adapting a technical trading technique to 
detect trends, the results suggest that acquirers operating in industries with positive 
industry prospects earn significantly higher returns compared to acquirers with negative 
industry prospects. Considering the industry relation between the acquirer and target, 
the results indicate that the gains in focused deals still exhibit the effect of industry 
prospects, whereas the impact in diversifying deals disappears. The findings suggest 
that with the acquisition of an industry-related target, the acquirer emphasises the 
strategic orientation of the combined company to the core business activity. Therefore, 
the influence of the industry’s overall growth rate on the company’s prospects remains 
unchanged after the merger. On the contrary, the acquirer lowers the influence of its 
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own industry growth rate and diversifies the company’s overall growth rate by merging 
with an industry-unrelated target. The results based on the relative target size and the 
mode of payment confirms this effect.  
Proponents of the efficient market hypothesis claim that corporate diversification 
should not add any value as individual investors can replicate such behaviour in their 
own portfolios. The findings, however, imply that corporate managers can create wealth 
for their shareholders by diversifying their business activities. Some evidence for a 
behavioural bias regarding the information content is also found in this study. The 
perception of focused and diversifying deals within different industry prospects is not 
consistent. Investors seem to have no particular preference on focused or diversifying 
deals in growing industries, as both deal types yield similar results. However, investors 
prefer diversifying acquisitions over focused deals in declining industries. As a whole, 
the findings show that investors consider information on broader industry factors, such 
as the growth prospects of an industry, as well as, the acquired growth opportunities in 
M&A deals and suggest behavioural biases are evident. 
1.2.3 Does Investor Sentiment influence Acquirers’ Gains? 
The final empirical examines the question whether M&A gains are generally influenced 
by sentiment. A considerable amount of theoretical and empirical studies challenge the 
neoclassical finance theory of an efficient market and advocates a behavioural influence 
on market participants. Together with the theory on limited arbitrage, investor sentiment 
builds the foundation of behavioural finance theory, and without investor sentiment, 
there would be no disturbances to efficient prices (Shleifer 2000b). A growing body of 
literature links investor sentiment6 to trading activity and trading behaviour, such as 
                                                                                                              
6 In the literature, investor sentiment has been seen as consisting of both a rational and irrational component (see, e.g. Verma and 
Soydemir (2006)). However, as it relates to this research, investor sentiment is typically seen as irrational behaviour within the 
efficient markets context. In the rest of the thesis, the term will be used in this way, unless explicitly stated. 
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momentum trading (e.g. Chau et al. 2011) or herding activity (e.g. Blasco et al. 2012). 
Investor sentiment has been found to also exist in several corporate finance areas, for 
instance in IPOs (e.g. Brown and Cliff 2004) and dividend premiums (e.g. Baker and 
Wurgler 2006) or closed-end fund discounts (e.g. Gemmill and Thomas 2002) and 
mutual fund flows (e.g. Frazzini and Lamont 2008). The significance of this study rests 
on the assumption that in an efficient market, short-term abnormal returns serve as an 
indicator of the future financial outcome of the takeover. A significant impact of 
investor sentiment on the short-term wealth effects would imply that these are not only 
a reflection of newly available information from the merger, but also that irrational 
behaviour influences M&A gains.  
Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) monthly investor sentiment change index serves to 
investigate the presence and impact of investor sentiment on M&A gains. In a sample 
from 1980 to 2010, the results suggest that investor sentiment has a statistically and 
economically significant effect on the returns to US acquirers. The overall gains are 
significantly higher during positive sentiment changes compared to negative sentiment 
changes. Additional tests on the mode of payment, target listing status, acquirer’s size 
and over/undervalued acquirers indicate that irrational investors react to information 
asymmetries and valuation signals differently depending on the sentiment in the market. 
The results imply that markets are not always subject to rational behaviour. Investor 
sentiment can significantly influence prices and the results of this study confirm 
evidence found in sentiment research that irrational investors’ sensitivity to information 
asymmetries and valuation signals varies during periods of increasing/decreasing 
sentiment.  
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. The next two chapters provide 
background information relevant to the empirical work in this thesis. While Chapter 2 
outlines the relevance of the M&A market and highlights trends and features of M&A, 
Chapter 3 provides a literature review on the methodology, M&A factors and relevant 
literature on each empirical chapter. The empirical work begins with Chapter 4 titled 
‘Information Asymmetries and the Impact of IFRS on Bidders’ Gains’ which 
investigates the expected transparency improvement by the adoption of IFRS in the 
European Union. This is followed by Chapter 5 ‘Industry Prospects and the Impact on 
Acquirers’ Gains’ in which the investors’ perception of information based on the 
acquirer’s industry prospects and their acquisition strategies is examined. The third 
empirical study in Chapter 6 titled ‘Investor Sentiment and the Impact on Acquirers’ 
Gains’ analyses the impact and the extent to what investor sentiment influences the 
gains to acquirers. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the findings and 
their implications, as well as, suggestions for future research. 
 
 
12 
2. Institutional Background of M&A 
This chapter presents background information and an overview on recent trends and 
features of M&A. Due to the focus of the empirical studies on M&A in the European 
Union7 in Chapter 4 and in the United States in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, this chapter 
therefore concentrates on these markets. 
2.1 Relevance of the EU and US M&A Markets  
Figure 2.1 presents the EU and US M&A markets in relation to the global M&A 
activity in terms of annual total deal values over the past 20 years. M&A literature 
suggests that merger activity occurs in waves over time and the graph confirms that the 
global market experienced two significant peaks over this period. The global market 
reached US$ 3,211 billion in 2000 and US$ 3,801 billion in 2007.  
Owen (2006) refers to these two waves as the 5th and 6th merger wave and states that 
each merger wave has distinguishing features. For example, cross-border and mega-
deals distinguished the 5th merger wave during the late 1990. The 6th merger wave 
during the mid-2000s was dominated by globalisation and private equity. Moreover, the 
end of these merger waves coincides with the stock market crash in 2001 and the recent 
financial crises period. 
                                                                                                              
7 The examined countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 2.1: Global M&A Activity 
This figure shows the global and regional activity in terms of deal values from 1993 to 2012. The deal data is from SDC Platinum. 
The minimum deal value is US$ 1 million. 
 
Figure 2.1 also shows the activity of EU and US acquirers and their proportion of the 
global M&A market. The figure indicates that US acquirers contributed roughly 
between 30 and 60 per cent per year to the global takeover market over the past 20 years 
and usually acquired in total more than EU acquirers. The market share of EU acquirers 
was between 20 and 40 per cent per year over same time period. Moreover, the EU 
market slightly lagged behind the US market during increasing merger activity periods, 
but closed the gap at the peak of each merger wave. The graphs demonstrate, by its size 
and proportion of the global M&A market, the economic relevance of the examined EU 
and US markets in this thesis. 
More detailed information on the deal size and frequency of the EU and US markets 
is provided in Figure 2.2. Both markets exhibit similar patterns in size and activity. As 
indicated in the previous figure, the US market was bigger and more active over the past 
20 years. The US market saw as much as US$ 1,501 billion worth of takeovers in 2001 
and as little as US$ 242 billion in 1993. The annual total market value was US$ 863 
billion. In the European Union, the most active year was in 1999 with US$ 1,330 billion, 
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whereas the least active year was in 1994 with US$ 167 billion. The total deal values 
were on average US$ 602 billion per year during the period from 1993 to 2012. 
Figure 2.2: EU and US M&A Market 
This figure shows the M&A activity based on deal values and number of announced transactions in the US and the EU (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom) from 1993 to 2012. The deal data is from SDC Platinum. The minimum deal value is US$ 1 million. 
 
On average 3,422 deals per year were observed in the US, with a maximum of 5,401 
deals in 1998 and a minimum of 2,183 deals in 2008. In the European Union, on 
average 2,667 deals per year took place over the last 20 years. The highest number of 
deals was observed in 2000 with 4,351 deals and the lowest in 1993 with 1,604 deals. 
The graphs again indicate that the EU market lagged behind the US market. 
Interestingly, the deal frequency of the US market had already slowed down during each 
merger wave, whilst the EU market was still increasing until the number of deals 
reached similar levels in both markets. 
Some M&A announcements make headlines due to the size of the deals. Table 2.1 
presents the 15 largest takeovers by EU (Panel A) and US acquirers (Panel B) over the 
past 20 years. Surprisingly, the largest deal took place not in the US, but in the EU in 
1999 with the takeover of the German Mannesmann AG by the British Vodafone PLC 
for US$ 202.79 billion. The largest US deal was the takeover of Time Warner by 
America Online Inc for US$ 164 billion in 2000. Another noticeable feature of these 
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mega-deals is that 9 of 15 mergers (60 per cent) in the EU and 8 of 15 mergers (53 per 
cent) in the US took place until 2000, which is in line with Owen’s (2006) description 
of the 5th merger wave. Distinctively, the top 15 US acquisitions are exclusively US 
domestic deals, whereas the proportion of cross-border deals in the EU is about half. 
UK acquirers and targets were most involved among the EU deals.  
Table 2.1: Largest Takeovers by EU and US Acquirers 
This table shows the largest takeovers by EU and US acquirers between 1993 and 2012. The deal data is from SDC Platinum. The 
minimum deal value is US$ 1 million. 
Panel A: EU Market 
 Acquirer  Target  Deal Value 
Year Name Nation  Name Nation  (US$ bill.) 
1999 Vodafone AirTouch PLC UK  Mannesmann AG WG  202.79 
2007 RFS Holdings BV NT  ABN-AMRO Holding NV NT  98.19 
2000 Glaxo Wellcome PLC UK  SmithKline Beecham PLC UK  75.96 
2004 Royal Dutch Petroleum Co NT  Shell Transport & Trading Co UK  74.56 
2006 Gaz de France SA FR  Suez SA FR  60.86 
1999 Vodafone Group PLC UK  AirTouch Communications Inc US  60.29 
2004 Sanofi-Synthelabo SA FR  Aventis SA FR  60.24 
2008 InBev NV BL  Anheuser-Busch Cos Inc US  52.18 
1999 Total Fina SA FR  Elf Aquitaine FR  50.07 
1998 British Petroleum Co PLC UK  Amoco Corp US  48.17 
2000 France Telecom SA FR  Orange PLC UK  45.97 
2009 HM Treasury UK  Royal Bank of Scotland Group UK  41.88 
1998 Daimler-Benz AG WG  Chrysler Corp US  40.47 
2000 Vivendi SA FR  Seagram Co Ltd CA  40.43 
1999 Royal Bank of Scotland Group UK  National Westminster Bank PLC UK  38.41 
Panel B: US Market 
 Acquirer  Target  Deal Value 
Year Name Nation  Name Nation  (US$ bill.) 
2000 America Online Inc US  Time Warner US  164.75 
1999 Pfizer Inc US  Warner-Lambert Co US  89.17 
1998 Exxon Corp US  Mobil Corp US  78.95 
2006 AT&T Inc US  BellSouth Corp US  72.67 
1998 Travelers Group Inc US  Citicorp US  72.56 
2001 Comcast Corp US  AT&T Broadband & Internet Svcs US  72.04 
2009 Pfizer Inc US  Wyeth US  67.29 
1998 SBC Communications Inc US  Ameritech Corp US  62.59 
1998 NationsBank Corp, Charlotte, NC US  BankAmerica Corp US  61.63 
2002 Pfizer Inc US  Pharmacia Corp US  59.52 
2004 JPMorgan Chase & Co US  Bank One Corp, Chicago, IL US  58.66 
1999 Qwest Commun Intl Inc US  US WEST Inc US  56.31 
2011 Shareholders US  Abbott Laboratories-Research US  55.51 
2009 Vehicle Acq Holdings LLC US  General Motors-Cert Assets US  55.28 
2005 Procter & Gamble Co US  Gillette Co US  54.91 
 
The presented graphs and figures in this section underpin the economic relevance of 
M&A, as well as, the chosen markets in terms of deal values and deal frequencies. The 
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EU and US markets contribute a significant proportion to the global M&A activity. 
These features demonstrate that the EU and US serve as ideal markets to carry out the 
proposed studies. 
2.2 M&A Features and Trends 
In this section, key M&A features from the European Union and the United States are 
highlighted. Due to technical reasons, some of these features are often neglected in 
M&A research. A lenient sample selection should provide information, which is usually 
not provided by standard M&A studies. 
2.2.1 Cross-Border Activity 
As pointed out in the previous section, EU acquirers engaged more in international 
acquisitions than US counterparts. Figure 2.3 for the EU and Figure 2.4 for the US 
provide further information on the cross-border activity in terms of deal values and deal 
frequencies. Figure 2.3 indicates that EU companies acquired more domestic than 
foreign firms. Domestic and foreign target deals on average totalled US$ 325 billion 
and US$ 276 billion per year, respectively. The highest annual total of domestic 
acquisitions was observed in 2008 with US$ 678.9 billion and the lowest in 1994 with 
US$ 111.4 billion. In 1999 and 2000, however, cross-border deals exceeded domestic 
counterparts with annual total values of US$ 741 billion and US$ 667 billion by roughly 
US$ 150 billion in each of these two years. 
The deal frequency also suggests higher domestic merger activity of EU acquirers. 
The average number of deals per year is consistently higher with 1,680 domestic deals 
and 987 cross-border deals. Domestic and cross-border reached their peak in 2000 with 
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2,520 and 1,830 deals, respectively. The lowest numbers were measured in 2012 with 
1,130 domestic deals and in 1993 with 465 cross-border deals. 
Figure 2.3 Cross-Border Activity of the EU Market 
This figure shows the cross-border M&A activity based on deal values and number of announced transactions in the EU (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom) from 1993 to 2012. The deal data is from SDC Platinum. The minimum deal value is US$ 1 million. 
 
The graphs in Figure 2.4 show that US acquirers engage substantially more in 
domestic than international deals. On average, 2,881 domestic deals were observed with 
an annual total value of US$ 761 billion per year. Targets on average had a foreign 
domicile in 540 deals, summing up to an average of US$ 103 billion per year. Domestic 
deals reached the highest annual total value with US$ 1,373 billion in 2000 compared to 
US$ 236 billion for cross-border deals in 2007. The latter figure is close to the lowest 
annual total of domestic deals measured in 1993 with US$ 224 billion. The lowest total 
value of cross-border deals was during the same year with US$ 18 billion.  
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Figure 2.4: Cross-Border Activity of the US Market 
This figure shows the cross-border M&A activity based on deal values and number of announced transactions in the US from 1993 
to 2012. The deal data is from SDC Platinum. The minimum deal value is US$ 1 million. 
 
The reason for this large difference in cross-border activity between the EU and US 
acquirers may lie in the geographical size of EU member countries. EU companies may 
simply be forced to internationally diversify in order to expand their businesses. 
2.2.2 Acquirer Listing Status 
M&A research using event study methodology to measure the short-term performance 
relies on share price data. Therefore, one of the selection criteria in these studies often 
requires that the examined companies are listed at a stock exchange. Figure 2.5 for the 
EU and Figure 2.6 for the US present the overall listing status of acquirers over the past 
20 years.  
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Figure 2.5: Acquirer Listing Status in the EU M&A Market 
This figure shows the acquirer listing status in the EU (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) from 1993 to 2012. The deal data is from 
SDC Platinum. The minimum deal value is US$ 1 million. 
Panel A: Deal Values 
 
Panel B: Number of Deals 
 
 
In both markets, listed acquirers were the driving force in terms of the total deal 
values (Panel A) and deal frequency (Panel B). The average annual deal value by listed 
companies was US$ 343.3 billion in the EU and US$ 576.4 billion in the US. On 
average, 1,270 deals per year were observed in the EU compared to 2,093 deals in the 
US. 
Private acquirers represent the second largest group. Their share, however, was 
significantly smaller. Private firms from the EU acquired on average US$ 144 billion in 
takeovers per year and engaged on average in 811 deals per year. In the US, private 
acquirers on average purchased targets for roughly US$ 184.0 billion in about 788 deals 
per year. 
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Figure 2.6: Acquirer Listing Status in the US M&A Market 
This figure shows the acquirer listing status in the US from 1993 to 2012. The deal data is from SDC Platinum. The minimum deal 
value is US$ 1 million. 
Panel A: Deal Values 
Panel B: Number of Deals 
 
Subsidiaries were the third largest acquirer type. In the EU and the US, they annually 
purchased on average companies for US$ 91.2 billion and US$ 89.3 billion, respectively. 
The M&A activity of subsidiaries in terms of deal frequency was on average 526 deals 
in the EU and 486 deals in the US per year. The share of the remaining acquirer types 
was marginal regarding total deal values and deal frequency.  
2.2.3 Target Listing Status 
A prominent feature in M&A research is the listing status of targets. Panel A of Figure 
2.7 shows that public targets are the largest groups in terms of deal values in the EU. 
The value of acquired listed targets was on average US$ 312 billion per year. The 
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maximum of US$ 935.5 billion was reached in 1999. The smallest annual total value of 
US$ 59.9 billion was observed in 1994. The graph suggests that the deal values were 
sensitive to the overall stock market. After the stock market crash in 2001 and the recent 
financial crises period, the total deal values plummeted to the level of private company 
targets. The average annual total value of private companies was by US$ 65.2 billion 
substantially smaller. The maximum of acquired private targets of US$ 125.08 billion 
was measured in 2007 and the minimum in 1993 in with US$ 17.7 billion. Interestingly, 
the deal frequencies suggest that private companies and subsidiary takeovers were much 
more targeted (Panel B). On average 1,048 private targets were taken over per year 
compared to 489 public targets. 
Figure 2.7: Target Listing Status in the EU M&A Market 
This figure shows the target listing status in the EU (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) from 1993 to 2012. The deal data is from SDC 
Platinum. The minimum deal value is US$ 1 million. 
Panel A: Deal Values 
Panel B: Number of Deals 
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The US data in Figure 2.8 (Panel A) suggests a similar pattern. In terms of total deal 
values, listed companies were the largest group of targets. The annual average was 
roughly US$ 488.6 billion. The highest annual total deal value was measured during the 
5th merger wave in 1998 with US$ 1,058.2 billion and the minimum of US$ 118.4 
billion in 1993. Similar to the EU, the total deal values of listed targets decreased to 
levels of private targets after the end of each merger wave. 
Figure 2.8: Target Listing Status in the US M&A Market 
This figure shows the acquirer listing status in the US from 1993 to 2012. The deal data is from SDC Platinum. The minimum deal 
value is US$ 1 million. 
Panel A: Deal Values 
Panel B: Number of Deals 
 
The figures show that listed targets contributed the largest proportion in terms of deal 
values. However, the numbers of deals indicate that private companies were most 
targeted (Panel B). The average number of private target takeovers was 1,376 per year 
compared to an average of 794 public target takeovers. The highest number of private 
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target acquisitions was recorded in 1998 with 2,291 deals and the lowest activity of 784 
deals was during the financial crises in 2009. The maximum of public target deals was 
two years earlier in 1996 with 1,428 observations. Ever since the annual number of 
listed target takeovers decreased to its minimum of 345 deals in 2012. Arguably to the 
similarity to private companies, subsidiaries are the second most purchased target type 
with an annual average of 1,194 deals. 
Due to the size, private companies and subsidiaries may be easier and faster to 
integrate. Moreover, acquirers may favour both types of targets because the lack of 
marketability may allow them to purchase subsidiaries and private companies at a 
discount. 
2.2.4 Method of Payment 
Another important feature of M&A is the mode of payment. Depending on the payment 
choice, it determines the actual price of the target and hence, the dollar gains from 
M&A. Figure 2.9 shows the annual distribution of the payment method in the EU (Panel 
A) and US deals (Panel B).  
Cash payments in EU M&A were used between 30 to 40 per cent over the past 20 
years. Cash offers ranged at similar levels in US M&A. The use of mixed (~15 to 20 per 
cent) and ‘other’ payments (~5 per cent) were also relatively similar in both markets. 
Other payments include special arrangements, such as earn-outs. Stock payments were 
more popular in the US with about 20 per cent than in the EU with a 5 per cent share 
until 2000. Post 2000, stock payments tended to be only marginally more preferred in 
the US. Most striking is the proportion of deals with unknown payments. In the EU, 
deals with undisclosed payments ranged between 35 and 50 per cent. The payment 
method was not made public in the US between for roughly 30 to 40 per cent. A reason 
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might be that more companies are unlisted in the EU and no requirement to disclose 
deal information exists. 
Figure 2.9: Payment Methods in the EU and US Markets 
This figure shows the payment methods in the EU (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and the US from 1993 to 2012. The deal data is 
from SDC Platinum. The minimum deal value is US$ 1 million. 
Panel A: EU Market 
Panel B: US Market 
 
2.2.5 Corporate Diversification 
The industry relation between the acquirer and target determines the source of synergies 
and time period to realise these. The gains from industry-unrelated acquisitions are 
considered to primarily involve financial synergies, whereas wealth in industry-related 
deals is created by production or cost synergies. Figure 2.10 shows the EU (Panel A) 
and US (Panel B) M&A activity in terms of focused and diversifying deals. 
The number of diversifying deals was consistently higher than focused deals in the 
EU over the last 20 years, ranging from 218 deals in 2001 to 491 deals in 2007. The 
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annual total values of diversifying and focused deals are relatively similar, except in 
1999 when focused deals exceeded diversifying deals by US$ 436.67 billion. As a 
whole, the deal activity of these deal types exhibits the merger wave patterns as earlier 
discussed. 
Figure 2.10: Corporate Diversification in the EU and US 
This figure shows the payment methods in the EU (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and the US from 1993 to 2012. The deal data is 
from SDC Platinum. The minimum deal value is US$ 1 million. 
Panel A: EU Market 
Panel B: US Market 
 
The US data suggests that there were a slightly higher number of focused deals until 
2000. Over the next five years, the deal frequencies suggest almost identical numbers of 
focused and diversifying deals and from 2005, the diversifying deal type was observed 
more often. The graphs suggest that during increasing activity, larger focused deals took 
place. Similar to the EU, however more pronounced, focused deals were most dominant 
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in 1998 and 1999 with US$ 507.4 billion and US$ 455.6 billion, but also in 2001 and 
2004 with US$ 259.6 billion and US$ 250.2 billion. 
2.2.6 The Financial Crisis 
The presented figures illustrate that the financial crises had not only an effect on the 
overall economy and stock market, but also on the M&A market. Both, deal values and 
activity have substantially dropped since 2007. The market disturbance may also have 
an impact on M&A research. It is easily conceivable that the financial crises may had a 
significant effect on the negotiation process and hence, the realised acquisition prices. 
Due to the turmoil in the market, investors might have reacted differently to corporate 
announcements. A shift in the sentiment of investors, which is also the focus of the third 
empirical study in this thesis, is expected to impact the abnormal returns from M&A 
announcements. 
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3. Literature Review 
This literature review consists of three main parts: (i) The first section provides an 
overview on the literature and theoretical background of the event study methodology, 
the underlying technique in all three empirical chapters to estimate the gains from 
M&A. The following two sections summarise (ii) empirical evidence on factors that 
have been found to impact the gains from M&A and (iii) literature related to the 
research areas of each empirical chapter. 
3.1 Event Study Methodology 
Since the seminal papers by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) 8, event 
studies have become an important technique in modern finance research in examining 
corporate decisions. To highlight the extent and the relevance of this methodology, 
Kothari and Warner (2007) found over 500 event studies in a census of five leading 
academic journals.9 Applied to M&A, this method evaluates the performance according 
to the stock price reaction on its announcement. 
3.1.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns - The Model 
If an unanticipated event occurs, the abnormal stock price reaction is the reflection of 
the event’s impact on the wealth of the firm’s shareholders (Brown and Warner, 1980). 
For a firm i and the time period t, the actual return Ri,t of the firm for a time period 
relative to the event date is: 
                                                                                                              
8 Corrado (2011) reports Dolley (1933), Myers and Bakay (1948), Barker (1956, 1957, 1958) and Ashley (1962 ) as even earlier 
published event study papers. 
9 The Journal of Business, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis and 
the Review of Financial Studies 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 28 
  
Ri,t = Ki,t + ei,t (3.1) 
where Ri,t is the actual return of stock i at day t, Ki,t is the expected return of stock i at 
day t and ei,t is the unexpected return of stock i at day t. 
The formulation of the actual return Ri,t in (3.2) allows to rewrite the unexpected or 
abnormal return ei,t as the difference between actual return Ri,t and the expected or 
predicted return Ki,t: 
ei,t = Ai,t = Ri,t –Ki,t (3.2) 
Before measuring the abnormal return ei,t, a model is required to estimate the expected 
return Ki,t. Researchers have developed a wide variety of models 10  with several 
derivations to estimate the expected returns. A market-adjusted return model as stated in 
Brown and Warner (1985) is followed to measure the wealth effects to the bidding 
firms. The abnormal returns are calculated by using a market-adjusted return model 
(3.3) without estimation period: 
Ai,t = Ri,t – Rm,t (3.3) 
where Ai,t is the abnormal return of stock i at day t, Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at 
day t and Rm,t is the rate of return on the corresponding market index of stock i for day t. 
Since several companies have multiple bids within a short time period, a market 
parameter based on an estimation period as in a market model approach has not been 
calculated. Frequent merger announcements might affect the estimation period, hence 
making beta coefficient estimations less effective. Moreover, Brown and Warner (1980) 
show that for short event window studies, beta adjusted estimation models do not 
significantly improve the quality of the abnormal returns. Several studies, such as Fuller 
et al. (2002), Faccio et al. (2006), Draper and Paudyal (2008) and Ekkayokkaya et al. 
                                                                                                              
10 See, for example, Campbell et al. (1997) or Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) 
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(2009b), apply the same market-adjusted return model for similar reasons. Specifically, 
the value-weighted domestic Datastream market index of the corresponding EU country 
where the bidder is listed assists as proxies for the market index in Chapter 4. In 
Chapter 5 and 6, the value-weighted CRSP index is used for the US samples. 
The average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) (3.4) surrounding 5-days (-2, +2)11 
of the announcement date is estimated as: 
 =


	 ,

  (3.4) 
where  is the average (cumulative) abnormal return over the multi-day interval t, Ai,t 
is the abnormal return of stock i at day t and Nt is the number of sample stocks whose 
abnormal returns are available at the multi-day interval t. 
To minimise the bias of outliers on the results and potentially wrong conclusions 
about the validity of the hypotheses, the cumulative abnormal returns are trimmed 
(removed) at cut-off points of 1 and 99 per cent. 
3.1.2 Statistical Significance 
Tests of statistical significance are assessed for each day within the event period and 
each multi-day interval. The test statistic (3.5) for any event day/window t is: 
 = 	 /
	̅
	
 (3.5) 
where  is the average (cumulative) abnormal return over the event period t, ̅	 is 
the standard deviation is estimated from the time-series of mean abnormal returns, 
 is 
the number of sample stocks whose abnormal returns are available at event period t. 
The test statistic is the ratio of the mean abnormal return to its standard error. The 
                                                                                                              
11 CARs surrounding 3-days (-1, +1) and 11-days (-5, +5) of the announcement date are also calculated and differences footnoted if 
appropriate. The full set of results is presented in the Appendices.  
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standard error is calculated from the standard deviation of the time-series of mean 
abnormal returns to the square root of the number of companies in the sample less one. 
The null hypothesis is that the mean abnormal return is not different from zero. If the 
announcements have a significant impact on the returns of companies in the sample the 
null hypothesis is rejected. 
3.2 M&A Factors and the Impact on Acquirers’ Gains 
3.2.1 Introduction 
In the context of this thesis, it is important to comprehend the empirical evidence that 
M&A research has yielded over the past years. The development of the event study 
framework enabled researchers to explore more closely the wealth effects from M&A. 
Empirical papers uniformly confirm that target shareholders experience positive gains 
around merger announcements (e.g. Wansley et al. 1983; Bradley et al. 1988; Harris and 
Ravenscraft 1991; Bargeron et al. 2008). On the other hand, the literature also suggests 
that the gains to acquiring companies are not clear-cut and are dependent on many 
factors. For this reason, an overview of M&A literature highlights factors which have 
been found to have a significant effect on the short-term gains to acquiring companies. 
3.2.2 Firm Size Effect 
The literature offers several arguments why the target size should have an impact on the 
M&A performance. Roll (1986), for example, argues that larger targets might lead to a 
better post-merger performance as they tend to be more difficult to integrate into the 
acquirer’s business. As a result of lower competition by rival companies during the 
bidding process, acquiring companies may purchase larger targets at a lower a price. 
Consequently, larger targets should lead to higher synergy gains. Jarrell and Poulsen 
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(1989) find evidence in a regression analysis that larger targets indeed lead to higher 
returns to acquirers.  
Simiarly, Asquith et al. (1983) find that the acquirer’s returns are positively related to 
the relative size of the target. Regression analysis reveals a statistically significant 
positive relationship between the returns to bidding companies and the ratio of target’s 
and bidder’s equity. For example, if the target is half the size of the bidder, the 
aggregated abnormal return is 1.8 per cent higher than compared to a ratio in which the 
target is only a tenth of the bidder. 
Fuller et al. (2002) investigate on how deal type characteristics, such as firm size, 
target listing status or mode of payment, affect the gains to bidding companies. Overall, 
they also find a positive relationship between the relative size of the target and the 
acquirer’s returns. However, the picture changes when they control for the target’s 
listing status. The positive relationship between the acquirer’s returns and the relative 
size of private target and subsidiary takeovers remains, however, the relationship is 
negative if the target is listed. They argue that the lack of marketability of private targets 
might be the reason and the target size enhances this effect. The lack of an impartial 
benchmark impedes the valuation and sale of private target. This situation might 
strengthen the bidder’s negotiation power and they may be able to purchase a private 
target at a discount.  
Empirical evidence suggests that the acquirer’s firm size of the acquirer has also an 
impact on the gains. Moeller et al. (2004) find that the absolute size of acquirer is 
correlated to the acquirer’s gains. They show that small acquirers gain significantly 
more than large firms. Further investigation on the economic significance of their 
results suggests that large acquirers pay higher premiums, which might be driven by 
managerial hubris (Roll 1986). 
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3.2.3 Target Listing Status 
As mentioned, the target listing status has been found to alter the gains from M&A 
announcements. In Fuller et al. (2002), they also focus on this feature. The results show 
that bidders experience negative wealth effects when they opt for listed targets, but gain 
when the target is privately-held or is a subsidiary. Moreover, they find that the 
acquisition of a public target with cash or a combination of cash and stocks generates 
insignificant returns but significant negative returns when only stocks are offered. On 
the other hand, the payment method has no significant effect in private target or 
subsidiary takeovers. 
Chang (1998) suggests that the creation of new blockholders causes the difference in 
returns to acquirers based on the target listing status. An event study shows that 
acquirers break even with cash offers for public and private targets. However, the 
results for stock payments are quite differential. Firms offering stocks to shareholders of 
privately-held targets experience positive abnormal returns, whereas the same payment 
method to public targets leads to a negative stock price reaction. Both results are highly 
significant. Further investigation on stock offers lends support that privately-held 
companies are often owned by a small number of shareholders and as a result, stock 
payments create new outside blockholders. These new influential shareholders may 
serve as an effective way to monitor the management’s performance. 
Ang and Kohers (2001) concentrate on the gains to bidders and the premiums paid 
for private targets. Their results show that acquirers of private targets generate positive 
returns, irrespective of the mode of payment. On the other hand, an acquisition of a 
public target with stocks leads to a significant loss. Cash and mixed payments have 
small and statistically insignificant wealth effects. Ang and Kohers (2001) argue that 
acquirers benefit from the purchase of private targets due to differences in the 
negotiation process. Negotiations with listed targets are often made public and an offer 
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might induce managers of rival companies to enter into a bidding competition. In 
contrast to listed targets, the probability of a hubris-driven acquisition might therefore 
be lower for a private target. Further, the acquisition of a private target might also 
minimise another agency aspect. Private targets are usually smaller than their listed 
counterparts. Hence, the likelihood of empire building motives involved in the 
acquisition of private targets should substantially be smaller.  
Empirical evidence from outside the US is similar. Draper and Paudyal (2006), for 
example, investigate the effects of the target listing status on the shareholders’ wealth of 
bidding firm in the UK. Overall, they find that bidders gain more if they intend to buy a 
private firm than compared to a listed company. Draper and Paudyal (2006) also find 
evidence that gains to bidders of listed and unlisted targets are also dependent on the 
mode of payment. Cash offers to a listed target generate small insignificant losses, 
whereas offers with stocks lead to significant losses. Stock offers to private targets, on 
the other hand, lead to significant positive returns, lending support for the corporate 
monitoring hypothesis on a positive effect from the creation of new blockholders. 
Faccio et al. (2006) investigate the returns to acquirers based on the target listing 
status in 17 Western countries. They also find similar wealth gain effects to acquirers. 
On average, listed targets lead to statistically insignificant losses and acquirers of 
private target experience significant positive returns. The listing effect is persistent over 
time and by the origin of the acquirer.  
3.2.4 Mode of Payment 
Once more, the mode of payment has been anticipated as a potential factor to 
signifcantly moderate M&A gains. Travlos (1987) finds a significant difference in the 
returns to acquiring companies based on the mode of payment. His analysis shows that 
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firms offering stocks significantly lose, whereas deals with cash offers insignificantly 
gain on the announcement day. Further, the difference in returns of both payment 
methods is highly statistically significant. The negative and only significant stock 
payment coefficient in a regression analysis supports the signalling hypothesis, which 
predicts that the payment method signals the acquiring management’s perception of 
their firm’s current valuation. As managers have an informational advantage of the 
firm’s value, they will choose the payment method accordingly, i.e. if they consider 
their firm’s stocks as currently overvalued, they will prefer a stock payment. However, 
if they consider their stocks as currently undervalued, they will opt for a cash payment. 
Similarly, Wansley et al. (1987) find insignificant returns to acquirers with stock 
offers and statistically significant positive returns to acquirers offering cash. Their 
results are robust to several event windows. Overall, these results also support the 
signalling hypotheses of the payment method.  
Draper and Paudyal (1999) find that these results hold for UK mergers. An offer 
proposing a stock exchange or a mix of shares and cash generates significant negative 
abnormal returns. Cash offers have hardly any effect on the shareholders’ wealth of the 
bidding company. 
3.2.5 Corporate and Geographical Diversification 
There is an ongoing debate on whether corporate diversification benefits shareholders12 
and the evidence contibuted by M&A research to this discussion is mixed, as well. 
Doukas et al. (2002) document a wealth destroying effect from diversifying M&A deals 
in Sweden. They find that acquirers in focused deals gain whilst diversifying deals lead 
to losses. Their findings also suggest a deterioration of cash flows and the return on 
                                                                                                              
12 See, for example, Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) (Extended portfolio theory), Lewellen (1971) (Coinsurance effect), Williamson 
(1970) (Internal capital market) and Baumol (1967) (Regulation) for supportive literature. For opposing arguments see, e.g., Jensen 
(1986a,b) (Agency theory) and Stein (1997) (Managerial capabilities). 
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assets. They argue that corporate diversification is not a value increasing decision as 
agency costs overrule the benefits of an internal capital market. On the other hand, there 
is research that indicates corporate diversification as a wealth creating strategy. DeLong 
(2001) examines US mergers in which at least one of the participants is a bank. He 
controls for the industrial, as well as, geographic relation between both merger parties. 
He finds that bidders on average lose in focused deals and gain in diversifying deals. 
Examination of the geographic scope shows that mergers with a geographical 
diversification and focus lead to negative wealth effects.  
Some studies suggest that a change in the perception of diversifying M&A deals over 
time. Matsusaka (1993) examines the wealth effects of diversifying mergers during and 
after the conglomerate wave in the late 1960s. They find evidence that the stock market 
reacted positively to announcements of diversifying deals during this period, whereas 
the acquisition of a related target was considered as empire building by investors. 
Matsusaka (1993) argues that conglomerates were considered as a financial innovation 
at that time. A set of different business lines served as a valuable substitute for the 
slowly emerging capital market. 
Hubbard and Palia (1999) find further evidence that the substitution of an external 
capital market by an internal capital market was beneficial in the 1960s. They argue that 
the returns found for conglomerate mergers during these years can be linked to the state 
of the capital markets’ infrastructure. Investors appreciated conglomerates since 
external capital markets were not yet fully developed. 
Further evidence is provided by Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010). They study the 
evolutionary development of the stock price reactions to diversifying mergers. By 
means of several data sources, they construct a sample spanning from 1950 to 2006. 
The results indicate a change in returns over time and the overall stock price reactions 
were less harmful to shareholders of diversifying firms than in related mergers. Finally, 
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they find some evidence that support the internal capital market hypothesis, as well. 
A related research stream focuses on the wealth effects of geographical 
diversification. In Doukas and Travlos (1988), they investigate cross-border deals and 
find that if acquirers already operate in the target’s country, the gains are negative and 
statistically insignificant. However, if the acquirer expands to a new country, the gains 
are positive and statistically significant. Further, the results suggest that acquiring 
companies profit from geographical expansion if the host country is less related and 
developed relative to the US economy.  
For the UK, Conn et al. (2005) study the wealth effects to acquiring companies in 
cross-border deals. They find that domestic deals lead to higher returns than cross-
border acquisitions. The results also show that domestic public targets generate negative 
returns, whereas acquisitions of public foreign targets break even around the 
announcement. On the other hand, acquisitions of domestic and foreign private targets 
generate positive gains. The mode of payment has no significant effect. Overall, they 
suggest the results support the internalisation of assets by multinational companies. 
3.2.6 Information Asymmetries 
More recently, some researchers focus on the role of information asymmetries in M&A. 
Draper and Paudyal (2008) show that undervalued acquirers with high information 
asymmetries gain most from early bids and the gains decrease for subsequent bids.13 
They argue that the announcement returns to bidding companies contain information on 
the synergy gains, as well as, revaluation gains from newly available information. 
Officer et al. (2009) find that information symmetries on targets also affect the 
acquirer’s returns. They find evidence that targets with highly asymmetric information 
lead to higher gains to acquiring companies. This is most apparent in deals with stock 
                                                                                                              
13 Draper and Paudyal (2008) examine a sample of mergers from the UK. Fuller et al. (2002) find similar results for the US. 
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payments. They argue that stock payments make the price of the target contingent on 
the merger outcome and therefore can be used to hedge risks if the acquiring managers 
feel information on the target were withheld.  
3.2.7 Market Valuation  
Finally, M&A research also found that the current market environment has a significant 
influence on the gains to acquiring firms. Rosen (2006) finds a positive relationship 
between the acquirer’s gains and the perception of recent merger announcements and 
the overall stock market. His findings suggest that the short-term gains to acquiring 
companies exhibit a ‘momentum’, which is probably caused by investors’ 
overoptimism. 
Antoniou et al. (2008) find similar results for the UK. Their findings also suggest 
that the bidder’s returns correlate to how recent mergers have been received and the 
current market condition. Further, they suggest that their results provide some evidence 
that investor sentiment seems to drive the bidders’ returns. However, they do not 
directly test the effect of investor sentiment on the bidders’ gains.  
In similar vein, Bouwman et al. (2009) find that the returns to acquirers are 
significantly higher during high valuation markets than during low valuation markets. 
Overall, their findings indicate that takeover activity is driven by managerial herding 
behaviour. 
3.2.8 Conclusion 
This literature review focuses on the acquirer’s short-term gains, which serve as an 
instrument to examine the research issues in this thesis. Whilst merger announcements 
lead to significant positive gains to target companies, M&A literature on the short-term 
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gains to acquiring firms shows that many factors affect the returns around merger 
announcements. These factors are multi-layered and span from deal-specific to external 
features. As a complicating matter, the findings show that these factors also interact and 
the results are often dependent on subsamples. This aspect impedes clear-cut statements 
on the acquirer’s wealth effects from M&A transactions. Recognising the potential 
influence, these factors are considered in the three empirical studies, after outlining the 
methodology and data used to calculate the gains in the following chapter. 
3.3 Literature on the Empirical Chapters 
3.3.1 The Adoption of IFRS in the European Union 
“This Regulation [International Financial Reporting Standards] aims at 
contributing to the efficient and cost-effective functioning of the capital market. 
The protection of investors and the maintenance of confidence in the financial 
markets is also an important aspect of the completion of the internal market in 
this area. This Regulation reinforces the freedom of movement of capital in the 
internal market and helps to enable Community companies to compete on an 
equal footing for financial resources available in the Community capital markets, 
as well as in world capital markets.” 
(Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002, (4), July 2002) 
 
The objective of financial reporting is to provide users of financial accounts with 
information that is decision useful. The reasons why stakeholders (e.g. existing and 
potential investors, suppliers, customers or employees) need to obtain financial 
information vary widely, but all of these groups suffer from problems of information 
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asymmetry between themselves and the management of the firm. Financial reports are 
one way in which information asymmetry can be circumvented. Financial reporting is 
only of value, however, if the provided information is relevant and faithful. If financial 
reporting is free of material error, neutral and complete, then this enables users to make 
confirmatory and predictive statements about the financial health of a firm. 
Comparability, timeliness, and verifiability are also critical to enhance further the 
relevance of financial reporting (IASB 2010). 
As the European Commission pointed out, the lack of these features due to the range 
of national accounting standards across European countries was considered as an 
impediment to a competitive and integrated European capital market. Users of financial 
accounts encountered several problems raised by numerous options and interpretations 
or even lack of accounting standards. As a result, the quality of financial statements 
from EU companies was considered as insufficient for meeting the requirements of 
international investors. Companies seeking to raise capital outside the European Union 
were, therefore, forced to prepare two sets of accounts under national and foreign 
accounting rules. This situation was costly for companies, and a concern was that large 
companies would be increasingly attracted by US GAAP (EC, COM 95 (508)).  
To counter these problems, the Fourth and the Seventh Company Law Directives of 
the European Council were designed to harmonise the accounting practice in the 
European Union. They are considered to take a first successful step towards greater 
comparability of the financial performance among companies in the European Union 
(EC, COM 95 (508)). The European Commission examined several approaches and 
came to an understanding that the adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards14 produced by the International Accounting Standards Board15 would be the 
most effective solution.  
                                                                                                              
14 (IFRS) (formerly International Accounting Standards (IAS)) 
15 (IASB) (formerly International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC)) 
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The IASB aims to issue internationally high quality accepted financial reporting 
standards. To better reflect a firm’s economic performance, the IASB produces 
principle-based standards which offer fewer accounting options and more consistent 
accounting measurements (IASC 1989). This is considered to increase the accounting 
quality by limiting the management’s opportunistic behaviour and provide investors a 
better basis for decision making (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001). 
Based on the conclusion that national accounting standards cannot ‘ensure a high 
level of transparency and comparability’, the European Parliament and the Council of 
the European Union decided in 2002 to adopt IFRS in order to develop an integrated 
European capital market (REGULATION (EC) No 1606/2002). From the beginning of 
the financial year of 2005, companies listed at a stock exchange within in a member 
state of the European Union were mandated to apply IFRS, whereas member states were 
given discretion as to whether IFRS adoption would be mandated for unlisted 
companies. 
As the opening vignette states, the perception of the EU was that a unique accounting 
framework increases the comparability and transparency of European companies, which 
would result in a more integrated financial market and improved market efficiency in 
the European Union. Officials considered this action as beneficial regarding their 
mission to promote growth, sustainable jobs, competition and wealth in the European 
Union. The Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkstein, for example, commented 
that “the proposed regulatory framework would benefit consumers, depositors and 
investors in the European Union by stimulating financial market efficiency and 
increasing competition” (IP/02/417, March 2002).  
The mandatory adoption of IFRS in the European Union was the biggest change in 
the accounting landscape ever seen and is heavily discussed by practitioners, as well as, 
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academics.16 The vast majority of accounting research suggests that the adoption of 
IFRS has been a success. Companies benefit from positive economic consequences due 
to lower information asymmetries between firms and investors. Several studies confirm 
that comparability (Bae et al. 2008) and transparency (Ding et al. 2007) among IFRS 
companies has improved. Leuz and Verrechia (2000) and Daske et al. (2008) document 
increased market liquidity. Further, a number of studies suggest that IFRS has a positive 
effect on companies’ cost of capital (Leuz and Verrechia 2000; Christensen et al. 2007; 
Daske et al. 2008), and less earnings management is observed (Barth at al. 2008; Ding 
et al. 2007). Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) and Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) find higher 
forecast accuracy and studies on the market reactions to the introduction of IFRS 
indicate a positive perception of the regulatory accounting change (Comprix et al. 2003; 
Armstrong et al. 2010). 
3.3.2 Information on Industry Prospects and the Returns 
Acquirers 
“All M&A Is Local - We can gain more traction by viewing M&A as an 
instrument of corporate transformation, a response by executives to a turbulent 
environment. This view does not disregard the behavioural influences on M&A 
activity that other researchers have exposed, but it points to other drivers as well 
and, overall, presents a more complex picture.” 
(Bruner 2004) 
 
A relatively new stream of M&A research focuses on merger activity and the 
                                                                                                              
16 For academic discussions see, for example, Ball (2006) for a discussion of the pros and cons for investors resulting from IFRS or 
Whittington (2005) on the adoption of IFRS in the EU. For a wide variety of discussions and opinions of practitioners on this topic, 
see, for example, the websites of Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG or PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). 
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underlying market conditions as a possible cause. Theoretical and empirical studies 
demonstrate a link between M&A activity and stock prices. Jovanovic and Rousseau 
(2002), for example, show in a model that merger activity is correlated with the 
acquirers’ valuation. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswananthan 
(2004) demonstrate in their models that the market valuation affects the probability of 
mergers taking place, as well as, the mode of payment used in a deal. In Rhodes–Kropf 
et al. (2005), empirical evidence suggests that misvaluations drive M&A activity, as 
well as, the choice of payment. Powell and Yawson (2005) find evidence that takeover 
activity also clusters across industries. Specifically, low growth, the threat of foreign 
competition and a high industry-adjusted stock market performance increase the 
likelihood of takeovers. Rosen (2006) links M&A activity to what he calls ‘merger 
momentum’. Returns to bidding companies are positively correlated to the perception of 
previous mergers and the overall stock market. Rosen finds that bidders are more likely 
to experience positive returns when recent bids have been well received or the stock 
market is performing well. Similarly, Bouwman et al. (2009) document that the returns 
to acquirers are significantly higher during high valuation markets than during low 
valuation markets. 
As Penman (1996) points out, the P/E ratio has been examined from several 
academic perspectives. Basu (1977) and Jaffe et al. (1989), for instance, investigate the 
P/E multiple as an indicator of mispriced stocks. Similarly, Fama and French (1998) 
also examine the properties of P/E ratios and mispriced stocks, but on an international 
scale. Graham et al. (1962) and Boatsman and Baskin (1981) interpret the P/E ratio as 
the earnings capitalization rate and Ball (1978) as a measure of risk. Derived from the 
Gordon growth model (1962), the reciprocal of the P/E ratio may also be considered to 
describe the return on equity. Similar to Cragg and Malkiel (1982) and Litzenberger and 
Rao (1971) who infer a firm’s P/E ratio as an earnings growth indicator, in this study 
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the industry P/E ratio is considered as an indicator of an industry’s growth prospects. 
Copeland et al. (1996) states that today’s P/E ratio reflects the economic prospects of an 
industry for an explicit period. Firms which have experienced several periods of rising 
earnings exhibit often high P/E multiples, because share prices have often risen faster 
than earnings (Nicholson 1960). Zarowin (1990) finds that the dominant determinant of 
the cross-sectional variation and time-series persistence of P/E ratios is forecasted by 
the long-term growth in earnings per share. Hence, a high P/E ratio indicates a growing 
industry whereas a declining industry has a low P/E ratio. 
3.3.3 Investor Sentiment and its Impact on the Returns to 
Acquirers 
“When market sentiment is bullish, managers may feel encouraged to make 
acquisitions because they believe the market expects firms to undertake growth-
enhancing initiatives like acquisitions. By the same token, when the market 
sentiment is bearish, the market does not expect acquisitions, and managers 
respond by avoiding acquisitions unless they are reasonably certain that the 
synergies are large enough to justify going against market sentiment and 
expectations.“ 
(Bouwman et al. 2003) 
 
In an efficient market, mispricing should not exist because arbitrageurs exploit these 
opportunities and drive prices back to efficiency (Friedman 1953). A significant number 
of studies, however, find evidence that challenge this neoclassical finance view. Besides 
recent asset bubbles and crashes, empirical evidence exists that make it difficult to 
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explain these anomalies by pure rational behaviour, suggesting that prices are also 
driven by psychology (Shleifer 2000a). 
Investor sentiment is defined by Lee et al. (1991) as the belief that future cash flows 
and risk do not match the information available. Baker and Wurgler (2007) regard 
investor sentiment as the investors’ propensity to speculate or the investors’ optimism 
or pessimism about stocks. One aspect, however, can be distilled from all proposed 
definitions: The market price of an asset does not correspond to its fundamental value. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that rational investors may not try to push prices 
towards their fundamental values, as betting against sentimental investors is costly and 
risky. De Long et al. (1990) argue that the behaviour of irrational investors is 
unpredictable, making arbitrage trading unattractive. Moreover, arbitrageurs may face 
additional limitations, such as short-term horizons, transaction costs or short selling 
restrictions, which prevent them from implementing adequate trading strategies. 
Most models and studies assume that investor sentiment is driven by irrational 
behaviour. However, a changing market sentiment could actually be “a rational 
reflection of prosperous times to come, an irrational hope for the future, or some 
combination of the two” (Brown and Cliff 2005). Rational shifts in sentiment, for 
example, include reactions to new information on dividends, or news generated by the 
trading process itself (Shleifer and Summers 1990)17 . Verma and Soydemir (2006) 
document rational and irrational factors in investor sentiment in several stock markets. 
Rational factors may lead to changes in investor sentiment. However, this study 
follows the definition of investor sentiment as irrational behaviour. Together with 
limited arbitrage opportunities, investor sentiment prevents prices from efficiency 
(Shleifer 2000b).  
As mentioned, prices can greatly deviate from their intrinsic values during periods 
                                                                                                              
17 See also, for example, Hirshleifer (2001) 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 45 
  
when sentiment overrides rationality. Several empirical studies document anomalies, 
which are attributable to a psychological impact on asset prices. Lee et al. (1991), for 
example, find evidence that discounts on closed-end funds are a proxy for changes in 
investor sentiment. They suggest that fund discounts are high if the sentiment is 
pessimistic about the future and low when sentiment is optimistic. Neal and Wheatley 
(1998) find evidence that closed-end funds predict the difference between the returns of 
small and large firms.  
Another finance area, which seems to be affected by investor sentiment are IPOs. 
Ritter (1991) documents that returns of IPO stocks reverse over the long-run. He argues 
that this is due to periodic waves of optimism and particularly impacts stock prices of 
young growth companies. Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that firms prefer to issue 
equity before low market return periods and debt before high return periods. They 
suggest that their findings indicate a stronger predictor of the one-year-ahead returns 
than other predictors. Cornelli et al. (2006) focus on the European grey market for IPOs 
and find that small investors act irrationally by overweighting their information, which 
suggests that these investors are driven by overconfidence. They further state if 
underwriters and other institutional investors know what sentimental investors are 
willing to pay then the sentimental investors’ optimism will generate short-term price 
patterns. 
According to Brown and Cliff (2005), investor sentiment predicts long-term market 
returns over the next one to three years. They attribute these findings to limited 
arbitrage in the long- but not in the short-run. In Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), they 
form a sentiment index and show that investor sentiment has a significant effect on 
difficult-to-value stocks. 
Several theoretical models attribute the behaviour of irrational investors to cognitive 
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and emotional biases. 18  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose prospect theory to 
explain how investors actually behave, instead of how they should act in an expected 
utility context. Depending on future prospects, investors are sometimes risk averse or 
risk seeking and the valuation of prospects depends on gains and losses relative to a 
reference point. Further, investors are averse to losses because losses are 
disproportionally felt more than gains (Ackert and Deaves 2010). Black (1986) states 
that sentimental investors act irrationally on noise in the market as if it were 
information, believing it would give them an advantage without actually being insider 
information. Daniel et al. (1998) show that overconfident investors overweight self-
generated information and as a result, cause an overreaction of share prices. In addition, 
if investors exhibit attribution bias, they account success to their personal abilities and 
attribute losses to circumstances beyond their control. In similar vein, Barberis et al. 
(1998) demonstrate that when irrational investors receive new information, they tend to 
pay too much attention to the strength and too little attention to its statistical weight. As 
a result, share prices underreact to corporate events, such as earnings announcement, but 
overreact to patterns of good or bad news. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) find 
that price reactions to earnings announcements are greater for good news in periods of 
high sentiment and lower for bad news in low sentiment. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This literature review demonstrates the relevance of event studies, as a model to 
evaluate the identified research issues in this thesis. The vast number of articles using 
this technique underpins the versatility in its application to assess corporate decisions. 
In the context of M&A research, several factors have been found to influence the 
returns around announcements. These range from deal-specific to market-wide factors. 
                                                                                                              
18 See, for example, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Black (1986), Campbell and Kyle (1993), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Hong 
and Stein (1999) for further theoretical models 
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In this context three empirically testable issues have been identifies. This review also 
provides the background on the literature on: (i) The adoption of IFRS within the 
European Union, (ii) the relevance of information on industry growth prospects and (iii) 
the impact of investor sentiment on several finance areas. 
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4. Information Asymmetries and the 
Impact of IFRS on Bidders’ Gains 
4.1 Introduction 
This study examines the impact of IFRS on M&A in the European Union. The aim of 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the European Union was to create a more integrated 
capital market by increasing the transparency among listed companies. To the author's 
best knowledge, this is the first study to examine if improved transparency due to the 
accounting harmonisation has had a significant effect on the shareholders’ wealth of EU 
listed acquirers. 
The overall gains to acquiring companies suggest that IFRS only had a small impact, 
but key M&A factors, which are expected to experience a greater magnitude of 
improved transparency, confirm the predictions. First, the returns from EU cross-border 
deals indicate that the move to a common set of accounting standards in the European 
Union facilitates the valuation process of foreign targets which leads to a significant 
positive change in abnormal returns to shareholders of bidding firms. An economically 
significant increase in deal values, as well as, the relative target size after the adoption 
provide evidence that IFRS has indeed improved transparency on foreign listed targets 
and bidders feel more comfortable to engage in cross-border deals. However, the results 
indicate that barriers remain after adoption of IFRS, as larger firms engage 
predominately in foreign acquisitions. Possibly cultural, legal or language barriers may 
still prevent smaller firms to expand on a European scale. Secondly, the results show a 
significant positive impact on the returns in stock offers. Further analysis suggests that 
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IFRS seems to have changed the risk profile of M&A transactions. The use of stocks 
was dominated to hedge information asymmetries in M&A transactions during the pre-
IFRS period and is now merely used as a financing tool. In summary, the regulator has 
made a step forward in the objective to create an integrated European capital market. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section develops the 
arguments on the effects of IFRS and provides testable hypotheses. Section 4.3 outlines 
the sample and applied methodologies to test the hypotheses. Section 4.4 presents and 
discusses the results. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes with a summary of the findings and 
their implications. 
4.2 IFRS and Bidders’ Gains - Hypotheses 
Development 
4.2.1 IFRS and the Impact on the Gains to Bidders 
M&A research shows that asymmetric information between bidders and targets has a 
significant effect on the returns to bidding companies around merger announcements.19 
Given the results from IFRS indicate a positive impact on the transparency and 
comparability of firms, consequently, if IFRS has contributed to a reduction of 
information asymmetries, then this should have a significant impact on M&A. The 
question of whether IFRS has had an impact on the shareholders’ wealth effects from 
M&A will provide important insights into whether the goals of a common mandatory 
accounting standard across the European Union have been achieved. 
Clear and transparent information is important in M&A transactions for two reasons: 
(i) It improves the decision making for the seeking firm to make a bid and (ii) it helps in 
determining the price of a potential target. In order to come to a conclusion about a 
                                                                                                              
19 See, for example, Officer et al. (2009) for intangible assets of targets or Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009b) for limited information on 
private targets. 
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firm’s value, bidders first need to find an appropriate target. Due to a positive change 
from IFRS, bidders should be able to more readily understand the company financial 
information and therefore at a lower cost. In the sense of Akerlof (1970), by removing 
accounting alternatives and introducing consistent accounting measures, hence 
improving the transparency on listed companies, acquirers bear less risk in selecting a 
bad target.  
The estimation of a target’s fair value and hence its acquisition price is a critical 
factor that determines a transaction as a value-enhancing or value-destroying activity. If 
the adoption of IFRS has achieved its goals, then information asymmetries about listed 
companies in the European Union should have been reduced. As a result, more precise 
target valuations are expected and the dollar gains to acquirers from M&A increase 
during the post-adoption period of IFRS. The first hypothesis is therefore, 
(H1) The adoption of IFRS had a positive effect on the returns to bidding firms of 
listed targets. 
4.2.2 IFRS and Cross-Border M&A 
Since the adoption of IFRS intended to improve transparency among European listed 
companies, it is expected that cross-border deals should exhibit a significant impact. If a 
firm decides to enter a new market, it has the choice to do so by setting up new 
operations, or by acquiring an already established firm in the target market. It has been 
argued that there are several advantages of entering a market by M&A over founding a 
foreign subsidiary.  
The time period required to execute the expansion is often seen as a great benefit of 
cross-border M&A. Danbolt (2004) states that setting up a subsidiary in a new market 
requires establishing relationships with suppliers, installing distribution channels and 
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the creation of a customer base. Consequently, a long horizon is necessary to 
successfully establish a new foreign business, whereas cross-border M&A provides a 
quick market access.  
While academics still disagree on the merits of corporate diversification20, some 
evidence suggests that shareholders may benefit from a firm’s international 
diversification. If multinational firms operate as arbitrageurs, they may be able to create 
wealth which cannot be replicated by investors in their own portfolios (Hisey and Caves 
1985; Markides and Ittner 1994; Baker et al. 2009).  
For example, by engaging in cross-border M&A, a firm may directly invest in a 
market and, thereby, services an investor’s investment objective, if these individuals 
face constraints, such as trade barriers or restrictions on capital in- or outflow. In many 
countries, regulators treat personal and corporate income differently. This situation can 
lead to significant tax advantages for companies. For example, global firms can direct 
sales and report assets in countries which offer lower tax rates leading to higher after-
tax profits (Scholes and Wolfson 1990; Servaes and Zenner 1994).  
Cross-border M&A may also facilitate the transfer of knowledge and technology and 
firms therefore benefit from internalising intangible assets. For instance, the acquisition 
of a foreign firm can increase economies of scale by expanding technology to a new 
market or by gaining access to valuable knowledge, such as patents or processes. 
Similarly, a foreign acquisition may help firms to increase their product lines and 
differentiate themselves from rivals (Caves 1971).  
Further, international firms may also profit from a segmented global market. 
Expanding operations to a foreign market may increase profitability by either shifting 
its production sites to low-cost countries or by increased sales from the target markets. 
                                                                                                              
20 See, for example, Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) (Extended portfolio theory), Lewellen (1971) (Coinsurance effect), Williamson 
(1970) (internal capital market) and Baumol (1967) (Regulation) for supportive literature. For opposing arguments see, e.g., Jensen 
(1986a,b) (Agency theory) and Stein (1997) (Managerial capabilities). 
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Further, firms may also benefit from favourable exchange rate exploitation (Froot and 
Stein 1991; Cebenoyan et al. 1992; Kang 1993). 
However, international expansion is not without risks. Acquirers of foreign targets 
might be confronted with different types and degrees of stakeholder influence. For 
example, unions and potential strikes may hamper the execution of a business plan 
(Straume 2003; Lommerud et al. 2006). ‘Soft’ problems, such as cultural differences, 
might also hinder the success of a merger and might prevent an optimal information 
flow between the national operations and social interactions of employees may suffer 
under these circumstances (Chatterjee et al. 1992; Datta and Puia 1995). 
As noted earlier, IFRS as a major change in the European accounting practice is 
expected to have a significant impact on the reduction of information asymmetries of 
listed companies in the European Union. Bidders should therefore be able to access 
relevant information more readily in the post-adoption era, and as a result the reliability 
of information, should enhance the process of valuing a listed target. Prior to the 
adoption of IFRS, different national accounting standards and conventions were utilised 
across the European Union. As a result, considerable uncertainty and lack of 
transparency could have existed in cross-border takeovers regarding the interpretation 
and translation of the targets’ financial reports. After the adoption of IFRS, this 
uncertainty has reduced. The analysis and selection of a foreign European target should, 
in theory, now require similar effort as analysing a domestic target. Hence, acquirers 
should face smaller barriers to bid for foreign targets and should be encouraged to 
engage in cross-border acquisitions. After the adoption of IFRS, lower levels of 
asymmetric information should also reduce the risk of overpayment. More precise target 
valuations and improved predictability of the expected synergies should lead to less 
overpayment and consequently, greater gains from M&A. This should be reflected in 
form of greater gains to bidding companies across the European Union. In summary,  
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(H2) The adoption of IFRS had a positive effect on the returns to bidding firms of 
foreign listed targets. 
4.2.3 IFRS and Mode of Payment 
M&A research has identified that the payment method has a significant effect on the 
returns of bidding firms.21 M&A literature suggests that the payment mode signals the 
acquiring management’s perception of their firm’s value. Similar to Myers and Majluf’s 
(1984) proposed pecking order theory, a stock payment resembles an equity issuance 
and has an adverse effect on the acquiring firm’s share price because this payment 
method signals that acquiring managers consider the shares of their firm as overvalued. 
Cash offers, on the other hand, are preferred if managers of the acquiring firm perceive 
its shares as undervalued. 
An alternative explanation states that the method of payment is dependent on the 
confidence of the bidding managers in the outcome of the merger. In this sense, the 
mode of payment is based on potential risk and reward sharing with the target’s 
shareholders (Hansen 1987). Both, acquirer and target only possess asymmetric 
information. The target’s management should know best the value of its assets and will 
only accept an offer which is higher than their own estimate. On the other hand, the 
acquiring firm has the choice of an offer in form of cash or stocks. In a cash offer, the 
bidder bears all risk but also receives all gains from the merger depending on whether 
the estimated synergies can be realized. The gains to the target shareholders, however, 
are fixed to the premium offered regardless of the merger outcome. If information 
asymmetries regarding the target’s value exist, the acquirer will prefer to pay with 
stocks. In a stock offer, the acquirer can transfer risk to target shareholders, but in return 
also shares the gains from the merger. This makes the payment ‘contingent’ on the 
                                                                                                              
21 See, for example, Asquith et al. (1983), Chang (1998), Servaes (1991), Loughran and Vijh (1997) or Draper and Paudyal (1999) 
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pricing of target and the outcome of the merger. As target shareholders become new 
blockholders of the combined firm, they participate with their stake in the gains or 
losses from the merger.  
If bidders are able to make more precise projections about the gains from a merger 
after the adoption of IFRS, the gains are expected to indicate a positive effect. However, 
stock offers might experience a greater impact. After the adoption of the new 
accounting standard, stock offers may still signal some uncertainty regarding the 
transaction. However, the proportion of information asymmetries associated with 
financial reporting should be eliminated. Hence, the impact from the risk reduction of a 
misinterpretation of financial accounts should be greater for stock deals than for cash 
deals. Hence, 
(H3) The adoption of IFRS had a positive effect on the returns to bidding firms 
with stock offers. 
4.3 Data and Methodologies 
4.3.1 Data and Sample Description 
The aim of this study is to analyse the effect of improved target transparency by the 
mandatory introduction of IFRS in the European Union and its impact on the bidders’ 
gains around M&A announcements. For this purpose, M&A data was obtained from 
SDC Platinum over a period from 01.01.1989 to 31.12.2011. The sample period has 
been divided into two sub-periods in order to identify the expected changes in abnormal 
returns from the adoption: The pre-IFRS period (1989 to 2005) and the post-IFRS 
period (2006 to 2011).22 In order to examine the effects on the gains, bidding companies 
are required to have share price data available from their primary stock exchange 
                                                                                                              
22 January 1, 2006 was selected as the starting point of the post-IFRS period as from this point in time the first mandatory IFRS 
annual reports are being published. 
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located in the European Union.23 Share prices and accounting data are retrieved from 
Datastream. Since the new accounting standard is only mandatory for listed companies, 
the sample is restricted to targets listed in the European Union, as well. Further, 
information on the reported accounting standard must be available and early IFRS 
adopters are removed in order to avoid a self-selection bias in the sample. Bidding 
companies are required to own less 50 per cent of the target’s shares before and 
intended to own more than 50 per cent after the acquisition to reflect a change in control 
of the target firm. To ensure a consistent sample of mergers, acquisitions types indicated 
as divestitures, management buy-outs/-ins, employee buy-outs and reverse takeovers are 
deleted. A size criterion has been applied of at least US$ 1 million24 in deal value and 
market value25 of the bidding company.26 Mergers announced on a weekend have been 
removed from the sample and the primary SIC codes of bidders and targets must be 
available. Deals with SIC codes suggesting that one of the M&A participants operate in 
the financial27 or utility28 industry have been dropped from the sample. Both industries 
exhibit industry-specific accounting attributes which might distort the results of this 
study.  
As a result, 494 deals survive the sample criteria. This is partly due to the fact that all 
targets are required to be listed, since IFRS is only mandatory for listed companies and 
the potential effects of a reduction in information asymmetries is only expected for such 
firms. As presented in Table 4.1in roughly 40 per cent of the deals, target shareholders 
were offered a cash payment and about 31 per cent stocks and 21 per cent a mix of both. 
                                                                                                              
23  Bids announced by bidders located in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland  , France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom are analysed. On May 1 2004, further ten 
countries, i.e. Cyprus (Greek part), the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
and on January 1 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union. These twelve new EU countries are, however, not 
included in the sample. 
24 Standardised with the base date of January 3, 2005 
25 Measured 15 trading days before the announcement 
26 US$ serve as an independent currency to facilitate the comparability, because a significant proportion of the sample period 
covers a significant time period before the introduction of the €-currency and the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark decided to 
keep their national currencies. 
27 Companies with SIC codes starting with ‘6’ 
28 Companies with 2-digit SIC codes of ‘49’ 
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For 43 deals or about 9 per cent of all deals, the payment offer was not disclosed. 57 per 
cent of all deals involve an industrially related target. In about 8 out of 10 deals, the 
targets have the same domicile as the acquirer. The average acquirer’s market 
capitalisation is US$ 5.3 billion and the average deal size is about US$ 1.2 billion. The 
relative size of a target is with about 45 per cent on average almost half the size of the 
acquirer. As presented shortly, the size characteristics of the EU sample are significantly 
larger than the figures from the US sample, which should be due to the listed target 
criterion. 
Table 4.2 shows that bidders from the United Kingdom are most active with 285 
bids, followed by French (47) and German (36) bidders. Firms from the United 
Kingdom are most sought after receiving 311 bids, followed by Dutch companies (36) 
and French (30) and German (30) firms. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of the EU sample 
This table presents descriptive statics of M&A announcements by and for firms based and listed within the European Union 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom) during the period from 01.01.1989 to 31.12.2011. . A bidder is required to be listed at a stock 
exchange in one of the 15 European member countries, the share price is available from Datastream and the deal and market value 
of the bidder is at least US$ 1 million. Values are in US$ millions or per cent.. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
  N % 
Full Sample  494  
Panel B: Deal Characteristics 
   EU 
Mode of Payment 
Cash 196 39.68 
Mixed 105 21.26 
Stock 150 30.36 
Unknown 43 8.70 
Deal Type 
Focused 281 56.88 
Diversifying 213 43.12 
Target Listing Status 
Private - - 
Public 494 100.00 
Subsidiary - - 
Target Origin 
Domestic 394 79.76 
Cross-Border 100 20.24 
Panel C: Size Characteristics 
  Mean SD 
Acquirer Size  
5,316.99 14,549.53 
(in US$ millions)  
Deal Value  
1,282.46 5,516.42 
(in US$ millions)  
Relative Target Size  
45.05 54.10 
(in %)  
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Table 4.2: Distribution of Deals by Bidders’ and Targets’ Domicile 
 
The table presents the geographical distribution of bids announced by, and for firms based, and listed within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) during the period from 01.01.1989 to 31.12.2011. A bidder is required to be listed at a stock exchange in one of the 15 European member 
countries, the share price is available from Datastream and the deal and market value of the bidder is at least US$ 1 million. 
 Targets’ Nation 
Bidders’ Nation Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK Total 
Austria 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 
Belgium 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 
Denmark 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 9 
Finland 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 2 1 11 
France 0 1 0 0 26 1 0 0 2 0 5 0 0 3 9 47 
Germany 0 0 0 0 1 21 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 9 36 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 
Italy 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 0 2 0 1 0 1 13 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 1 0 6 25 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 12 0 4 18 
Sweden 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 18 3 23 
UK 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 270 285 
Total 1 4 9 5 30 30 10 1 12 0 36 1 15 29 311 494 
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Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3 show that M&A activity started to increase in 1994 and 
reached its peak in the years of 1999 and 2000. After a substantial drop until 2002, 
merger activity recovered until the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007. Since then 
merger activity has been in decline over the last past years. In total, 358 M&A bids 
were announced during the pre-IFRS period and 136 bids during the post-IFRS period. 
Figure 4.1: Annual Distribution of M&A Announcements 
The figure presents the annual distribution of M&A announcements by and for firms based and listed within the European Union 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom) during the period from 01.01.1989 to 31.12.2011. The cut-off point of the IFRS sub-periods is the 
01.01.2006. 
 
 
The summary statistics of the full sample in Table 4.4 show that toeholds in target 
companies were on similar levels during both periods with roughly 4.5 per cent. The 
mean and median of the intended percentage held after the acquisition suggest that in 
both periods bidders on average intended to make full takeovers in this sample. 
However, this feature might be due to the change of control criterion. Further, cash 
offers were on average preferred over stock offers. The cash proportion, however, was 
higher during the post-IFRS period (52.05 vs. 47.04 per cent), whereas the stock 
proportion was higher during the pre-IFRS period (31.90 vs. 42.50 per cent). The 
average deal size, as well as, the average size of the bidders indicates larger merger 
participants during the post-IFRS. The mean of the relative target size suggests larger 
targets in the pre-IFRS period, however, the median suggests the opposite. This might 
be related to the overall stock market valuations in both periods. 
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Table 4.3: Annual Distribution of M&A Announcements 
The table presents the annual distribution of M&A announcements by, and for firms based, and listed within the European Union 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom) during the period from 01.01.1989 to 31.12.2011. The cut-off point of the IFRS sub-periods is the 
01.01.2006. 
Period Year No. of Announcements 
Pre-IFRS 
1989 7 
1990 3 
1991 1 
1992 3 
1993 2 
1995 7 
1996 13 
1997 25 
1998 34 
1999 55 
2000 55 
2001 34 
2002 23 
2003 32 
2004 29 
2005 35 
Post-IFRS 
2006 34 
2007 35 
2008 21 
2009 13 
2010 18 
2011 15 
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of the Full Sample 
The table presents summary statistics of M&A announcements by and for firms based and listed within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) during the period from 01.01.1989 to 31.12.2011. The cut-off point of the IFRS sub-periods is the 01.01.2006. Values are in US$ millions or per cent. 
 
 Full Sample 
Period Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Min Max 
Pre-IFRS 
Shares Held at Announcement (in %) 358 4.32 11.32 0.00 0.00 49.90 
Shares Intended to Purchase (in %) 358 96.58 10.68 100.00 50.01 100.00 
       
Paid in Stocks (in %) 358 42.50 45.69 6.54 0.00 100.00 
Paid in Cash (in %) 358 47.04 46.15 35.19 0.00 100.00 
Paid in Other (in %) 358 1.26 8.20 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Paid in Unknown (in %) 358 9.20 28.54 0.00 0.00 100.00 
       
Deal Value (in US$ millions) 358 1,201.80 5,785.33 139.66 1.33 75,960.85 
Acquirer’s Market (in US$ millions) 358 4,608.71 13,472.54 660.16 5.49 131,849.78 
Relative Target Size (in %) 358 0.46 0.58 0.28 0.00 4.89 
Post-IFRS 
Shares Held at Announcement (in %) 136 4.49 11.34 0.00 0.00 50.00 
Shares Intended to Purchase (in %) 136 96.61 11.02 100.00 50.46 100.00 
       
Paid in Stocks (in %) 136 37.90 44.46 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Paid in Cash (in %) 136 52.05 45.92 54.53 0.00 100.00 
Paid in Other (in %) 136 1.23 8.97 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Paid in Unknown (in %) 136 8.82 28.47 0.00 0.00 100.00 
       
Deal Value (in US$ millions) 136 1,494.77 4,749.39 161.32 2.83 42,244.12 
Acquirer’s Market (in US$ millions) 136 7,181.45 16,977.42 753.12 14.56 92,166.08 
Relative Target Size (in %) 136 0.43 0.43 0.31 0.00 2.99 
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Table 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics based on the target’s origin. The size of 
toeholds increased more for foreign targets from the pre-IFRS to the post-IFRS period 
(3.57 to 6.89 per cent), indeed toeholds in domestic firms slightly decreased from 4.51 
to 3.89 per cent over the two sub-periods. The proportion of stock offers is about double 
the size for domestic targets than for foreign targets. The percentage of stock offers 
decreased for domestic targets over time and remained at about the same level for 
foreign targets. The cash percentage, on the other hand, increased for domestic and 
foreign targets over time. Noticeably, the average deal value of foreign targets is more 
than twice as high in the post-IFRS period than in the pre-IFRS period. Foreign targets 
and the average bidder of foreign targets are larger in both sub-periods than compared 
with the domestic counterparts. Further, the statistics also show that the proportions of 
cross-border deals remain relatively constant over both periods (pre-IFRS: 20.39 per 
cent vs. post-IFRS: 19.35 per cent). 
These deal features indicate that with the adoption of IFRS, bidders may have gained 
confidence in interpreting foreign financial statements, and as a result, the size of 
foreign targets has increased over time. However, the figures also indicate that acquirers 
still face some barriers since the average acquirer of a foreign target is more than twice 
the size of a domestic bidder. Moreover, the numbers also suggest that takeover activity 
was not affected by IFRS. Larger acquirers probably have the resources to overcome 
informational constraints. 
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics by the Target’s Domicile 
The table presents summary statistics of M&A announcements by and for firms based and listed within the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) during the period from 01.01.1989 to 31.12.2011. The cut-off point of the IFRS sub-periods is the 01.01.2006. 
  
Domestic Targets  Foreign Targets 
Period Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Min Max  N Mean Std Dev Median Min Max 
Pre-IFRS 
Shares Held at Announcement (in %) 285 4.51 11.40 0.00 0.00 49.73  73 3.57 11.03 0.00 0.00 49.90 
Shares Intended to Purchase (in %) 285 97.53 8.98 100.00 50.01 100.00  73 92.87 15.16 100.00 50.04 100.00 
              
Paid in Stocks (in %) 285 48.18 45.60 50.00 0.00 100.00  73 20.34 39.06 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Paid in Cash (in %) 285 43.80 45.42 29.44 0.00 100.00  73 59.67 47.10 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Paid in Other (in %) 285 0.67 4.61 0.00 0.00 42.40  73 3.55 15.58 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Paid in Unknown (in %) 285 7.35 25.57 0.00 0.00 100.00  73 16.44 37.32 0.00 0.00 100.00 
              
Deal Value (in US$ millions) 285 1,008.01 5,881.47 119.77 3.82 75,960.85  73 1,958.39 5,364.83 402.78 1.33 32,594.91 
Acquirer’s Market (in US$ millions) 285 3,334.56 11,671.51 544.75 5.49 131,849.78  73 9,583.13 18,197.26 3,534.98 13.26 95,081.07 
Relative Target Size (in %) 285 0.50 0.62 0.29 0.00 4.89  73 0.30 0.34 0.22 0.00 1.92 
Post-IFRS 
Shares Held at Announcement (in %) 109 3.89 10.41 0.00 0.00 50.00  27 6.89 14.49 0.00 0.00 49.00 
Shares Intended to Purchase (in %) 109 96.46 11.33 100.00 50.46 100.00  27 97.23 9.84 100.00 51.10 100.00 
              
Paid in Stocks (in %) 109 42.15 45.55 23.84 0.00 100.00  27 20.72 35.56 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Paid in Cash (in %) 109 49.09 46.09 47.21 0.00 100.00  27 64.02 44.05 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Paid in Other (in %) 109 1.42 9.98 0.00 0.00 100.00  27 0.45 1.85 0.00 0.00 9.32 
Paid in Unknown (in %) 109 7.34 26.20 0.00 0.00 100.00  27 14.82 36.20 0.00 0.00 100.00 
              
Deal Value (in US$ millions) 109 603.83 1,288.05 102.18 2.83 7,752.31  27 5,091.53 9,667.87 1,020.02 19.75 42,244.12 
Acquirer’s Market (in US$ millions) 109 5,626.41 15,429.85 603.30 14.56 92,166.08  27 13,459.20 21,367.72 3,463.43 42.88 82,875.27 
Relative Target Size (in %) 109 0.41 0.45 0.28 0.00 2.99  27 0.47 0.35 0.45 0.00 1.43 
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4.3.2 Univariate Framework 
To calculate the gains surrounding M&A announcements, an event study methodology 
using a market-adjusted model is applied. Datastream market indices of the countries 
where the bidders are listed serve as proxies for the domestic index. Chapter 3 outlines 
the event study methodology in greater detail. 
The average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) surrounding 5-days (-2, +2)29 of the 
announcement date is estimated as: 
 =


	 ,


  (3.4) 
where  is the average (cumulative) abnormal return over the multi-day interval t, , 
is the abnormal return of stock i at day t and  is the number of sample stocks whose 
abnormal returns are available at the multi-day interval t. 
4.3.3 Multivariate Framework 
The effects of the adoption of IFRS on the gains to bidding companies are analysed by 
examining the bidders’ 5-days (-2, +2)30 cumulative abnormal returns in a multivariate 
framework as in equation (4.1): 
 −  = 	 + 	∑ 

 	 + 
  (4.1) 
where  is the cumulative return to bidder i over the specific event window and  is 
the cumulative return of the bidder’s domestic Datastream market index. The intercept 
(α) can then be regarded as a measure of the abnormal return after controlling for the 
effects of vector		 of explanatory variables.  
                                                                                                              
29 CARs surrounding 3-days (-1, +1) and 11-days (-5, +5) of the announcement date are also calculated and differences footnoted if 
appropriate. 
30 The results for the 5-days event window are presented and regression results based on the 3- and 11-days windows are 
commented  where appropriate. 
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The following explanatory variables in the regression framework test the proposed 
hypotheses: 
The first hypothesis tests the overall impact of IFRS on the gains. For this purpose, a 
post-IFRS dummy takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced after the 01.01.2006, 
otherwise the value of 0. 
The second hypothesis is on the impact of information asymmetries in cross-border 
deals. Here, the Cross-Border binary dummy variable takes on the value of 1 if a bid is 
made for a foreign target, otherwise the value of 0. 
The third hypothesis is concerning the payment method and its associated 
information content. Cash Offer is a binary dummy variable which takes on the value of 
1 if the payment offer is 100 per cent in cash, otherwise the value of 0. Stock Offer is a 
binary dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the payment offer is 100 per cent 
in the bidder’s shares, otherwise the value of 0. In this context, the targets’ intangible 
assets serve as a proxy of information asymmetries. High Intangible Assets is a dummy 
variable which takes on the value of 1, if the intangible assets of a target exceed 30 per 
cent of its total assets, otherwise the value of 0. Intangible assets are standardised by the 
target’s total assets and both last reported before the announcement was made.31 
The following control variables are used which might have a significant effect in 
altering to the gains to bidder: 
Industry Relation: M&A literature has identified that the industry relation between 
the acquirer and target often has a significant impact on the shareholders’ wealth.32 This 
relationship might also determine the ability to estimate future synergies from the 
transaction and hence may be an indicator for the degree of transparency between 
acquirer and bidder. Focused deals is a binary dummy variable which takes on the value 
                                                                                                              
31 See, for example, Officer et al. (2009) 
32 See, for example, Morck et al. (1990) , Matsusaka (1993), Hubbard and Palia (1999) or Doukas et al. (2002) 
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of 1 if the bidder and target share the same primary 2-digit SIC code, otherwise the 
value of 0. 
Relative Target Size: The size of the target in relation to the bidder is often 
considered as a transparency indicator.33 Besides the aspect that larger targets have a 
greater impact on the dollar returns from the transaction, an increasing structural and 
operational complexity of larger targets might also have an inherent degree of 
intransparency. Relative Target Size is the ratio of the reported deal value to the market 
capitalisation of the bidder measured 15 trading days before the announcement was 
made.  
Eurozone: In particular situations, IFRS requires a translation or re-measurement of 
future operations of the target’s local currency to the acquirer’s presentation currency.34 
Depending on the technique, this will have different implications on the income 
statement and the balance sheet, as well, on financial ratios of the consolidated 
accounts. Eurozone is a binary dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if bidder’s 
and target’s primary operating location is a €-currency country, otherwise the value of 
0. 
By regressing M&A factors in each subsample and examining interactive dummy 
variables in a corresponding pooled regression, it is possible to determine statistically 
significant changes in the independent variables between the pre- and post-IFRS period. 
The changes are presented by interactive post-IFRS dummies which take on the value of 
the respective explanatory variable if the announcement occurred in 2006 or later, 
otherwise the value of 0. The variables are denoted as ‘D_’. 
To reduce the influence of outliers, the approach of studentised residuals as in 
Francis and Schipper (1999) and Clinch et al. (2002) is followed. By dividing the 
                                                                                                              
33 See, for example, Asquith et al. (1983) and Fuller et al. (2002) 
34 See, for example, Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009a) for the impact of the introduction of the €-currency on banking mergers 
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residuals by their standard error, Freund et al. (2006) suggest two positive properties: 
(i) Standardised residuals have a zero mean and a unit standard deviation. This enables 
to conclude the deviation of an observation from its mean and determine to obtain an 
outlier by chance. (ii) Further, this method allows for compensation of outliers that 
potentially cause problems. Since the sample is relatively small, an absolute cut-off 
point of 2 is chosen, which is within the suggested range found in the econometrics 
literature.35 
Financial data is known to often exhibit a non-constant volatility. This may lead to a 
violation of the assumptions regarding linear regression models of a constant variance 
in the error terms. A violation of this assumption may produce biased estimates, 
however, the main concern are biased standard errors. As a result, a wrong conclusion 
may be drawn about the validity of the hypotheses. To reduce the risk of Type I and 
Type II errors and ensure a constant variance of error terms (homoskedasticity), White-
corrected36 standard errors are calculated to arrive to reliable t-statistics. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 IFRS and the Impact on the Gains to Bidders 
The first hypothesis proposes an increase in the bidders’ gains after the adoption of 
IFRS. An improved information environment should enable bidders to value targets 
more precisely, which should ultimately lead to higher absolute gains, as well as, higher 
returns around the merger announcement.  
Figure 4.2 and Table 4.6 present the results of the cumulative abnormal returns of 
intervals spanning from (-1, +1) to (-5, +5). The most obvious finding is that the CARs 
                                                                                                              
35 The range is generally from 2 to 3. A studentised residual of 2 is more conservative but less prone to have outliers influence the 
results and a studentised residual of 3 being more lenient but more likely to have outliers included in the sample. 
36 See White (1980) 
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are consistently higher in the post-IFRS period than in the pre-IFRS period. The 
differences between the pre- and post-IFRS abnormal returns increase as the length of 
the event window increases. Longer event windows (9- and 11-days) suggest small 
positive but statistically insignificant abnormal returns for deal announcements during 
the post-IFRS era. The median results signal the same pattern, that abnormal returns are 
higher during the post-IFRS period. 
Figure 4.2: Univariate Framework: Cumulative Daily Abnormal Returns 
The figure presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements by firms based and listed within the European 
Union during the period from 01.01.1989 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are calculated using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = 
Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return on the corresponding 
domestic Datastream index of stock i for day t. The cut-off point of the IFRS sub-periods is the 01.01.2006. 
 
 
Overall, the results suggest no statistically significant change in abnormal returns. 
Throughout the examined event windows, however, the returns are closer to zero in the 
post-IFRS era, implying indeed improved target valuations. Further, relatively large pre-
to-post IFRS changes in returns suggest economic relevance of the adoption of the new 
accounting standard. 
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Table 4.6: Univariate Framework: Cumulative Daily Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements by firms based and listed within the European 
Union during the period from 01.01.1989 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are calculated using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = 
Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return on the corresponding 
domestic Datastream index of stock i for day t. The cut-off point of the IFRS sub-periods is the 01.01.2006. T-test of mean equal to 
zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. In parentheses are the corresponding t-
stats or p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Panel A: Mean Returns 
Interval Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS  Pre- vs. Post-IFRS 
(-1, +1) 
-0.464  -0.138   0.325  
(-1.215)  (-0.254)   (0.644)  
(-2, +2) 
-0.813* -0.487   0.325  
(-1.814)  (-0.779)   (0.693)  
(-3, +3) 
-0.619  -0.199   0.420  
(-1.294)  (-0.294)   (0.634)  
(-4, +4) 
-0.418  0.084   0.503  
(-0.810)  (0.123)   (0.593)  
(-5, +5) 
-0.534  0.311   0.845  
(-0.985)  (0.418)   (0.395)  
Panel B: Median Returns 
Interval Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS  Pre- vs. Post-IFRS 
(-1, +1) 
-0.625 -0.179  0.446  
(0.179) (0.686)  (0.659)  
(-2, +2) 
-0.598** -0.414  0.184  
(0.073) (0.602)  (0.583)  
(-3, +3) 
-0.521 0.136  0.657  
(0.159) (0.858)  (0.516)  
(-4, +4) 
-0.361 -0.102  0.259  
(0.457) (0.772)  (0.560)  
(-5, +5) 
-0.596 0.162  0.758  
(0.342) (0.558)  (0.319)  
 
To this point, the univariate analysis does not provide strong statistical evidence that 
the adoption of IFRS had a highly significant positive impact on the reduction of 
information asymmetries about target companies. The results indicate a rather 
qualitative impact. The following dummy variable approach investigates a shift in 
abnormal returns from the adoption of the new accounting standards in a multivariate 
framework. A relatively stable proportion of cross-border M&A activity shown earlier 
in the summary statistics support this view and suggest an investigation of the IFRS 
implications in a regression model context. 
In Table 4.7, the overall effect of the accounting standard on the abnormal returns in 
the post-IFRS period are examined by using an IFRS dummy variable. Model (1) uses 
the full sample and in model (2), UK-domestic deals are excluded because they account 
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for the majority of deals in the sample and might greatly influence the results.37 
Table 4.7: Multivariate Framework: IFRS 
The table presents the regression results of acquirers based and listed within the European Union during the period from 01.01.1989 
to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 5-days cumulative abnormal return (−2, +2) to European bidders and is regressed 
against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The variables includes the relative target size, a dummy variable 
representing the business relation between bidder and target (focus versus diversifying deals). Further, the models include a dummy 
if the acquirer and target are from a €-currency country. A post-IFRS dummy includes all deals announced after the 01.01.2006. The 
intercept represents the average abnormal return to bidders after controlling for the effects of the explanatory variables. Regression 
(1) includes the full sample and regression (2) excludes UK-domestic M&A announcements. In parentheses are the corresponding t-
stats. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Non UK-Domestic Sample 
 (1)  (2) 
Intercept 
0.09751   1.62751* 
(0.18)   (1.68)  
 
   
Relative Target Size 
0.07520   0.12455  
(0.15)   (0.19)  
 
   
Focused Deal 
-1.26365**  -1.69316** 
(-2.27)   (-2.17)  
 
   
Eurozone 
0.40573   -1.07842  
(0.72)   (-1.30)  
    
Post-IFRS 
0.14836   0.34477  
(0.26)   (0.43)  
      
      
N 466   211  
F-Statistics 1.33   1.66  
R2 (%) 1.14   2.12  
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.29   1.24  
 
The intercept suggests M&A announcements of listed targets on average break-even 
with small and insignificant abnormal returns of 0.10 per cent. The coefficient of the 
relative deal size of the target indicates a statistically insignificant positive relationship 
of 0.08 per cent. Similarly, the results indicate that the €-currency proxy yields a return 
of 0.41 per cent, however, the coefficient is statistically insignificant. If the bidder and 
target operate in the same industry, bidders earn 1.26 per cent less than comparable 
diversifying transactions. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 per cent 
level. The variable of interest, the IFRS dummy, suggests a small and statistically 
insignificant increase of 0.15 per cent, which confirms the previous univariate results. 
Since the majority of announcements are UK-domestic deals, such deals are 
                                                                                                              
37 In Appendix A, further results for 3- and 11-days event windows are provided. 
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excluded and the calculations are repeated to check that the results are not influenced. 
The intercept suggests that non-UK domestic M&A involving listed targets earn on 
average a statistically significant positive abnormal return of 1.63 per cent. This is 
roughly 1.5 percentage points higher than for the full sample. The coefficient regarding 
the relative size of the target is slightly higher with 0.12 per cent. Focused deals lose 
statistically significant -1.69 per cent and compared to the full sample is about 0.4 
percentage points lower. The currency proxy turns negative in this regression with -1.08 
per cent. 
The post-IFRS dummy is positive, but statistically insignificant with 0.34 per cent.38 
After removing the UK domestic deals, the variable is more than twice the size of the 
same coefficient from regression (1). This is an encouraging finding as a significant 
proportion of domestic deals have been removed from the sample and domestic deals 
presumably exhibit less asymmetric information asymmetries between acquirers and 
targets. Cross-border M&A and the implication of IFRS are investigated in greater 
detail in the next section. Similar to the univariate analysis, the results of the IFRS 
dummy from both regressions suggest that the level of abnormal returns is not 
substantially higher for bidding companies after the adoption of IFRS. On this basis, the 
empirical evidence is not sufficient to accept hypothesis (H1) that overall the gains to 
bidding companies have experienced a significant positive change.  
  
                                                                                                              
38 The coefficients based on the 11-days window are positive with 1.05 per cent in model (1) and 1.15 per cent in model (2). Both 
indicate statistical insignificance, however the magnitude suggests that these results are economically meaningful. 
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4.4.2 IFRS and Cross-Border M&A 
As proposed earlier, there are strong reasons to assume that for specific factors or 
situations, a single accounting standard across the European Union had a quantifiable 
effect on the gains to bidding companies. The proposed hypothesis concerns the 
information asymmetries in cross-border deals. From the descriptive statistics in Table 
4.4, the majority of deals are domestic and it is reasonable that bidders of domestic 
targets face less information asymmetries than in foreign targets. If not, a domestic 
bidder should, however, be able to spot questionable assets and the corresponding 
accounting standards more easily and apply an appropriate discount factor to address 
these issues. 
Bidding companies in cross-border deals should experience an impact on the gains 
from the new accounting standard due to improved transparency. The fact that the 
proportion of cross-border deals has hardly changed after the accounting harmonisation, 
suggests that competition on foreign targets remains unchanged. Due to an improved 
valuation basis and similar competition in the merger market on foreign targets, a 
positive change in abnormal returns after adoption of IFRS is expected. 
Table 4.8 presents the effect of IFRS on the gains from cross-border deals in the 
IFRS sub-samples and pooled-sample regressions with the earlier described interactive 
IFRS dummy variables.39 The F-statistics and adjusted R2 of the full sample and non 
UK-domestic regression sets have slightly improved compared to the regression models 
(1) and (2), but are still low. 
                                                                                                              
39 The interactive IFRS dummy variables are denoted as ‘D_ ’ in the tables. 
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Table 4.8: Multivariate Framework: IFRS and Cross-border M&A 
The table presents the regression results of acquirers based and listed within the European Union during the period from 01.01.1989 
to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 5-days cumulative abnormal return (−2, +2) to European bidders and is regressed are 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The pre-IFRS regressions contain all M&A deals from 
01.01.1989 to 31.12.2005 and the post-IFRS regressions all deals from 01.01.2006 to 31.12.2011. The pooled regressions contain 
interactive post-IFRS dummies of the respective variable. These IFRS-change dummies are denoted as ‘D_’. The set of explanatory 
variables includes the relative target size, a dummy variable representing the business relation between bidder and target (focus 
versus diversifying deals). Further, the models include a dummy if the acquirer and target are from a €-currency country, as well as, 
a dummy if the deal is a cross-border M&A. The intercept represents the average abnormal return to bidders after controlling for the 
effects of the explanatory variables. Regression (3) includes the full sample and regression (4) excludes UK-domestic M&A 
announcements. In parentheses are the corresponding t-stats. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, 
respectively. 
 Full Sample  Non UK-Domestic Sample 
 (3)  (4) 
 Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled  Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled 
Intercept 
0.05387 -0.05256 0.05387  2.92935** 0.72898 2.92935** 
(0.09)
 
(-0.07)
 
(0.09)
 
 (2.29)
 
(0.61)
 
(2.29)
 
D_Post-IFRS 
  -0.10643    -2.20037 
 
 
 
 
(-0.11)
 
 
  
(-1.26)
 
      
    
Relative Target Size 
0.28526 -1.12881 0.28526  0.46460 -4.48995** 0.46460 
(0.49)
 
(-1.11)
 
(0.49)
 
 (0.63)
 
(-2.53)
 
(0.63)
 
D_Relative Target Size 
  -1.41407    -4.95455*** 
  
(-1.21)
 
 
  
(-2.58)
 
    
    
Focused Deal 
-1.52859** -0.56499 -1.52859**  -2.28181** -1.33344 -2.28181** 
(-2.18)
 
(-0.67)
 
(-2.18)
 
 (-2.22)
 
(-1.27)
 
(-2.22)
 
D_Focused Deal 
  0.96360    0.94837 
  
(0.88)
 
 
  
(0.65)
 
    
    
Eurozone 
0.32489 0.00897 0.32489  -1.75144* 0.77815 -1.75144* 
(0.46)
 
(0.01)
 
(0.46)
 
 (-1.65)
 
(0.68)
 
(-1.65)
 
D_Eurozone 
  -0.31592    2.52960 
  
(-0.26)
 
 
  
(1.62)
 
        
Cross-Border 
0.55163 3.02203*** 0.55163  -1.26597 2.93719*** -1.26597 
(0.58)
 
(2.66)
 
(0.58)
 
 (-1.24)
 
(2.60)
 
(-1.24)
 
D_Cross-Border 
  2.47040*    4.20316*** 
 
 
 (1.67)
 
 
  
(2.76)
 
 
            
              
N 337 130 467   152 60 212
F-Statistics 1.27 2.08** 1.31   1.73 3.53** 1.76* 
R2 (%) 1.5 6.25 2.52   4.49 20.42 7.28
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.32 3.25 0.60   1.89 14.63 3.15
 
In the regression set (3), the intercept term indicates that bids for listed targets on 
average break even in both sub-periods. The dummy variable on the change shows that 
no statistically significant difference between both time periods exists. The relative 
target size variables suggest a positive effect on the gains in the pre-IFRS and a negative 
effect in the post-IFRS period, both statistically insignificant. The negative change is 
statistically insignificant. However, a change of -1.41 percentage points suggest 
economic relevance. Focused deals lose statistically significant -1.53 per cent in the pre-
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IFRS period and statistically insignificant -0.56 per cent in the post-IFRS period. The 
difference between the pre- and post-IFRS period is statistically insignificant, but the 
size of the change suggests economic significance. The currency proxy exhibits small 
statistically insignificant positive returns in the pre-IFRS period and a break-even 
during the post-IFRS era. Further, the statistically insignificant change indicates that 
IFRS had no major impact on this factor.  
Cross-border deals earn on average statistically insignificant 0.55 per cent during the 
pre-IFRS period40 and experience a statistically significant (10 per cent significance 
level) positive change of 2.47 percentage points to 3.02 per cent, statistically significant 
at the 1 per cent level, as well.41 This is in line with the expected positive change in 
returns from cross-border deals. 
The results with a non-UK domestic subsample are re-examined in the regression 
set (4). The overall pattern remains the same or the IFRS changes become even more 
pronounced. The intercept is with 2.93 per cent statistically significant at the 5 per cent 
level during the pre-IFRS period compared to statistically insignificant 0.73 per cent 
during the post-IFRS period. The negative change from the pre-IFRS to the post-IFRS 
period of -2.20 percentage points indicates economic relevance. The coefficient of the 
relative target size is still statistically insignificant with 0.46 per cent during the pre-
IFRS period. But during the post-IFRS period, the estimate is -4.49 per cent and 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The IFRS-change variable of about 5 
percentage points is statistically significant at a 1 per cent level. An industry-related 
target produces a statistically significant negative loss of -2.28 per cent during the pre-
IFRS period. With the adoption of IFRS, the loss decreases by 0.95 percentage points to 
-1.33 per cent, both statistically insignificant. The acquisition of a Eurozone-target leads 
                                                                                                              
40 Faccio et al.’s (2006) EU study on the targets’ public status does not offer a listed target only regression for direct comparison, 
however, univariate results suggest that listed acquirers in cross-border transactions experience an insignificant gain of 0.11 per 
cent. This is similar to the pre-IFRS period findings. 
41 Over an 11-days window, the change in abnormal returns shows a negative sign. 
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to a loss of -1.75 per cent during the pre-IFRS period, which is statistically significant at 
a 10 per cent level. A similar target leads to statistically insignificant gain of 0.78 per 
cent after the adoption of IFRS. Despite a change of 2.53 percentage points and a 
change in sign, the coefficient is not statistically significant but suggests economic 
relevance. 
The change of returns in cross-border deals increases even further and suggests 
increased statistical significance compared to the results from the regression sets (3). To 
be more specific, during the pre-IFRS period, bidders lose statistically insignificant  
-1.27 per cent. After the adoption of IFRS, gains increase by 4.20 percentage points to 
2.94 per cent. Both coefficients are statistically significant at a 1 per cent level.42  
The results from Table 4.8 show that with the adoption of IFRS, bidders can earn 
substantially more if they opt for a foreign target, indicating that information 
asymmetries between bidders and targets have declined in order to generate this change. 
The summary statistics indicate that the proportion of cross-border deals was relatively 
unaffected by the IFRS adoption. This suggests that significant barriers must to remain 
and some bidders are reluctant to diversify internationally, putting more pressure on the 
gains from cross-border M&A. 
With the regression set (6) of Table 4.11, the robustness of the regression results of 
the non-domestic UK sample are checked by adding the mode of payment. The pattern 
of results is qualitatively similar to the results from regression set (5), which will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next section. Except the post-IFRS regression, the 
adjusted R2 and the F-statistics of the regressions remain low. The intercept suggests on 
average positive abnormal returns of 2.59 per cent during the pre-IFRS era. The change 
of -3.17 percentage points is economically significant. After the adoption of IFRS, deals 
suffer on average a loss of -0.58 per cent. The relative target size contributes to a small 
                                                                                                              
42 The results of the 11-days window also suggest a positive and economically meaningful change. 
Chapter 4: Information Asymmetries and the Impact of IFRS on Bidders’ Gains 76 
  
and statistically insignificant gain of 0.37 per cent before and a loss of -4.98 per cent 
after the adoption of IFRS, statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The change of 
-5.35 percentage points is also statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Focused 
deals lose -2.19 per cent, which is statistically significant at a 5 per cent, before IFRS 
and statistically insignificant -1.54 per cent. The IFRS-change variable indicates a 
statistically insignificant positive change of 0.65 per cent. Cash offers almost break 
even with a statistically insignificant loss of -0.13 per cent before IFRS and gain by 1.41 
percentage points to statistically insignificant 1.28 per cent after the adoption of IFRS. 
The IFRS change for stock offers of 4.28 per cent is statistically significant at a 5 per 
cent level. To be more precise, stock offers lose statistically insignificant -1.46 per cent 
during the pre-IFRS period, but gain statistically significant 2.83 per cent in the post-
IFRS period. 
Cross-border deals suffer negative returns of -1.40 per cent before the accounting 
harmonisation and highly statistically significant positive gains of 3.72 per cent 
afterwards. The change of 5.12 percentage points is statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent level. 43  A relatively small sample size may hinder us to report statistically 
significant test statistics for the regressions, but the empirical evidence found in these 
regression sets are in favour for the proposed hypothesis that bidders gain more in 
cross-border deals after the adoption of IFRS. 
The acquirer’s size and the deal value, as well as, the relative target size 
characteristics in cross-border deals as a possible cause of the change in abnormal 
returns are further investigated in Table 4.9. Acquirers of foreign companies are on 
average significantly larger than acquirers of domestic firms in both sub-periods. But 
more interestingly, foreign targets are significantly larger than domestic targets during 
the post-IFRS era. The results indicate that foreign targets are more than twice the size 
                                                                                                              
43 The change in gains over the 11-days event window is with 1.30 percentage points economically meaningful. 
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in the post-IFRS period, while the size of domestic targets decreases over time. Further, 
the relative size of foreign targets is significantly smaller than domestic targets in the 
pre-IFRS period and after the IFRS adoption, the relative size is statistically indifferent. 
The same pattern is observed in  
Table 4.10, testing the median. These results confirm the previous findings that IFRS 
contributed to an improved transparency on foreign targets. Increased deal values and 
relative target sizes suggest that a reduction of information asymmetries in cross-border 
deals. 
Table 4.9: Deal Features: Cross-border M&A (Mean Analysis) 
The table presents the mean analysis of cross-border deal features of acquirers based and listed within the European Union during 
the period from 01.01.1989 to 31.12.2011. The acquirer’s market value is measured 15 trading days before the bid was announced. 
The market and deal values are in US$ millions and the price level of the bidder’s market index observed at each point in time. The 
base date is the 01.01.2005. The relative size of target is the deal value divided by the acquirer’s market value as described here. In 
parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Panel A: Acquirer’s Market Value 
 Domestic Foreign  Domestic vs. Foreign 
Pre-IFRS 
3,476.3*** 10,060.7***  6,584.4*** 
(<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0004)
 
Post-IFRS 
5,931.1*** 13,459.2***  7,528.1* 
(0.0002)  (0.0030)   (0.0961)  
     
Pre- vs. Post-IFRS 
2,454.8  3,398.5    
(0.1563)  (0.4425)    
Panel B: Deal Value 
 Domestic Foreign  Domestic vs. Foreign 
Pre-IFRS 
1,057.1 2,037.8***  980.7 
(0.0046) (0.0030)  (0.1991) 
Post-IFRS 
619.4*** 5,091.5**  4,472.1** 
(<.0001) (0.0110)  (0.0239) 
     
Pre- vs. Post-IFRS 
437.7 3,053.7   
(0.2655) (0.1317)   
Panel C: Relative Target Size 
 Domestic Foreign  Domestic vs. Foreign 
Pre-IFRS 
0.4915*** 0.3031***  0.1884*** 
(<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0009) 
Post-IFRS 
0.4048*** 0.4696***  0.0649 
(<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.4968) 
     
Pre- vs. Post-IFRS 
-0.0868 0.1665** 
  
(0.1418) (0.0365)   
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Table 4.10: Deal Features: Cross-border M&A (Median Analysis) 
The table presents the median analysis of cross-border deal features of acquirers based and listed within the European Union during 
the period from 01.01.1989 to 31.12.2011. The acquirer’s market value is measured 15 trading days before the bid was announced. 
The market and deal values are in US$ millions and the price level of the bidder’s market index observed at each point in time. The 
base date is the 01.01.2005. The relative size of target is the deal value divided by the acquirer’s market value as described here. In 
parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Panel A: Acquirer’s Market Value 
 Domestic Foreign  Domestic vs. Foreign 
Pre-IFRS 
550.3*** 3695.9 ***  3145.5*** 
(<.0001)
 
(<.0001) 
 
 (<.0001)
 
Post-IFRS 
622.3*** 3463.4 ***  2841.13*** 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) 
 
 (0.0037)
 
      
Pre- vs. Post-IFRS 
71.9  232.47   
(0.5467)  (0.6639)    
Panel B: Deal Value 
 Domestic Foreign  Domestic vs. Foreign 
Pre-IFRS 
118.2*** 430.5 ***  312.3*** 
(<.0001)
 
(<.0001) 
 
 (<.0001)
 
Post-IFRS 
104.5*** 1020.2 ***  915.7*** 
(<.0001)
 
(<.0001) 
 
 (0.0003)
     
Pre- vs. Post-IFRS 
13.7 589.7  
(0.7574)
 
(0.1583)  
Panel C: Relative Target Size 
 Domestic Foreign  Domestic vs. Foreign 
Pre-IFRS 
0.2897*** 0.2262 ***  0.0635*** 
(<.0001)
 
(<.0001) 
 
 (0.0071)
Post-IFRS 
0.2679*** 0.4462 ***  0.1783
(<.0001)
 
(<.0001) 
 
 (0.1529)
    
Pre- vs. Post-IFRS 
0.0218 0.2200 **  
(0.1544) (0.0105) 
 
 
 
Overall, the gains to bidders in cross-border deals experience an increase after the 
adoption of IFRS. However, the results also show that some barriers, especially for 
smaller acquirers, must still exist in the market for corporate control. As a result, 
competition for foreign targets did not increase after the adoption. Predominately, larger 
firms engage in foreign acquisitions as they have probably more resources available to 
overcome the obstacles in cross-border M&A. The results also indicate that acquirers 
gained more confidence in purchasing larger foreign targets after the adoption of IFRS 
which might have led to higher NPV projects and consequently, to higher gains to 
bidding companies. This suggests that the adoption of IFRS had a positive effect on the 
transparency of foreign listed targets across the European Union by removing the 
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proportion of risk concerning a misinterpretation of financial statements. Further, the 
cross-border variable remains statistically significant after adding the mode of payment 
variables to the regression model. The results support hypothesis (H2), that cross-border 
deals experience a significant impact from the adoption of IFRS. 
4.4.3 IFRS and Mode of Payment 
In this subsection, the final hypothesis regarding the IFRS effect on the mode of 
payment is investigated. The argument by Hansen (1987) on the choice of the payment 
method in M&A suggests that the preferred payment method is driven by the managers’ 
confidence in the outcome of the deal and the desire to transfer risk. In the context of 
this study, a significant change in the returns to shareholders based on the payment 
method due to an altered level of information transparency is expected. 
In Table 4.11, the mode of payment variables are added to the regression models. 
Considering the sample size, the F-statistics and adjusted R2 of regression set (5) 
reaches levels of comparable M&A studies.44 The intercept term suggests that bidders 
break even before the adoption of the common accounting practice in the European 
Union. After the adoption of IFRS, bids for listed targets generate a loss of -2.08 per 
cent, which is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The change of 2.10 
percentage points can be considered as economically meaningful. The relative target 
size is positive and statistically insignificant with 0.41 per cent in the pre-IFRS era and 
also statistically insignificant with -0.86 per cent in the post-IFRS era. The change in 
signs and return of more than 1.2 percentage points suggest an economic relevant 
impact of IFRS. Focused deals during the pre-IFRS period produce losses of -1.76 per 
cent which are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. After the IFRS adoption, 
focused deals break even with statistically insignificant returns of -0.10 per cent. Again, 
                                                                                                              
44 Fuller et al. (2002) present in their M&A study on the target’s public listing similar figures from their dummy-dominated 
regressions. 
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the change of 1.67 percentage points is economically meaningful. The currency proxy 
suggests a positive return of 0.97 per cent during the pre-IFRS era and a slightly lower 
return of 0.61 per cent in the post-IFRS period. The decrease of -0.36 per cent is 
statistically insignificant. 
The coefficient of cross-border variable shows a small insignificant negative return 
of -0.20 per cent for the pre-IFRS period and a highly statistically significant positive 
return of 3.02 per cent in the post-IFRS period.45 The IFRS-change variable suggests a 
statistically significant increase at the 5 per cent level. This is further evidence regarding 
the cross-border hypothesis (H2). Before the adoption, cross-border deals might have 
been considered opaque, but after the adoption this seems to have changed. Bidders, 
who overcome the potential barriers, are rewarded with significant positive gains. 
The presented results suggest that the mode of payment served as mean of altering 
the risk level in M&A transactions. Cash deals still earn more than stock deals and the 
results show that cash and stock offers experience an increase in gains after the adoption 
of IFRS. However, the impact of the IFRS adoption is higher on stock offers. The fact 
that stock offers experience a change in signs, as well as, an increase by two percentage 
points underpin the statistical and economic relevance. As a whole, the findings support 
hypothesis (H3).  
Cash offers earn a statistically insignificant positive return of 0.95 per cent before the 
adoption of IFRS and a statistically significant positive return of 2.40 per cent 
afterwards. The difference in gains between pre- and post-IFRS is statistically 
insignificant, but a change in returns of roughly 1.44 percentage points indicates an 
economically relevant implication. 
                                                                                                              
45 The coefficient of the 11-days window is 0.83 percentage points economically meaningful. 
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Table 4.11: Multivariate Framework: IFRS, Cross-border M&A and Mode of Payment  
The table presents the regression results of acquirers based and listed within the European Union during the period from 01.01.1989 
to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 5-days cumulative abnormal return (−2, +2) to European bidders and is regressed a set 
of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The pre-IFRS regressions contain all M&A deals from 01.01.1989 to 
31.12.2005 and the post-IFRS regressions all deals from 01.01.2006 to 31.12.2011. The pooled regressions contain interactive post-
IFRS dummies of the respective variable. These IFRS-change dummies are denoted as ‘D_’. The set of explanatory variables 
includes the relative target size, a dummy variable representing the business relation between bidder and target (focus versus 
diversifying deals). Further, the models include a dummy if the acquirer and target are from a €-currency country, as well as, a 
dummy if the deal is a cross-border M&A. Two dummies represent the mode of payment proxies, cash and stock offers. The 
intercept represents the average abnormal return to bidders after controlling for the effects of the explanatory variables. Regression 
(5) includes the full sample and regression (6) excludes UK-domestic M&A announcements. In parentheses are the corresponding t-
stats. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Non UK-Domestic Sample 
 (5)  (6) 
 Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled  Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled 
Intercept 
0.02622 -2.08039* 0.02622  2.59271 -0.58067 2.59271
(0.03) (-1.75) (0.03)  (1.57) (-0.40) (1.57)
D_Post-IFRS 
-2.10660  -3.17338
(-1.49)  (-1.45)
 
 
Relative Target Size 
0.40579 -0.85515 0.40579  0.37288 -4.98182*** 0.37288
(0.67) (-0.81) (0.67)  (0.49) (-2.94) (0.49)
D_Relative Target Size 
-1.26094  -5.35470*** 
(-1.04)  (-2.88)
 
 
Focused Deal 
-1.76345*** -0.09507 -1.76345***  -2.19080** -1.53745 -2.19080** 
(-2.57) (-0.11) (-2.57)  (-2.07) (-1.38) (-2.07)
D_Focused Deal 
1.66839  0.65335
(1.50)  (0.43)
 
 
Eurozone 
0.96877 0.60794 0.96877  -0.79548 0.74645 -0.79548
(1.36) (0.60) (1.36)  (-0.69) (0.66) (-0.69)
D_Eurozone 
-0.36083  1.54194
(-0.29)  (0.96)
 
 
Cross-Border 
-0.20453 3.01943*** -0.20453  -1.40282 3.71936*** -1.40282
(-0.22) (2.67) (-0.22)  (-1.30) (3.76) (-1.30)
D_Cross-Border 
3.22395**  5.12217*** 
(2.22)  (3.50)
 
 
Cash Offer 
0.94733 2.39356** 0.94733  -0.13041 1.28144 -0.13041
(1.15) (2.20) (1.15)  (-0.10) (1.10) (-0.10)
D_Cash Offer 
1.44623  1.41184
(1.06)  (0.82)
 
 
Stock Offer 
-1.80762** 1.13124 -1.80762**  -1.45908 2.82275** -1.45908
(-2.06) (0.80) (-2.06)  (-1.11) (2.14) (-1.11)
D_Stock Offer 
2.93885*  4.28184** 
(1.77)  (2.30)
              
              
N 334 131 465  151 59 210
F-Statistics 2.91*** 2.18** 2.27***  1.14 3.48*** 1.41
R2 (%) 5.06 9.55 6.13  4.55 28.67 8.56
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.32 5.18 3.43  0.58 20.44 2.50
 
Stock offers suffer a statistically significant loss of -1.81 per cent at the 5 per cent 
significance level during the pre-IFRS era and yield positive but statistically 
insignificant returns of 1.13 per cent during the post-IFRS period. The change of 2.94 
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percentage points is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.46,47 As presented 
earlier, the stock payment coefficients indicate similar results as in the non-UK 
domestic regression set (6). The gains from stock offers are negative returns in the pre-
IFRS period and positive gains in the post-IFRS period. The change of 4.28 percentage 
points is statically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
To provide further evidence on stock payments as a mean to hedge information 
asymmetries in M&A transactions, this aspect is examined in a probit model in Table 
4.12. This type of model with stock payments as the dependent variable and high 
intangible assets as the key explanatory variable should yield results in favour of the 
proposed hypothesis. Intangible assets can be considered as difficult-to-value assets, as 
the nature of these assets is relatively opaque for an outsider and the value in the 
financial reports is to some extent dependent on the management’s discretion. In the 
context of this study, stock offers should be less concerned about the risk transfer of a 
misinterpretation of intangible assets after the accounting harmonisation. If IFRS has 
contributed to an improved transparency, then the intangible assets coefficient should 
reflect this change.  
The pre-IFRS model and the intangible asset variable are highly statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. Besides the intercept term, the intangible asset 
variable has the largest estimate. For the post-IFRS period, the results suggest a 
statistically insignificant model, as well as, a statistically significant intangible assets 
dummy variable. These findings emphasise the role of intangible assets in explaining 
the probability of the choice of a stock payment during the pre-IFRS period. The results 
suggest that stock payments played an important role in hedging risk associated with 
intangible assets. After IFRS was implemented, the need for risk transfer was lessened 
                                                                                                              
46 The stock payment coefficient is with 1.67 percentage points economically significant. 
47 Draper and Paudyal’s (2006) report qualitative similar results for the pre-IFRS period. In their UK study on the target listing 
status, a listed target-only regression indicates a positive insignificant abnormal returns of 0.10 per cent and significant negative 
abnormal returns of -2.11 per cent for stock offers. 
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due to improved accounting standards. Indeed, a positive significant relative target size 
coefficient of the post-IFRS model suggests that stocks may now primarily serve as a 
financing tool. 
Table 4.12: Probit Model: Stock Offer 
The table presents the results of a probit model with the dependent variable being stock offers. The explanatory variables are the 
relative target size (deal value divided by the acquirer’s market value), a dummy for focused deals, a dummy if the acquirer and 
target are from a €-currency country and a dummy variable for target high intangibles assets. In parentheses are the corresponding p-
values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Stock Offer: 
Pre-IFRS  Post-IFRS 
Estimate Pr > ChiSq  Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -0.7379*** (<.0001)  -1.1299 (<.0001) 
  
 
 
   
Relative Target Size 0.1762 (0.1526)  0.5638** (0.0443) 
 
 
 
   
Focused Deal -0.0690 (0.6419)  0.0813 (0.7454) 
 
 
 
   
Eurozone 0.2977* (0.0666)  0.1218 (0.6666) 
 
 
 
   
High Intangible Assets 0.6628*** (0.0036)  0.2964 (0.2428) 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
Likelihood Ratio 13.9076*** (0.0076)  5.9654 (0.2017) 
 
 
 
   
No. of observations (1/0) 100/236 
 
 33/97  
 
Overall, the results support the risk transfer hypothesis of stock payments. The 
intention to transfer risk due to uncertainties of reporting issues seem to be reduced. The 
fact that cash offers still earn more further supports this argument. Managers choose 
cash payments if they are highly confident in a successful outcome of the merger, since 
there is hardly any incentive to share risk or profits with the targets’ shareholders. Stock 
offers have experienced a significant positive change in abnormal returns in mergers 
with potential information asymmetries. This indicates that IFRS has contributed to a 
more transparent information environment in the merger market. Further, the creation of 
new blockholders in the target country might be a valuable monitoring tool and helpful 
support for the management team to assess the prevailing market condition. In 
summary, empirical evidence supports for the third hypothesis (H3) regarding the mode 
of payment in M&A, that a significant increase of abnormal returns in stock payments is 
expected due to an improved transparency situation.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
With the mandatory adoption of IFRS, another step was undertaken to create a more 
integrated European Union. This study examines this goal in the market for corporate 
control. Since the adoption of IFRS is expected to have a greater impact on the 
reduction of information asymmetries of public companies, a sample of listed target 
takeovers within the European Union is examined over a time period from 1989 to 
2011. 
Empirical evidence suggest that the overall gains to bidding companies have not 
statistically increased. However, a small sample size might hinder to report results at 
conventional significance levels. But, economically meaningful changes indicate the 
relevance of IFRS on an improved transparency level of listed targets. 
The results in this study also show that the examined information asymmetries 
proxies do experience a significant change. For example, cross-border deals exhibit a 
significant positive increase in returns. Further investigations on these results suggest 
that significant barriers must have remained in the European M&A market since the 
takeover activity remains constant and acquirers who engage in cross-border M&A are 
significantly larger. The evidence also suggests that IFRS has helped to gain acquirers’ 
confidence in interpreting financial reports, evidenced by increased deal values and 
relative target sizes. Higher absolute gains from larger takeovers might be the main 
source for the significant changes in gains after the adoption of IFRS in the European 
Union. 
Stock offers, the second examined information asymmetry proxy, indicate a 
significant change as well. As proposed, stock offers show a significant and greater 
change in gains than cash offers. The results support the hypothesis that stock payments, 
a mean to transfer risk in M&A transactions has lost some relevance due to more 
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available information on target firms. Further tests on the targets’ high intangible assets 
support this hypothesis. Before the regulator adopted a common accounting standard in 
the European Union, a high proportion of intangible assets increased the probability of 
stock offers. With the adoption of IFRS, this feature diminished and the tests suggest 
that stock payments primarily serve to finance M&A transactions. 
However, this research area is not finalised yet and especially the indicated barriers 
in cross-border deals require more exploration, so smaller companies may also profit 
from a more integrated European market. Further, the impact of the recent financial 
crisis and following years should be taken into consideration later in time. At the 
completion of this study, several European economies were still in turmoil. Future 
research might investigate how the effects of an improved transparency among 
companies in an integrated market might has helped to regain trust and confidence to 
recover from recession. 
In summary, the findings of this study align with the majority of accounting research 
that the adoption of a single mandatory accounting standard has improved the 
transparency for listed companies in the European Union. The regulator’s reasoning that 
“it is important for the competitiveness of Community capital markets to achieve 
convergence of the standards used in Europe for preparing financial statements, with 
international accounting standards that can be used globally, for cross-border 
transactions or listing anywhere in the world” (Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002, (5)) 
finds support in the results. The findings indicate that IFRS has a positive effect on 
mergers by reducing the risk of misinterpretation of financial accounts. Further, 
managers can create value for their shareholders by engaging in apparent high 
information asymmetry deals. The European Commission’s goal to create a more 
integrated financial market across the member countries of the European Union has 
made a step forward, however, further actions are necessary to encourage also smaller 
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firms enter the European M&A market.  
87 
 
5. Industry Prospects and the Impact on 
Acquirers’ Gains 
5.1 Introduction 
M&A research has identified that target shareholders earn significant positive returns 
around deal announcements. The findings on the returns to acquiring shareholders are 
not as clear-cut. Several factors have been identified over the years that have a 
significant positive, as well as, a negative impact on shareholders’ wealth.48 
To the author's best knowledge, no study has however examined whether information 
relating to growth prospects of an industry is seen as important by investors. This study 
intends to fill this gap by investigating the investors’ perception of information on an 
industry level, as well as, their preferences on acquisition strategies based on the 
prevailing industry prospects. As Robert Bruner’s opening quote signifies, industry 
prospects are expected to have a significant impact on the returns to acquiring firms. To 
measure and classify the prospects of an industry, quarterly moving industry P/E 
medians are used in a framework similar to Bollinger Bands. This concept is primarily 
used in technical stock analysis to detect trends and trading signals. 
The findings of this study show that acquirers operating in industries with a positive 
outlook earn significantly higher returns than acquirers with declining industry 
prospects. However, once the industry relation between acquirer and target is taken into 
account, the results reveal that the industry prospects maintain a significant impact on 
                                                                                                              
48 See, for example, Moeller et al. (2004) for the acquirer’s size, Fuller et al. (2002) for the target’s relative size, Wansley et al. 
(1983, 1987) for the mode of payment, Faccio et al. (2006) for the target’s listing status. 
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the gains from focused deals, whereas the effect almost disappears in diversifying deals.  
A plausible reason might be that since managers emphasise the strategic orientation 
of the core business activity in focused deals, the firm’s future performance remains to 
some extent dependent on the acquirer’s industry growth. On the other hand, the 
acquiring company lowers in a diversifying deal the exposure to its industry growth by 
adding a new business segment to their corporate portfolio.  
Further support on the impact of industry prospects on the returns to acquiring 
companies provides tests on the relative target size and the mode of payment. The 
relative target size as an indicator of the deal’s impact on the company’s future results 
suggests that the industry prospects have a greater impact on focused deals than on 
diversifying deals. In focused transactions, larger targets have an enhancing effect of 
industry prospects on the returns to acquiring companies.  
Moreover, evidence suggests that the payment method in focused deals also signals 
the acquiring managers' perception of their company's current value, whereas the results 
from diversifying deals may support the risk transfer argument. In focused deals, the 
returns reflect both the valuation signal of the payment method and industry prospects. 
On the other hand, the results for diversifying transactions are consistent with the 
previous findings that industry prospects have no significant effect on this deal type. 
The main findings are robust to a multivariate framework.  
The results also suggest a behavioural bias regarding information content. The 
perception of focused and diversifying deals within different industry prospects is not 
consistent. Investors seem to have no particular preference for focused or diversifying 
deals in growing industries, as both deal types yield similar returns. However, investors 
prefer diversifying acquisitions over focused deals in declining industries. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section sets out the 
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arguments on the impact of industry prospects on the acquirers’ returns and offers 
testable hypotheses. Section 5.3 discusses the data and methodologies to test the 
hypotheses. In Section 5.4, the findings are presented and discussed. Finally, Section 
5.5 concludes with a summary of the findings. 
5.2 Industry Prospects and Acquirers’ Gains - 
Hypotheses Development 
5.2.1 Industry Prospects and the Impact on the Gains to 
Acquirers 
As mentioned, the prevailing industry prospects are expected to have a significant 
impact on the shareholder wealth of acquiring companies. Besides the expected 
financial or operational gains from a merger, the economic success of the combined 
company is also determined by external factors, such as business cyclicality or growth 
opportunities. In particular, industry growth or prospects should significantly influence 
the future performance of a firm. Therefore, evidence in the gains to acquiring 
companies is expected that investors assess these prospects at the time of a merger 
announcement. 
The price-earnings ratio (P/E ratio) serves in this study as a proxy for the growth 
prospects of an industry. P/E ratios are readily available in the financial press and 
widely used amongst investment professionals as a measure of growth prospects. They 
also find application during the valuation process of many corporate events, such as 
IPOs or corporate restructuring (Alford 1992). In M&A, for instance, the P/E ratio is 
used in conjunction with other ratios for a market multiple valuation approach or to 
determine the deal’s accretive or dilutive effect on earnings (Bodie et al. 2008).  
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Increasing industry P/E ratios over time indicate that growth opportunities are 
available and firms make use of them to expand their operations. Firms in growing 
industries exhibit high profit margins and increasing sales figures. In growing 
industries, the primary motive to engage in M&A is to generate further growth. These 
circumstances allow companies to achieve this goal by proactively identifying 
appropriate targets. Acquirers in growing industries may also have more negotiating 
power than acquirers in declining industries, which may have a positive effect on the 
target’s price and consequently the gains from the merger. Due to a solid earnings 
history, investors and lenders should also be more willing to provide funds to finance 
such deals. Overall, firms operating in industries with a positive outlook are expected to 
create more wealth by engaging in M&A. 
On the other hand, declining industry P/E multiples indicate that companies 
experience a decreasing trend in earnings. This suggests that companies usually face a 
decline in demand because new technology or substitutes lead to a shift in costumers’ 
preferences. As a result, these industries exhibit production overcapacities. Due to 
decreasing sales figures, companies have to deal with shrinking profit margins and firms 
in declining industries often have little growth prospects. Firms need to react to this 
situation and an acquisition may be the attempt to adjust their business strategy. 
However, due to the negative outlook, investors might be sceptical about the future of 
these companies and if a takeover is indeed an appropriate solution.  
Based on the prevailing growth opportunities, the perception of companies operating 
in growing industries is more positive than compared to companies in declining 
industries. The described properties should also be reflected in the returns to acquiring 
firms around M&A announcements. Hence, 
(H1) Acquiring firms in growing industries experience significantly higher 
abnormal returns than acquiring firms in declining industries. 
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5.2.2 Industry Prospects and Corporate Diversification 
As mentioned, the main hypothesis proposes that industry prospects have a significant 
effect on the acquirers’ gains. An investigation on the industry relation between acquirer 
and target should reveal further confirming evidence that the industry prospects have a 
significant impact on the returns. 
In focused deals, the primary source of gains is often from operational efficiency 
improvements. These involve synergies from either cost reductions or increased sales. 
In the context of this research, companies in growing industries may also take over a 
similar business in order to increase their production capacities. It cannot be ruled out 
that this is also an attempt to gain access to valuable intangible assets, such as R&D, to 
promote further growth. Overall, focused acquisitions in growing industries should be 
perceived to produce positive future gains and create shareholders’ wealth.  
On the other hand, companies in declining industries struggle with deteriorating 
earnings and managers are forced to react to this situation. From an M&A point of view, 
an acquiring company has two options: (i) To either remain focused or (ii) diversify 
their business activities. By focusing on their core business and at the same time on the 
industry they operate in, managers may intend to acquire market share in order to 
strengthen their competitive position. Further, cost synergies due to improved 
operational efficiency may be part to alleviate this situation. However, cost synergies 
unlike financial synergies should take relatively long to realise because these acquisition 
strategies require lengthy processes of eliminating duplicate positions or manufacturing 
facilities. Therefore, a focused deal may not be regarded as an appropriate strategy in 
this industry condition as this might be an attempt to take over another weak company 
with poor growth prospects. Irrespective of industry prospects, a focused deal means an 
unchanged influence of the acquirer’s industry growth rate on the combined company 
growth rate. Based on these aspects, the prevailing industry prospects are expected to 
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have a significant impact on the returns from focused deals.  
Considering diversifying M&A from a portfolio perspective, each segment or 
division represents a stock of a single-segment firm and a diversified company is 
comparable to an investment portfolio. This derived portfolio theory predicts that the 
influence of external impacts should mitigate and hence decrease risk (Lubatkin and 
Chatterjee 1994). Technically, each division in the portfolio is considered as a cash 
flow. If these cash flows are less than perfectly correlated, the overall risk of the 
portfolio should decrease. The theory predicts that the diversification effect should be 
greatest if the transaction involves two industry-unrelated businesses. In contrast, 
merging two industry-related firms with similar income streams should not affect 
diversifiable unsystematic risk (Amit and Livnat 1988; Chang and Thomas 1989). The 
purchase of an industry-unrelated company with relatively stable cash flows may create 
an internal capital market and provide acquirers access to a capital source to finance 
future projects (Williamson 1970). Since uncorrelated cash flow streams are expected to 
lower the level of corporate risk, lenders might also be inclined to grant more debt 
(Lewellen 1971), and in the vein of Modigliani and Miller (1958), higher debt levels are 
positively associated with the value of the firm. Similar to leveraged buy-outs, the 
repayment of debt over time might be an additional source of shareholders’ wealth 
creation in diversifying deals. With respect to this study, corporate diversification may 
be a strategy to acquire new growth opportunities outside of the acquirer’s industry. 
Acquirers in diversifying deals will be less dependent on the acquirer’s industry growth 
prospects, because the combined company’s performance shifts to some degree to the 
target’s industry growth rate. On this basis, industry prospects should have a less 
pronounced effect on the returns to acquirers in diversifying deals. 
In summary, the acquiring company sets its emphasis with an acquisition of an 
industry-related target on its main business activity. As a result, the future performance 
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of the combined company is to a great extent dependent on the industry growth it 
operates in. A focused deal is therefore a commitment to the industry and its outlook. 
Hence, the returns to focused acquirers should clearly reflect the different growth 
opportunities of growing and declining industries. On the contrary, an industry-
unrelated target diversifies an acquirer’s business and at the same time, diversifies the 
exposure to the acquirer’s industry growth. As a result, the gains to acquiring companies 
should be less affected by industry prospects. Therefore,  
(H2.1) Acquiring companies in focused deals earn significantly greater abnormal 
returns in growing than in declining industries. 
(H2.2) On the other hand, abnormal returns to acquiring companies in 
diversifying deals are less affected by the industry prospects. 
5.2.3 Industry Prospects, Corporate Diversification and 
Relative Target Size 
If industry prospects have a significant effect on the returns to acquiring companies, 
then they are also expected to manifest themselves with regard to the relative size of the 
target. As explained earlier, focused deals are expected to be  primarily affected by the 
prevailing industry prospects. In a focused acquisition, the dependence of future 
operational results remains largely unchanged on the acquirer’s industry growth. As the 
size of a target has a direct influence on the dollar gains from the acquisition and is a 
significant contributor to the future financial results, the relative target size should have 
an enhancing effect on the returns to acquiring companies (Asquith et al. 1983).  
Due to the size effect, an industry-related acquisition of a large target in a growing 
industry should lead to larger positive future dollar gains than a small target, whereas a 
focused takeover of a large target in a declining industry increases the risk of potential 
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negative future results more than a small target. As a result, the impact of growing and 
declining industry prospects is more pronounced in focused deals with larger targets. 
The impact of the acquirer’s industry prospects in diversifying deals is expected to be 
less pronounced. Returning to the portfolio perspective, the corporate diversification 
effect reduces predominately corporate risk. However, there might be a difference 
between relatively large and small targets as this is comparable to altering the asset 
weights in a portfolio, but the acquirer’s industry prospects should not significantly 
affect the returns to acquiring firms based on the relative target size. As mentioned, the 
dependence on the industry growth shifts in diversifying deals to some extent to the 
target’s industry performance. Hence,  
(H3.1) The abnormal returns to acquiring companies of relatively large targets in 
focused deals are significantly larger in growing than in declining industries. 
(H3.2) The industry prospects have a smaller impact on the abnormal returns to 
acquiring companies in diversifying deals in terms of the relative target size. 
5.2.4 Industry Prospects, Corporate Diversification and Mode 
of Payment 
Further evidence of a significant influence of industry prospects on the returns in 
focused and diversifying deals is anticipated based on the payment method. A 
prominent argument in explaining what payment method managers choose, suggests 
that the payment method signals the perception of the acquiring management’s own 
firm value. Similar to the pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984), a stock 
payment resembles an equity issuance. Therefore, a stock payment is a negative signal 
because managers of the acquiring firm perceive their stocks as overvalued. On the 
other hand, a cash payment signals to the market that managers consider their own 
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stocks as undervalued and therefore, prefer to pay in cash. Support for this argument is 
expected to be found in focused deals. The summary statistics indicate that in growing 
industries acquiring managers in focused deals used more stock-only than cash-only 
payments. The opposite pattern is found in declining industries that managers choose 
predominately cash over stock payments. These preliminary results suggest that 
managers in focused deals may choose a payment method relative to its firm’s 
valuation. Investors might use the valuation signals of cash and stock offers in addition 
to the industry prospects to value a deal. As a result, both cash and stock payments in 
focused deals should exhibit firm-specific valuation signals, as well as, industry-specific 
growth prospects. In detail, focused deals paid in cash have positive returns, whereas 
stock offers lead to negative returns and additionally deals announced in growing 
industries have larger returns than in declining industries.  
In diversifying mergers, operational synergies are difficult to realise and are almost 
limited to financial synergies (Leland 2007). As mentioned, industry diversification is 
expected to reduce business risk and the risk transfer argument by Hansen (1987) may 
apply to diversifying deals. A stock payment limits the risk to acquiring firm’s 
shareholders, however future gains have to be shared with target shareholders. A stock 
offer might be well perceived by investors as managers may not have the relevant 
expertise on the new industry segment. Such hedging strategies may be particularly 
attractive in declining industries to limit additional risk resulting from the transaction. A 
cash offer should be a positive signal that the management team is highly confident in a 
positive outcome of the merger. 
As a whole, the impact of industry prospects based on the mode of payment should 
be most noticeable in focused deals, whereas industry prospects should be less 
pronounced in diversifying M&A. Thus, 
(H4.1) The abnormal returns to acquiring companies in focused deals with stock 
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are negative and cash deals are positive. For each payment method, focused deals 
earn more in growing than declining industries. 
(H4.2) There is no significant impact of the industry prospects on the abnormal 
returns in diversifying deals. 
5.3 Methodologies and Data 
5.3.1 Industry Prospects 
To detect a trend in the growth prospects of an industry, a methodology originally 
stemming from technical trading analysis is adapted. The methodology is closest related 
to what is commonly known as Bollinger Bands. The underlying idea of these break-out 
strategies is that moving location measures (e.g. means or medians) smoothen a volatile 
time series and generate a trading signal (Brock 1992). The inputs and calculation 
procedures for this trading analysis, however, vary widely. As mentioned, the P/E 
multiple is used to identify the prospects of an industry. Based on 2-digit SIC codes, 
first quarterly industry P/E medians are calculated. Moving medians across 5, 9 and 13 
quarterly intervals49 and their standard deviations then form the proxies for the P/E 
trend: 
Upper/Lower Band = Moving Median +/- Standard Deviation  (5.1) 
To categorise industry prospects, the industry median when the merger was announced 
is compared to the bands. If the prevailing median is above the upper limit then the 
industry is considered as a ‘growing industry’. If the prevailing median is below the 
lower limit then the industry is categorised as a ‘declining industry’ and otherwise as a 
‘neutral industry’. In order to minimise the bias of outlier companies and to obtain 
                                                                                                              
49 These intervals are chosen with the assumption that managers have one, two or three years as an assessment period and use the 
subsequent quarter to react. The target screening process might have started during the assessment period, however, if no 
information leakage has taken place, the announcement date should be the first time investors learn about an M&A deal. 
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representative industry conditions, the calculations are based on medians. 
Campbell and Shiller (1988) point out that due to extraordinary items, single annual 
earnings are too unreliable to value a company. Using the earnings trend over time 
should reduce this bias and provide a clearer picture. In similar vein, Graham and Dodd 
(1934) suggest to use average earnings of at least five years or more to value a 
company.50 
5.3.2 Univariate Framework 
To calculate the gains surrounding M&A announcements, an event study methodology 
using a market-adjusted model is applied. The value-weighted index provided by CRSP 
serves as the corresponding market benchmark. Chapter 3.1 outlines the event study 
methodology in greater detail. 
The average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) surrounding 5-days (-2, +2)51 of the 
announcement date is estimated as: 
 =


	 ,


 (3.4) 
where  is the average (cumulative) abnormal return over the multi-day interval t, , 
is the abnormal return of stock i at day t and  is the number of sample stocks whose 
abnormal returns are available at the multi-day interval t. 
5.3.3 Multivariate Framework 
In addition to a univariate analysis, the effects of industry prospects are investigated by 
examining the bidders’ 5-days (-2, +2) cumulative abnormal returns in a multivariate 
                                                                                                              
50  This study uses quarterly data of at least five intervals with the assumption that managers react more quickly to their 
environment. 
51 CARs surrounding 3-days (-1, +1) and 11-days (-5, +5) of the announcement date are calculated and differences footnoted if 
appropriate. 
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framework as in equation (5.2): 
 −  = 	 + 	∑ 

 	 + 
  (5.2) 
where  is the cumulative return to acquirer i over the specific event window and  is 
the corresponding CRSP market return. The intercept (α) can then be regarded as a 
measure of the abnormal return after controlling for the effects of vector Xi of 
explanatory variables. The following explanatory variables are used in the regression 
framework to test the proposed hypotheses:  
Growing is a binary dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the prevailing 
quarterly 2-digit SIC code industry P/E median is higher than the industry moving 
median over 9 quarters and the standard deviation, and the value of 0 if the prevailing 
quarterly 2-digit SIC code industry P/E median is lower than the specific industry 
moving median and the standard deviation. By using only deals from growing and 
declining industries prospects, the impact on the returns to acquiring companies can be 
directly compared after controlling for other influential deal characteristics. 52  The 
second part of the multivariate analysis examines the magnitude of the industry 
prospects’ impact on the gains by adding a Growing and Declining dummy to the 
regression models. In this setting, the full sample of M&A deals is used and Growing is 
a binary dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the prevailing quarterly 2-digit 
SIC code industry P/E median is higher than the industry moving median over 9 
quarters and the standard deviation and otherwise the value of 0. Declining is a binary 
dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the prevailing quarterly 2-digit SIC 
code industry P/E median is lower than the industry moving median over 9 quarters less 
the standard deviation and otherwise the value of 0 
To test the hypotheses on corporate diversification, the Focused dummy variable 
                                                                                                              
52 Further regression results based on different variable specifications are presented, as well. 
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takes on the value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same primary two-digit SIC 
code, otherwise the value of 0. Based on the deal value to acquirer’s market value53, the 
sample is split into three equally weighted groups. Large Target is a binary dummy 
variable which takes on the value of 1 if the deal-to-market value is among the group of 
the largest ratios, otherwise the value of 0. Cash is a binary dummy variable which 
takes on the value of 1 if the payment offer is 100 per cent in cash, otherwise the value 
of 0. Stock is a binary dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the payment is 
100 per cent in the bidder’s shares, otherwise the value of 0. 
The following control variables are used in the multivariate framework of 
equation (5.2): 
Acquirer’s Market Value: Moeller et al. (2004) and Masulis et al. (2007) find that the 
acquirer’s size has a significant negative impact on the returns to acquiring companies. 
They attribute this effect to agency-related issues. The Market Value is the log of the 
acquirer’s market value measured 15 trading days before the announcement.  
Geographical Diversification: Several studies investigate a cross-border effect in 
M&A (e.g. Morck and Yeung 1992; Doukas and Travlos 1988; Moeller et al. 2005). 
Acquirers may try to generate further growth by acquiring a target abroad. To control 
for this effect, the control variable Cross-Border is added which is a binary dummy 
variable that takes on the value of 1 if the target’s nation is not the United States, 
otherwise the value of 0.  
Deal Attitude: Berle and Means (1933) argue that conflicts may arise from the 
appointment of managers who might not always act in the best interest of shareholders. 
Jensen (1986b) states that hostile takeovers may have a disciplinary effect on managers 
who do not use available resources efficiently.54 Hostile is a binary variable which takes 
                                                                                                              
53 Measured 15 trading days before the M&A announcement 
54 See also, for example, Travlos (1987), Morck et al. (1989) or Mitchell and Lehn (1990) 
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on the value of 1 if the is deal is indicated as a hostile takeover.  
Target Listing Status: A wide array of studies55 confirm that the target listing status 
has significant influence on the gains to acquiring companies. To control for a possible 
effect, a Public Target binary variable takes on the value of 1 if the target is listed, 
otherwise the value of 0. Private Target is also a dummy variable, which takes on the 
value of 1 if the target is privately-held, otherwise the value of 0. 
Financial data is known to often exhibit a non-constant volatility. This may lead to a 
violation of the assumptions regarding linear regression models of a constant variance 
in the error terms. A violation of this assumption may produce biased estimates, 
however, the main concern are biased standard errors. As a result, a wrong conclusion 
may be drawn about the validity of the hypotheses. To reduce the risk of Type I and 
Type II errors and ensure a constant variance of error terms (homoskedasticity), White-
corrected56 standard errors are calculated to arrive to reliable p-values. 
5.3.4 Data and Sample Description 
This subsection describes the sample used to examine the proposed hypotheses. Deal 
information is obtained from SDC Platinum. Share prices are downloaded from the 
CRSP tapes and accounting data from Compustat. The sample period spans from 
01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The acquirers are required to have their primary listing either 
on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ stock exchange. The targets’ listing status is either 
public, private or a subsidiary and the deal value must be US$ 1 million or greater. 
Further, the size of the target relative to the market value of the acquirer57 is set to be at 
least 1 per cent. To ensure a change in control, acquirers are required to hold less than 
50 per cent before and more than 50 per cent after the completed deal. Cash and stock 
                                                                                                              
55 See, for example, Faccio et al. (2006) for results on the US and Draper and Paudyal (2006) for the UK. 
56 See White (1980) 
57 Measured at 15 trading days before the merger announcement 
Chapter 5: Industry Prospects and the Impact on Acquirers’ Gains 101 
  
payments in this study are paid 100 per cent in cash or stocks, respectively. Any 
combination of stocks, cash or payments labelled as others are pooled as mixed 
payments. Announcements cannot fall on weekends as the corresponding stock price 
reaction cannot reliably be measured. SIC codes are required to categorise the deals as 
focused or diversifying transactions. Acquirers or targets identified as a holding 
company by the 2-digit SIC code ‘67’ are deleted from the sample. Acquisition 
techniques related to MBO/MBI, reverse takeovers or employees are excluded. The 
same accounts for deal types such as minority stake purchases, acquisitions of 
remaining interest, privatisations, leveraged buyouts, self-tenders, and share 
repurchases. In total, 16,202 deals survive the stated sample criteria. 
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show the annual distribution of the full sample. The sample 
exhibits three significant peaks. These coincide with the overall merger activity as 
presented in Chapter 2. In this sample, the peaks are in 1984 with 392 deals, in 1998 
with 1,219 deals and finally, in 2005 with 653 deals.  
Figure 5.1: Annual Distribution of M&A Deals 
The figure presents the annual distribution of M&A deals by US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The 
acquirers are required that their primary listing is either on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ stock exchange. The targets’ public 
status is either public, private or a subsidiary and the deal value is US$ 1 million or greater. Further, the relative size of the target to 
the market value of the acquirer is more than 1 per cent. To ensure a change in control, acquirers are required to hold less than 50 
per cent before and more than 50 per cent after the completed deal. The mode of payment is known and as either cash, stock or as 
others categorised. Other payment types are grouped to the mixed payments. Announcements cannot fall on weekends as the stock 
price reaction cannot be reliably measured. SIC codes are required to categorise the deals as focused or diversifying transactions. 
Acquirers or targets identified as a holding company by the 2-digit SIC code ‘67’ are deleted from the sample. Acquisition 
techniques related to MBO/MBI, reverse takeovers or employees are excluded. The same accounts for deal types such as minority 
stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, privatisations, leveraged buyouts, self-tenders, and share repurchases. 
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Table 5.1 further indicates that the annual share of focused deals rose to relatively 
consistent rate of 65 per cent by 1989. The average acquirer’s market capitalisation is 
roughly US$ 650 million bigger in declining than growing industries. Further, the 
descriptive statistics indicate that the average relative target size slightly higher in 
declining than growing industry conditions. 
Table 5.1: Annual Distribution of M&A Deals 
The table presents the annual distribution of M&A deals by US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. Panel A and 
Panel B show the annual distribution of deals by the full sample and by industry prospects, respectively. Moving P/E medians over 9 
quarters are used to measure the industry prospects. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving 
median and the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A 
announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining industry. 
Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. The average annual acquirers’ market values in US$ millions are from CRSP and the 
average annual relative target size is the deal value from SDC platinum to the acquirer’s market value in per cent. If acquirer and 
target have a matching 2-digit SIC code then the deal is categorised as focused, otherwise as diversifying.  
Panel A: Annual Distribution of Deals by the Full Sample 
Full Sample 
 Acquirers’ Relative Target Diversifying Focused 
Year N Market Value Size N % N % 
1980 23 3,045.27 33.13 14 60.87 9 39.13 
1981 158 865.25 25.12 83 52.53 75 47.47 
1982 218 573.48 41.19 106 48.62 112 51.38 
1983 296 616.81 23.44 154 52.03 142 47.97 
1984 392 850.69 31.08 156 39.80 236 60.20 
1985 177 1,775.52 57.91 89 50.28 88 49.72 
1986 203 1,163.40 36.90 73 35.96 130 64.04 
1987 208 1,323.82 33.30 69 33.17 139 66.83 
1988 194 1,783.29 46.14 75 38.66 119 61.34 
1989 273 1,499.45 29.60 95 34.80 178 65.20 
1990 225 1,101.57 35.33 80 35.56 145 64.44 
1991 300 1,092.17 23.11 90 30.00 210 70.00 
1992 427 879.31 22.98 147 34.43 280 65.57 
1993 605 1,073.74 22.90 205 33.88 400 66.12 
1994 790 1,122.70 52.94 265 33.54 525 66.46 
1995 848 1,341.07 24.23 270 31.84 578 68.16 
1996 952 1,433.29 22.86 335 35.19 617 64.81 
1997 1,178 1,935.95 24.44 414 35.14 764 64.86 
1998 1,219 3,005.80 25.28 416 34.13 803 65.87 
1999 993 4,513.30 25.42 321 32.33 672 67.67 
2000 803 5,898.72 24.68 280 34.87 523 65.13 
2001 592 3,930.73 24.05 202 34.12 390 65.88 
2002 591 2,919.09 20.15 210 35.53 381 64.47 
2003 550 4,090.74 22.14 177 32.18 373 67.82 
2004 630 2,830.89 19.12 190 30.16 440 69.84 
2005 653 4,856.28 18.81 200 30.63 453 69.37 
2006 612 4,529.39 17.87 221 36.11 391 63.89 
2007 583 6,448.92 18.43 214 36.71 369 63.29 
2008 407 3,779.48 29.48 141 34.64 266 65.36 
2009 320 6,855.40 23.50 112 35.00 208 65.00 
2010 405 7,292.68 18.32 143 35.31 262 64.69 
2011 377 5,588.68 19.67 142 37.67 235 62.33 
Total 16,202 3,034.32 25.96 5,689 35.11 10,513 64.89 
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Table 5.1 Continued 
Panel B: Annual Distribution of Deals by the Industry Prospects 
Growing Industries 
 
Neutral Industries 
 
Declining Industries 
  
Acquirers’ Relative   
  
Acquirers’ Relative 
   
Acquirers’ Relative 
  
  
Market Target Diversifying Focused 
 
 
Market Target Diversifying Focused 
 
 
Market Target Diversifying Focused 
Year N Value Size N % N % N Value Size N % N % N Value Size N % N % 
1980 13 4,674.81 18.15 9 69.23 4 30.77  9 1,023.11 54.84 4 44.44 5 55.56  1 60.64 32.49 1 100.00 - - 
1981 49 864.90 27.89 28 57.14 21 42.86  102 867.58 19.68 53 51.96 49 48.04  7 833.70 84.92 2 28.57 5 71.43 
1982 74 755.05 20.95 44 59.46 30 40.54  113 510.31 52.23 57 50.44 56 49.56  31 370.31 49.23 5 16.13 26 83.87 
1983 194 544.80 22.42 97 50.00 97 50.00  102 753.78 25.39 57 55.88 45 44.12  - - - - - - - 
1984 33 1,033.14 29.52 8 24.24 25 75.76  321 893.05 31.18 126 39.25 195 60.75  38 334.43 31.57 22 57.89 16 42.11 
1985 59 1,780.44 32.36 27 45.76 32 54.24  115 1,775.12 71.52 61 53.04 54 46.96  3 1,693.68 39.05 1 33.33 2 66.67 
1986 95 1,349.93 25.02 29 30.53 66 69.47  104 976.76 48.32 41 39.42 63 60.58  4 1,585.90 22.26 3 75.00 1 25.00 
1987 45 941.02 35.77 18 40.00 27 60.00  111 1,374.78 35.58 32 28.83 79 71.17  52 1,546.32 26.27 19 36.54 33 63.46 
1988 5 547.17 54.02 3 60.00 2 40.00  102 1,478.43 54.41 40 39.22 62 60.78  87 2,211.75 35.99 32 36.78 55 63.22 
1989 57 2,377.11 31.69 19 33.33 38 66.67  205 1,274.79 28.98 73 35.61 132 64.39  11 1,138.47 30.28 3 27.27 8 72.73 
1990 39 854.54 75.46 13 33.33 26 66.67  140 1,267.11 25.92 48 34.29 92 65.71  46 807.20 29.94 19 41.30 27 58.70 
1991 150 991.24 21.64 36 24.00 114 76.00  145 1,227.66 24.38 53 36.55 92 63.45  5 190.57 30.04 1 20.00 4 80.00 
1992 142 1,196.87 15.81 36 25.35 106 74.65  282 718.07 26.51 110 39.01 172 60.99  3 1,003.78 29.97 1 33.33 2 66.67 
1993 186 1,370.03 20.40 62 33.33 124 66.67  363 906.42 25.46 136 37.47 227 62.53  56 1,174.25 14.57 7 12.50 49 87.50 
1994 62 938.38 22.30 28 45.16 34 54.84  612 970.47 60.91 186 30.39 426 69.61  116 2,024.36 27.28 51 43.97 65 56.03 
1995 116 750.11 25.16 46 39.66 70 60.34  693 1,424.04 23.87 205 29.58 488 70.42  39 1,624.38 28.01 19 48.72 20 51.28 
1996 382 1,220.14 17.77 106 27.75 276 72.25  505 1,561.72 25.95 209 41.39 296 58.61  65 1,688.08 28.84 20 30.77 45 69.23 
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Table 5.1 Continued 
1997 443 2,387.50 23.47 123 27.77 320 72.23  651 1,754.89 25.68 264 40.55 387 59.45  84 957.86 19.95 27 32.14 57 67.86 
1998 401 3,044.54 25.16 134 33.42 267 66.58  501 3,412.49 25.84 174 34.73 327 65.27  317 2,314.04 24.57 108 34.07 209 65.93 
1999 37 6,287.85 51.12 8 21.62 29 78.38  770 4,523.14 22.52 259 33.64 511 66.36  186 4,119.58 32.32 54 29.03 132 70.97 
2000 256 5,684.85 16.51 86 33.59 170 66.41  393 6,151.55 27.90 160 40.71 233 59.29  154 5,609.02 30.03 34 22.08 120 77.92 
2001 185 7,209.79 19.78 80 43.24 105 56.76  387 2,300.33 25.57 115 29.72 272 70.28  20 5,147.54 34.21 7 35.00 13 65.00 
2002 88 4,602.47 22.17 28 31.82 60 68.18  322 1,813.95 22.01 118 36.65 204 63.35  181 4,066.70 15.87 64 35.36 117 64.64 
2003 99 5,696.46 18.68 22 22.22 77 77.78  443 3,476.16 23.14 151 34.09 292 65.91  8 18,252.31 9.92 4 50.00 4 50.00 
2004 265 3,057.70 19.39 67 25.28 198 74.72  350 2,502.23 18.48 114 32.57 236 67.43  15 6,492.60 29.32 9 60.00 6 40.00 
2005 159 2,600.11 18.05 56 35.22 103 64.78  410 4,989.64 18.00 119 29.02 291 70.98  84 8,475.99 24.19 25 29.76 59 70.24 
2006 102 2,055.21 20.11 37 36.27 65 63.73  439 3,778.93 17.72 158 35.99 281 64.01  71 12,723.98 15.60 26 36.62 45 63.38 
2007 102 4,651.93 15.57 38 37.25 64 62.75  401 7,326.24 20.04 144 35.91 257 64.09  80 4,342.54 14.01 32 40.00 48 60.00 
2008 20 3,070.53 23.90 4 20.00 16 80.00  157 5,590.43 39.31 60 38.22 97 61.78  230 2,604.96 23.25 77 33.48 153 66.52 
2009 16 48,906.89 26.04 10 62.50 6 37.50  264 4,364.05 20.27 86 32.58 178 67.42  40 6,477.73 43.80 16 40.00 24 60.00 
2010 57 6,589.79 16.95 22 38.60 35 61.40  309 7,318.05 19.02 110 35.60 199 64.40  39 8,118.92 14.81 11 28.21 28 71.79 
2011 101 7,364.33 14.40 36 35.64 65 64.36  212 4,985.81 22.52 81 38.21 131 61.79  64 4,783.47 18.53 25 39.06 39 60.94 
Total 4,032 2,993.85 22.02 1,360 33.73 2,672 66.27  10,033 2,918.26 27.66 3,604 35.92 6,429 64.08  2,137 3,655.55 25.39 725 33.93 1,412 66.07 
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The descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 5.2 also suggest that the proportion of 
focused and diversifying deals in growing and declining industries remains relatively 
similar. The relative target size shows that small targets and medium targets remain 
relatively constant across all industry prospects with roughly 3 and 10 per cent, 
respectively. Whereas, the relative target size increases from 56 per cent in growing 
industries to 61 per cent declining industries. Panel B of Table 5.2 reveals that acquirers 
in growing industries prefer to buy larger related targets, whereas acquirers with neutral 
or declining industry prospects purchase larger unrelated targets. 
For the full sample (Table 5.2, Panel A), cash-only payments were used in roughly 
35 per cent and stock-only payments in roughly 25 per cent of all deals. The summary 
statistics also show that stock-only deals were preferred in roughly 31 per cent by 
acquirers in growing industries compared to about 23 per cent in declining industries. 
Cash-only were used in 30 per cent of the cases in growing industries and roughly 38 
per cent in declining industries. This is a first indication regarding the choice of 
payment method based on the valuation argument. Panel B indicates that this is driven 
by focused deals. Cash-only deals increase by about 5 percentage points from growing 
to declining industries and stock-only deals decrease by about 10 percentage points 
from growing to declining industries. In comparison, the use of cash in diversifying 
deals increases by roughly 4 per cent and decrease about 5 percentage points in stock 
deals from growing to declining industries. 
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics 
The table presents the annual distribution of M&A deals by US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. Panel A 
shows the summary statistics of the full sample and by the industry prospects. Panel B presents the summary statistics of focused 
and diversifying deals in growing, neutral and declining industries. Moving medians over 9 quarters are used to measure the 
industry prospects. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving median and the standard deviation 
then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving 
median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as 
neutral. If acquirer and target have a matching 2-digit SIC code then the deal is categorised as focused, otherwise as diversifying. 
Cash or stock is a payment in cash-only or stock-only. Mixed is a combination of stocks and cash. The relative target size is deal 
value from SDC platinum to the acquirer’s market value from CRSP. The relative target size has been split into three equally 
weighted groups. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of the Full Sample and the Industry Prospects 
  
 
 
Growing Neutral Declining 
Full Sample  Industries Industries Industries 
Mode of 
Payment 
Cash 
N 5,647  1,213 3,612 822 
% 34.85  30.08 36.00 38.47 
Mixed 
N 6,497   1,563 4,100 834 
% 40.10  38.76 40.87 39.03 
Stock 
N 4,058  1,256 2,321 481 
% 25.05  31.15 23.13 22.51 
Industry 
Relation 
Diversifying 
N 5,689  1,360 3,604 725 
% 35.11  33.73 35.92 33.93 
Focused 
N 10,513  2,672 6,429 1,412 
% 64.89  66.27 64.08 66.07 
Relative 
Target Size 
Small 
N 5,400  1,384 3,300 716 
Mean 2.82  2.82 2.83 2.80 
% 33.33  34.33 32.89 33.50 
Medium 
N 5,401  1,375 3,348 678 
Mean 10.06  9.95 10.10 10.03 
% 33.34  34.10 33.37 31.73 
Large 
N 5,401  1,273 3,385 743 
Mean 64.99  55.94 69.24 61.18 
% 33.34  31.57 33.74 34.77 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Focused or Diversifying Deals in Growing, Neutral and Diversifying Deals 
   
Growing Industries 
 
Neutral Industries 
 
Declining Industries 
   
Diversifying Focused 
 
Diversifying Focused 
 
Diversifying Focused 
Mode of 
Payment 
Cash 
N 441  772   1,396  2,216   303  519  
% 32.43 28.89  38.73 34.47  41.79 36.76 
Mixed 
N 617  946   1,527  2,573   296  538  
% 45.37 35.40  42.37 40.02  40.83 38.10 
Stock 
N 302  954   681  1,640   126  355  
% 22.21 35.70  18.90 25.51  17.38 25.14 
Relative 
Target Size 
Small 
N 493  891   1,272  2,028   252  464  
Mean 2.78 2.84  2.75 2.88  2.86 2.76 
% 36.25 33.35  35.29 31.54  34.76 32.86 
Medium 
N 484  891   1,168  2,180   246  432  
Mean 9.97 9.94  10.06 10.13  10.01 10.04 
% 35.59 33.35  32.41 33.91  33.93 30.59 
Large 
N 383  890   1,164  2,221   227  516  
Mean 52.35 57.48  81.78 62.66  62.01 60.81 
% 28.16 33.31  32.3 34.55  31.31 36.54 
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The descriptive statistics in Table 5.3 show that the Business Equipment industry is 
most active in this sample, followed by Finance, Other and Health. Noteworthy, 
Finance, Energy and Telecom have a focused deal type rate of over 70 per cent across 
the full sample. There is no common trend in a shift to focused or diversifying deals in 
growing or declining industry prospects. Utility firms increase the focused deal type rate 
to 80 per cent in declining industries. However, the number of deals is too small to draw 
a reliable conclusion. The remainder of industries indicate rate changes between 0.20 
and 11.64 percentage points. The preliminary findings indicate that managers are 
sensitive to the potential industry growth. The impact of the industry prospects on the 
gains to acquiring companies is examined in greater detail in the next section.  
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Table 5.3: Distribution of Deals by Industry 
The table presents the distribution of deals per industry by US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The industry classification is adopted from the Fama and French 12 industry portfolios. Moving 
medians over 9 quarters are used to measure the industry prospects. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving median and the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a 
growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified 
as neutral. If acquirer and target have a matching 2-digit SIC code then the deal is categorised as focused, otherwise as diversifying. 
 
 Full Sample  Growing Industries  Neutral Industries  Declining Industries 
 
 Diversifying Focused  Diversifying Focused  Diversifying Focused  Diversifying Focused 
Industry Classification  N % N %  N % N %  N % N %  N % N % 
Consumer Non-Durables  287 39.32 443 60.68  70 40.00 105 60.00  193 38.52 308 61.48  24 44.44 30 55.56 
Consumer Durables  174 51.63 163 48.37  33 50.00 33 50.00  121 53.54 105 46.46  20 44.44 25 55.56 
Manufacturing  946 58.94 659 41.06  207 62.35 125 37.65  569 58.24 408 41.76  170 57.43 126 42.57 
Energy  154 24.88 465 75.12  28 25.93 80 74.07  97 24.25 303 75.75  29 26.13 82 73.87 
Chemicals  132 43.56 171 56.44  36 43.37 47 56.63  76 45.24 92 54.76  20 38.46 32 61.54 
Business Equipment  1,483 35.00 2,754 65.00  343 35.00 637 65.00  970 35.78 1,741 64.22  170 31.14 376 68.86 
Telecommunications  216 29.31 521 70.69  61 31.28 134 68.72  132 28.03 339 71.97  23 32.39 48 67.61 
Utilities  130 38.81 205 61.19  17 37.78 28 62.22  107 41.15 153 58.85  6 20.00 24 80.00 
Shops  552 47.26 616 52.74  110 47.41 122 52.59  363 47.76 397 52.24  79 44.89 97 55.11 
Health  474 30.94 1,058 69.06  131 33.42 261 66.58  286 29.85 672 70.15  57 31.32 125 68.68 
Finance  362 13.47 2,326 86.53  116 12.13 840 87.87  201 14.28 1,207 85.72  45 13.89 279 86.11 
Other  779 40.76 1,132 59.24  208 44.44 260 55.56  489 40.99 704 59.01  82 32.80 168 67.20 
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5.4 Results 
Before analysing the impact of industry prospects on the returns to acquiring firms 
within a single-factor framework, the overall acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns of 
the full sample are presented in Panel A of Table 5.4. The average gain to acquirers is 
qualitative similar with comparable M&A studies. Over a 3-days event window, 
acquirers gain on average 0.99 per cent. The returns increase to 1.22 and 1.57 per cent 
over the 5- and 11-days event windows, respectively. The test statistics indicate highly 
statistically significant results at the 1 per cent level for each event window.  
Table 5.4: Full Sample and Corporate Diversification: Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 
to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1),(-2, +2) and (-5, +5) 
using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. Panel A presents the results of the acquirers’ returns of the full sample 
and Panel B by the industry relation of acquirer and target. If acquirer and target have a matching 2-digit SIC code then the deal is 
categorised as focused, otherwise as diversifying. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the 
significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into 
account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by the Full Sample 
    (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Full Sample  N  Mean p  Mean p  Mean P 
All Acquirers 
 
16,202  0.9910*** <.0001  1.2200 *** <.0001  1.5729 *** <.0001 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by the Industry Relation 
    (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Industry Relation  N  Mean p  Mean p  Mean P 
Focused  10,512  0.8873*** <.0001  1.0996 *** <.0001  1.3962 *** <.0001 
Diversifying  5,690  1.1825*** <.0001  1.4425 *** <.0001  1.8995 *** <.0001 
Focused vs. Diversifying    0.2952*** 0.0075  0.3429 ** 0.0125  0.5033 *** 0.0088 
 
As reference, Fuller et al. (2002) find that acquirers gain on average 1.77 per cent (1 
per cent significance level) over a 5-days event window between 1990 and 2000. Rosen 
(2006) documents that acquirers generate a statistically significant average return of 
1.86 per cent over a 5-days event window during the time period from 1982 to 2001. 
Cai et al. (2011) examine M&A announcements between 1985 and 2009. They measure 
an average return to acquirers of 0.71 per cent (significance level of 1 per cent) over a 3-
days event window.  
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Statistically significant positive returns to acquiring companies verify the validity of 
the sample in this study with recent M&A papers and suggest that managers can on 
average create wealth for their shareholders by engaging in M&A transactions.58 
5.4.1 Industry Prospects and the Impact on the Gains to 
Acquirers 
This subsection begins by examining the key hypothesis (H1) on the expected impact of 
the prevailing industry prospects on the returns to acquiring companies. The results 
presented in Table 5.5 show that acquirers in growing industries earn consistently 
statistically significant (1 per cent level) returns between 1.48 and 1.57 per cent across 
all three examined intervals. Acquirers with neutral industry prospects earn significant 
returns between 1.14 and 1.24 per cent and are statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level. Takeovers by acquirers in declining industries earn between 0.63 and 0.88 per 
cent, which are significant at the 1 per cent level, as well. The differences in returns of 
mergers in growing and declining industries are between 0.68 and 0.94 percentage 
points. Statistical tests indicate significant differences in returns between deals in 
growing and declining industries at the 1 per cent level for all intervals.59 
The positive relationship between the returns to acquiring companies and industry 
prospects supports hypothesis (H1). The findings suggest that acquirers operating in 
growing industries generate both statistically and economically significantly higher 
returns than compared to acquirers in declining industries. Investors may use the 
relative strength of the past industry performance to evaluate the future outcome of the 
takeover. Mergers by acquirers taking place in growing industry may be perceived as a 
strategy to initiate further growth. In this situation, it might be helpful that managers are 
                                                                                                              
58 The results of 5-days event windows are shown throughout this section, but CARs based on 3- and 11-days event windows are 
continued to be measured and footnoted if appropriate. The full set of results on the additional event windows are presented in 
Appendix B. 
59 The 3 and 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar and suggest the same pattern. 
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not forced to react, but can proactively act. On the other hand, acquirers in declining 
industries experience a decreasing earnings trend. They face little growth prospects 
which is subsequently reflected in the announcement returns. 
Table 5.5: Industry Prospects: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-2, +2) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing and declining industries 
during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are calculated 5-days surrounding the announcement (-2, +2) 
using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. For the industry prospects, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are 
used. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcement is above the moving median over the specific period quarters and the 
standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcement is 
below the moving median over the specific period quarters less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining 
industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to 
examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has 
been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  
5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Prospects 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean P 
 
N Mean p 
Growing 
 
3,492 1.5654 *** <.0001  4,032 1.4750*** <.0001  4,184 1.5574*** <.0001 
Neutral 
 
10,579 1.2226 *** <.0001  10,033 1.2392*** <.0001  10,081 1.1424*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
2,131 0.6261 *** 0.0005  2,137 0.6340*** 0.0004  1,937 0.8789*** <.0001 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 0.9393 *** <.0001   0.8410*** 0.0001   0.6785*** 0.0034 
 
5.4.2 Industry Prospects and Corporate Diversification 
Panel B of Table 5.4 again present the acquirers’ cross-sectional returns by the industry 
relation between the acquiring companies and their targets of the full sample before 
concentrating on the impact of industry prospects. Focused deals earn statistically 
significant returns of 0.88, 1.10 and 1.40 per cent over the 3-, 5- and 11-days event 
windows, respectively. Diversifying deals generate with 1.18, 1.44 and 1.89 per cent 
consistently larger returns during the same event windows, all statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level. Tests on the return differences between focused and diversifying 
deals confirm the statistical significance at least at the 5 per cent level or greater.  
On first sight, these results might be surprising, as a common perception is that 
focused deals should earn higher returns than diversifying deals because operational 
synergies in focused transactions are considered to be potentially greater than financial 
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synergies in diversifying deals. 60  However, Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010), who 
construct a sample period of more than 50 years, point out in their study on corporate 
diversification that announcement returns of focused and diversifying deals vary over 
time. Further, diversifying deals were less harmful than focused deals to the 
shareholders of acquiring companies. The returns from their matching sample period 
support the results of this study that diversifying deals earn higher returns than focused 
deals.61 
Having established first support for the main hypothesis earlier, the returns to 
acquirers in focused and diversifying deals based on their industry prospects are now 
examined. Focused deals are expected to earn significantly larger returns in growing 
than in declining industries, however, industry prospects should not have a significant 
effect in diversifying deals. As Panel A of Table 5.6 shows, focused deals generate 
returns between 1.44 and 1.58 per cent in growing industries. The test statistics indicate 
a significance level of 1 per cent for all intervals. The same deal type earns between 
0.48 and 0.72 per cent in declining industries, which are statistically significant at least 
at the 5 per cent level or greater. The differences in returns from focused deals between 
growing and declining industries range between 0.83 and 0.86 percentage points, all 
significant at a significance level of 1 per cent. Highly significant results confirm the 
expected findings that the prevailing industry prospects have a statistically and 
economically significant impact on the announcement returns to acquirers in focused 
deals. 
Diversifying deals generate returns between 1.54 and 1.75 per cent in growing 
industries and the test statistics indicate a significance level of 1 per cent across all 
intervals. In declining industries, the returns from diversifying deals span from 0.58 to 
1.19 per cent and all are statistically significant at least at the 10 per cent level. The 
                                                                                                              
60 See, for example, Doukas et al. (2002) 
61 Their returns are negative which is most likely due to Akbulut and Matsusaka’s (2010) sample criterion of listed targets only. 
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differences in returns from diversifying deals with growing and declining industries 
prospects are between 0.33 and 1.17 percentage points. Statistically insignificant test 
statistics of the 9 and 13 quarterly intervals are in line with the expected results that 
industry prospects do not have a significant effect on the returns to acquiring companies 
in diversifying deals.62 
 
                                                                                                              
62 The 3-days CARs are qualitatively similar and suggest the same patter. The 11-days CARs suggest that industry prospects might 
have a greater impact over the 5 and 9 quarter intervals. 
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Table 5.6: Industry Prospects and Corporate Diversification: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-2, +2) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are calculated 5-
days surrounding the announcement (-2, +2) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP 
index for day t. For the industry classification, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving median and the standard deviation then 
the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining industry. 
Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. A deal is considered as focused if the first 2-digit SIC of the acquirer and target match, otherwise diversifying. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is 
applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 
per cent, respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Prospects and Industry Relation 
      5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Industry Prospects   N Mean p   N Mean p   N Mean p 
Focused 
Growing   2,349 1.4765*** <.0001  2,672 1.4417*** <.0001  2,719 1.5776*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
1,409 0.6511*** 0.0027  1,412 0.4788** 0.0259  1,284 0.7218*** 0.0025 
Growing vs. Declining    0.8254*** 0.0022   0.9629*** 0.0002   0.8558*** 0.0023 
Diversifying 
Growing 
 
1,143 1.7480*** <.0001  1,360 1.5406*** <.0001  1,465 1.5199*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
722 0.5773* 0.0734  725 0.9363*** 0.0040  653 1.1876*** 0.0007 
Growing vs. Declining    1.1708*** 0.0036   0.6043 0.1236   0.3323 0.4153 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Relation and Industry Prospects 
   
5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Prospects Industry Relation 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
Growing 
Focused 
 
2,349 1.4765*** <.0001  2,672 1.4417*** <.0001  2,719 1.5776*** <.0001 
Diversifying 
 
1,143 1.7480*** <.0001  1,360 1.5406*** <.0001  1,465 1.5199*** <.0001 
Focused vs. Diversifying 
 
 0.2715 0.3442   0.0989 0.7096   0.0578 0.8226 
Declining 
Focused 
 
1,409 0.6511*** 0.0027  1,412 0.4788** 0.0259  1,284 0.7218*** 0.0025 
Diversifying 
 
722 0.5773* 0.0734  725 0.9363*** 0.0040  653 1.1876*** 0.0007 
Focused vs. Diversifying 
 
 0.0739 0.8491   0.4575 0.2394   0.4658 0.2637 
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The findings confirm hypotheses (H2.1) and (H2.2). Highly statistically significant 
differences in returns suggest that focused deals earn more in industries with positive 
than with negative prospects. For diversifying deals, this is only true for the 5 quarters 
interval. Considering longer intervals, diversifying deals earn statistically similar returns 
in growing and declining industries. This suggests that mainly focused deals are 
affected by industry prospects. The prevailing industry outlook is a significant factor for 
acquirers in focused deals, as an industry-related target enhances the concentration on 
the acquirer’s industry. In diversifying deals, a new business segment reduces corporate 
risk because a new uncorrelated cash flow stream is expected to generate a 
diversification effect. 
As earlier argued, the target’s industry prospects might be a significant factor to the 
returns to acquirers. In focused deals, acquirers and targets operate in the same industry 
and therefore, the influence of the industry growth rate remains unchanged on the 
combined company’s growth rate. In diversifying deals, however, the growth rate is to 
some extent a function of the acquirer’s and target’s industry growth rate. Assuming an 
efficient market, a direct comparison of focused and diversifying deals should provide 
evidence on what acquisition strategy is preferred by investors with respect to the 
outlook of an industry. Industry prospects are expected to influence the investor’s 
perception of these acquisition strategies. In growing industries, acquirers proactively 
engage in takeovers to promote further growth and the investors’ perception of these 
companies should on average be positive. This is why focused and diversifying deals 
are expected to generate similar returns in growing industry prospects. In declining 
industries, an industry-unrelated target diversifies the influence of the current negative 
industry growth prospects to another industry. Diversifying acquisitions should initiate 
new impulses for growth and as a result, such deals should lead to positive returns. On 
the contrary, focused deals emphasise the current business activity. In a negative 
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industry environment, however, this might not be regarded as an optimal strategy. 
Hence, the market appreciates diversifying deals with significantly greater returns than 
focused deals in declining industries. 
Panel B of Table 5.6 presents the return differences between focused and 
diversifying deals by industry prospects. In growing industries, the 5 quarters interval 
shows that diversifying deals earn by 0.27 percentage points higher returns than focused 
deals. The 9 and 13 quarters intervals indicate that focused and diversifying deals break 
even with differences of 0.10 and 0.06 percentage points, respectively. Statistical tests 
confirm that focused and diversifying deals earn similar returns in growing industries.  
The results from deals announced in industries with declining industry prospects 
suggest the opposite pattern. The difference in returns between focused and diversifying 
deals of 0.07 percentage points over the 5 quarters interval is not statistically different 
from 0. The differences increase to 0.46 and 0.47 percentage points over the 9 and 13 
quarters intervals, respectively. Overall, longer intervals are in line with the expected 
results. 63  These results also suggest a behavioural bias regarding the investors’ 
preferences on the acquisition strategies in growing and declining industries. Investors 
seem to be indifferent regarding the acquisition strategies in growing industries. In both 
deal types, acquiring companies may be expected to continue with the past performance 
and engage in further wealth creating takeovers. However, the results from deals in 
declining industries suggest that investors prefer acquirers to diversify their business 
activities and seek new growth opportunities outside of acquirer’s industry. Further, the 
mentioned lower risk level due to the diversification effect might give rise to higher 
returns in diversifying deals. 
                                                                                                              
63 The 3-days CARs confirm this finding with statistically significant and even larger differences in mean returns. The results of the 
11-days CARs do not reveal a clear picture. 
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5.4.3 Industry Prospects, Corporate Diversification and 
Relative Target Size 
The relative size of the target as presented in Table 5.7 is the focus in this subsection. 
The relative target size is expected to have an enhancing impact of the industry 
prospects on the returns to acquirers in focused deals. On the other hand, industry 
prospects are expected have less influence on the gains from diversifying deals. 
Focused takeovers of large targets in growing industries earn between 1.66 and 1.88 
per cent, all significant at the 1 per cent level. In declining industries, similar deals 
produce returns between 0.31 and 1.03 per cent. Only the 5 quarter interval indicates a 
significance level of 5 per cent. The differences range from 0.59 to 1.36 percentage 
points and the return differences of the 9 and 13 quarters intervals suggest statistical 
significance levels of 1 and 5 per cent, respectively. Medium-sized targets lead to 
returns between 1.44 and 1.61 per cent in growing industries and between 0.78 and 0.84 
per cent in declining industries. The statistical tests indicate that the returns from such 
deals in growing industries are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level and in 
declining industries, they are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The 
differences in returns between growing and declining industries span from 0.60 to 0.83 
percentage points. The 5 quarters interval indicates a significance level of 10 per cent. 
Relatively small target acquisitions produce returns between 1.19 and 1.32 per cent in 
growing industries, all statistically significant the 1 per cent level. In declining 
industries, the returns are between 0.14 and 0.70 per cent. The return of the 13 quarters 
interval is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The test results suggest for the 
5 and 9 quarters intervals statistically significant differences at the 1 and 5 per cent 
level, respectively. Longer intervals are in line with the expected results that industry 
prospects have a significant impact on the returns to acquiring companies, whereas 
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smaller takeover targets exhibit a smaller impact.64 
Diversifying deals with large targets generate between 1.82 and 2.32 per cent in 
growing industries, all statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. In declining 
industries, the returns range from 1.44 to 1.63 per cent, which are also statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level. The statistical tests on the differences in returns 
between 0.19 and 0.89 percentage points indicate no statistically significant differences. 
Medium-sized target takeovers in growing industries lead to returns between 1.49 and 
2.14 per cent, all statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. In comparison, similar 
deals produce returns between -0.04 and 1.05 per cent in declining industries. Only the 
return of the 13 quarters interval reaches the 10 per cent significance level. The 
differences range between 0.65 and 2.17 percentage points and except the 5 quarters 
interval, no statistical significance is indicated. Diversifying takeovers of small targets 
generate in growing industries positive gains of between 0.78 and 1.04 per cent, all 
significant at least at a 5 per cent level or greater. In declining industries, the returns 
range from 0.33 to 0.88 per cent and only the gain of the 13 quarters interval is 
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The differences are between 0.16 and 
0.45 percentage points and indicate no statistical significance. Overall, the findings are 
consistent with the view that the returns from diversifying deals are less influenced by 
industry prospects and the relative target size has not a pronounced effect.65 
 
                                                                                                              
64 The 3- and 11-days CAR results support the hypothesis that larger targets in focused deals contribute to a statistical and 
economic significant impact of the prevailing industry prospects, whereas acquisitions of relatively small targets do not exhibit this 
effect. 
65 The 3-days CARs support this finding. 
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Table 5.7: Industry Prospects, Corporate Diversification and Relative Target Size: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-2, +2) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are 
calculated 5-days surrounding the announcement (-2, +2) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-
weighted CRSP index for day t. For the industry classification, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are used. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving median and the standard 
deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining 
industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. A deal is considered as focused if the first 2-digit SIC of the acquirer and target match, otherwise diversifying. The relative target is calculated as the ratio of the 
deals size to the acquirer’s market capitalisation. The ratios within the specific deal type are split by the size into three equally-weighted groups. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine 
the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
    
5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Relative Target Size Industry Prospects 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
Focused 
Large 
Growing 
 
783 1.6257*** <.0001  891 1.6660 *** <.0001  906 1.8756*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
470 1.0319** 0.0169  471 0.3050 0.4660  428 0.6231 0.1735 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 0.5937 0.2574   1.3610 *** 0.0068   1.2525** 0.0192 
Medium 
Growing 
 
783 1.6145*** <.0001  891 1.4429 *** <.0001  907 1.5388*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
470 0.7824** 0.0351  471 0.8386 ** 0.0235  428 0.8383** 0.0432 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 0.8321* 0.0661   0.6043 0.1690   0.7004 0.1432 
Small 
Growing 
 
783 1.1895*** <.0001  890 1.2159 *** <.0001  906 1.3185*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
469 0.1380 0.6647  470 0.2924 0.3655  428 0.7041* 0.0528 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 1.0515*** 0.0090   0.9235 ** 0.0200   0.6145 0.1527 
Diversifying 
Large 
Growing 
 
381 2.3241*** <.0001  453 2.2498 *** <.0001  488 1.8200*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
241 1.4375** 0.0482  242 1.6153 ** 0.0223  218 1.6336** 0.0302 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 0.8866 0.3131   0.6345 0.4478   0.1864 0.8283 
Medium 
Growing 
 
381 2.1368*** <.0001  454 1.4924 *** 0.0001  489 1.6986*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
241 -0.0376 0.9350  242 0.7142 0.1819  218 1.0489* 0.0638 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 2.1745*** 0.0006   0.7782 0.2195   0.6496 0.3219 
Small 
Growing 
 
381 0.7832** 0.0147  453 0.8797 *** 0.0059  488 1.0407*** 0.0007 
Declining 
 
240 0.3309 0.4525  241 0.4776 0.2417  217 0.8789* 0.0624 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 0.4523 0.3964   0.4021 0.4460   0.1618 0.7704 
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Similar to earlier findings, industry prospects have a greater impact on the gains from 
focused deals than diversifying deals. Focused deals concentrate on the main business 
activities and the company’s future performance is more reliant on the industry growth 
rate. This effect is more pronounced for relatively large targets. Due to the size effect, 
large target takeovers have a greater impact on the combined company in form of higher 
absolute dollar gains. In comparison, relatively small target takeovers generally 
underperform large target takeovers. A diversifying acquisition strategy, however, 
spreads the growth opportunities beyond the acquirer’s main industry. The results also 
indicate that large diversifying takeovers in declining industries are preferred, possibly 
due to a substantial reduction of the dependence on the current industry growth, as well 
as, the acquisition of growth opportunities in other industries. Overall, the results 
confirm the predictions in hypotheses (H3.1) and (H3.2). 
5.4.4 Industry Prospects, Corporate Diversification and Mode 
of Payment 
Table 5.8 presents the returns to acquiring companies from diversifying and focused 
deals based on the mode of payment and industry prospects. As in hypotheses (H4.1) 
and (H4.2) stated, not only evidence on an impact of industry prospects on the returns in 
focused deals are expected, but also evidence on valuation signals from the mode of 
payment. On the other hand, the results are expected to provide support for the risk 
transfer argument from the payment method in diversifying deals. 
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Table 5.8: Industry Prospects, Corporate Diversification and Mode of Payment: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-2, +2)  
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are 
calculated 5-days surrounding the announcement (-2, +2) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-
weighted CRSP index for day t. For the industry classification, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are used. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving median and the standard 
deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining 
industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. A deal is considered as focused if the first 2-digit SIC of the acquirer and target match, otherwise diversifying. Cash are deals with cash only offers and are deals 
with stock only offers are stock. A combination of both is considered as mixed. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of 
the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Relation, Mode of Payment and Industry Prospects 
        5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Payment Method Industry Prospects   N Mean p   N Mean p   N Mean  p 
Focused 
Cash 
Growing   689 1.7333*** <.0001  772 1.6068*** <.0001  753 1.9810*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
473 1.0321*** 0.0014  519 0.9317*** 0.0022  481 1.0583*** 0.0021 
Growing vs. Declining    0.7013* 0.0905   0.6751* 0.0869   0.9227** 0.0320 
Mixed 
Growing 
 
835 2.1639*** <.0001  946 2.0967*** <.0001  1,062 2.0193*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
581 1.3229*** 0.0004  538 0.9836** 0.0121  485 1.1419*** 0.0072 
Growing vs. Declining    0.8410* 0.0731   1.1131** 0.0183   0.8774* 0.0721 
Stock 
Growing 
 
825 0.5663** 0.0349  954 0.6585*** 0.0070  904 0.7228*** 0.0062 
Declining 
 
355 -0.9559** 0.0232  355 -0.9483** 0.0248  318 -0.4277  0.3784 
Growing vs. Declining    1.5222*** 0.0020   1.6068*** 0.0007   1.1505** 0.0376 
Diversifying 
Cash 
Growing 
 
375 1.8250*** <.0001  441 1.6061*** <.0001  450 1.3382*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
267 1.0392** 0.0244  303 1.1710*** 0.0092  274 1.3905*** 0.0028 
Growing vs. Declining    0.7858  0.1733   0.4351  0.4277   0.0523  0.9247 
Mixed 
Growing 
 
502 1.5866*** <.0001  617 1.3525*** <.0001  681 1.5125*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
321 0.1365  0.7834  296 0.6802  0.2109  262 0.8993  0.1386 
Growing vs. Declining    1.4501** 0.0183   0.6723  0.2887   0.6132  0.3670 
Stock 
Growing 
 
266 1.9441*** 0.0013  302 1.8293*** 0.0017  334 1.7797*** 0.0011 
Declining 
 
134 0.7125  0.4159  126 0.9736  0.2485  117 1.3583  0.1323 
Growing vs. Declining    1.2316  0.2388   0.8557 0.4133   0.4214 0.6897 
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Table 5.8 Continued 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Relation, Industry Prospects and Mode of Payment 
        5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Industry Prospects Payment Method   N Mean p   N Mean p   N Mean  p 
Focused 
Growing 
Cash   689 1.7333*** <.0001  772 1.6068*** <.0001  753 1.9810*** <.0001 
Stock 
 
825 0.5663** 0.0349  954 0.6585*** 0.0070  904 0.7228*** 0.0062 
Cash vs. Stock    1.1670*** 0.0019   0.9483*** 0.0068   1.2582*** 0.0008 
Declining 
Cash 
 
473 1.0321*** 0.0014  519 0.9317*** 0.0022  481 1.0583*** 0.0021 
Stock 
 
355 -0.9559** 0.0232  355 -0.9483** 0.0248  318 -0.4277  0.3784 
Cash vs. Stock    1.9879*** 0.0002   1.8799*** 0.0003   1.4860** 0.0126 
Diversifying 
Growing 
Cash 
 
375 1.8250*** <.0001  441 1.6061*** <.0001  450 1.3382*** <.0001 
Stock 
 
266 1.9441*** 0.0013  302 1.8293*** 0.0017  334 1.7797*** 0.0011 
Cash vs. Stock    0.1191 0.8631   0.2232 0.7348   0.4415  0.4765 
Declining 
Cash 
 
267 1.0392** 0.0244  303 1.1710*** 0.0092  274 1.3905*** 0.0028 
Stock 
 
134 0.7125  0.4159  126 0.9736 0.2485  117 1.3583  0.1323 
Cash vs. Stock    0.3268  0.7408   0.1974 0.8358   0.0323  0.9745 
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Cash payment in focused deals earn between 1.61 and 1.98 per cent in growing 
industries and between 0.93 and 1.06 per cent in declining industries. All returns are 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The return differences of deals with cash 
payments in growing and declining industries span between 0.68 and 0.92 percentage 
points. The results of the 5 and 9 quarters intervals are statistically significant at the 10 
per cent level and the 13 quarter interval indicates the statistical significance level of 5 
per cent. Stock payments generate gains between 0.57 and 0.72 per cent in growing 
industries, all statistically significant at least at the 5 per cent level or greater. In 
declining industries, the same deal type leads to negative returns between -0.43 and  
-0.96 per cent. The 5 and 9 quarters intervals results are statistically significant at the 5 
per cent level. The return differences from stock deals in growing and declining 
industries range between 1.15 and 1.61 percentage points and are statistically significant 
at the 5 per cent level. The 5 and 9 quarters intervals indicate a significance level of 1 
per cent. The results confirm that in focused deals the valuation signal of the payment 
method and industry prospects are reflected in the gains to acquiring companies. As a 
result, cash deals generate higher returns than stock deals and for each payment method, 
deals in growing industries earn more than in declining industries.66 
Diversifying deals with cash payments earn between 1.34 and 1.83 per cent in 
growing industries, which are all statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. In 
declining industries, cash payments lead to returns between 1.04 and 1.39 per cent. The 
5 quarters interval result is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and the 
remaining intervals are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The differences in 
returns vary between 0.05 and 0.79 percentage points and the statistical tests suggest 
that the differences in returns are not different from 0. Stock deals generate returns 
between 1.78 and 1.94 per cent in growing industries, which are statistically significant 
                                                                                                              
66 The 3-days CARs exhibit an even more pronounced pattern. 
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at the 1 per cent level. On the other hand, stock payments in declining industries lead to 
returns between 0.71 and 1.36 per cent. The differences in returns are between 0.42 and 
1.23 per cent, but no statistical significance is indicated. The results show that industry 
prospects do not have a significant effect on the acquirers’ gains from diversifying 
deals, supporting the argument that contrary to a valuation-driven choice of the payment 
method in focused deals, the rational in diversifying deals is closer related to a risk 
transfer aspect. Further contributes to this reasoning that stock payments in diversifying 
deals generate large positive returns and large significant negative gains in focused 
deals.67 
The findings support hypotheses (H4.1) and (H4.2) that based on the perceived 
information from the mode of payment, the returns from focused deals differ in growing 
and declining industries. As focused deals lead to a greater concentration on the 
acquirer’s industry, industry prospects and the signal of the acquiring managers’ 
perception of their company’s current valuation are both reflected in the gains. The 
findings again confirm that focused deals are the deal type, which are more affected by 
industry prospects. This is most obvious when cash deals in growing and stock deals in 
declining industries are compared. Cash deals in growing industries lead to the largest 
wealth creation, whereas stock deals in declining industries have the largest wealth 
destructing effect. On the other hand, the results suggest a different pattern in 
diversifying deal. The benefits and risks from corporate diversification are perceived 
differently with respect to the mode of payment. Irrespective of industry prospects, 
positive returns from diversifying deals with stock payments suggest that investors 
appreciate the risk reduction from stock payments. For both payment methods, only 
weak evidence suggest that different industry prospects have a pronounced effect on the 
returns from this deal type. Instead, statistically indifferent returns of cash and stock 
                                                                                                              
67 The 3-days CARs show even greater support. 
Chapter 5: Industry Prospects and the Impact on Acquirers’ Gains 126 
  
payments in growing and declining industries suggest that investors appreciate 
corporate diversification. This is most noticeable by comparing stock payments in 
focused and diversifying deals in declining industries, where the difference in gains is 
about 2 percentage points.  
Panel B of Table 5.8 contains additional tests on the differences in cash and stock 
payments within the same industry condition. The differences in returns from focused 
deals in growing industries range from 0.95 to 1.26 percentage points. All results are 
highly statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The differences in returns are 
slightly higher in declining industries. They are between 1.49 and 1.99 percentage 
points and all statistically significant at around the 5 per cent level or greater. 
On the other hand, diversifying deals in growing and declining industries lead to 
statistically similar returns based on cash or stock payments. In growing industries, the 
differences in returns between cash and stock payments span from 0.12 to 0.44 
percentage points and are statistically insignificant. In declining industries, the return 
differences between stock and cash payments of 0.03 and 0.33 percentage points are 
statistically insignificant, as well. 
These results further support the hypothesis that the industry growth potential has a 
greater impact on the gains to acquiring companies in focused deals. This is most 
obvious in declining industries, where cash payments generate positive returns and 
stock payments negative returns. On the other hand, diversifying deals with cash and 
stock offers in growing industries lead to similar results and in declining industries 
slightly higher returns from stock offers. In the vein of Hansen’s (1987) risk transfer 
argument, the positive returns from cash payments indicate the acquiring management 
team is highly confident in a positive outcome of the merger. 
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5.4.5 Multivariate Results 
In this section, the findings of the univariate analysis are re-examined in a multi-factor 
framework in order to confirm their validity under the influence of other significant 
M&A factors. In Table 5.9, the hypotheses on the effects of growing and declining 
industries on the returns to acquiring firms are tested. To verify the significance of the 
impact of industry prospects in M&A, only deals announced in growing and declining 
industry conditions are considered. For this purpose, the value of the Growing dummy 
variable is 1 if the deal is announced within growing industry prospects and the value of 
0 if the deal is announced within declining industry prospects.
68
 This comparison 
directly tests the impact of industry prospects and their difference in returns while 
controlling for other significant factors. Further, specific subsamples are used to test the 
hypotheses in each regression. Hence, focused or diversifying deals are the scope in 
model (2) and (3), and model (4) and (5) are additionally filtered for relatively large 
targets and model (6) to (9) for deals with cash-only and stock-only payments. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the impact on the gains to acquiring companies are 
examined and the results are presented in Table 5.10. The mentioned key variable for 
the Growing and Declining binary variables is substituted, i.e. the Growing variable is 
equal to 1 if the deal is announced in a growing industry, otherwise 0. The Declining 
dummy takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a declining industry, 
otherwise 0. The control variables remain unchanged in this regression analysis. As a 
consequence of these two different approaches, the sample sizes differ in Table 5.9 and 
Table 5.10. 
The F-statistics in Table 5.9 indicate a significant fit of the models in explaining the 
variation of the dependent variable. The adjusted R
2
 of the models ranges from 1.48 to 
                                                                                                              
68 In Appendix B, further investigations are presented using a binary variable where the value is 1 if the deal is announced within 
growing industry prospects and the value of 0 if deals take place in neutral or declining industries (e.g. full sample). Further, the 
regression results based on a 3- and 11- days event window are provided in Appendix B. These results are commented if 
appropriate. 
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8.59 per cent. Considering the number of dummy variables in the regression models, the 
level is common for this research area. For instance, Fuller et al. (2002) present in their 
M&A study on the target’s public listing similar figures from their dummy-dominated 
regressions.  
The overall impact of industry prospects on the returns to acquiring firms is tested in 
model (1). The control variables show a familiar pattern from recent M&A studies. For 
instance, a statistically significant intercept of 3.41 per cent confirms that acquirers on 
average experience a positive gain around the announcement. A relatively small 
coefficient of -0.01 per cent, as well as, statistically insignificant test statistics suggest 
that focused and diversifying deals generate similar returns. Large targets contribute to 
statistically significantly higher gains of 0.55 percentage points, indicating a greater 
impact of larger targets on the future results of the combined company. Cash payments 
generate on average higher returns of 0.55 percentage points, whereas stock payments 
lead to lower returns of 0.06 percentage points. The p-values, however, indicate that 
both coefficients are statistically insignificant. Acquirers experience with public and 
private targets statistically significantly lower gains. The negative impact of a public 
target is with -2.94 percentage points substantially larger than of a private target with an 
estimate of -0.69 percentage points. Further, a statistically significant estimate of -0.28 
suggests an inverse relationship between the acquirer’s size and announcement returns. 
The cross-border and hostile takeover proxies are statistically insignificant. 
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Table 5.9: Multivariate Framework: Industry Prospects (Growing and Declining Industry Prospects Only) (-2, +2) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 5-days abnormal returns (-2, +2) to US acquirers and is regressed 
against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. For the prospect classification, moving medians over 9 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving 
median and the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is 
classified as a declining industry. Growing is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a growing industry and 0 if it is announced in a declining industry. A Relatively Large Target is the 
group of the largest relative target size ratios, which was split into three equally-weighted groups. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a target publicly 
listed on a stock exchange. Private Target is held by private investors. Market Value is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal is indicated as a 
hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
3.41220***  3.73936*** 2.98784***  3.54940*** 6.22166***  0.93992 3.51877**  2.96282 ** 1.99311  
(<.0001)   (<.0001) (0.0013)  (0.0006) (0.0002)  (0.3539)
 
(0.0339)
 
 (0.0233) 
 
(0.4320)  
            
    
Growing 
0.82508***  0.98668*** 0.57650  1.60757*** 0.42695  0.63771 1.15091***  0.46735 0.60494  
(0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.1373)  (0.0009) (0.6155)  (0.1051)
 
(0.0147)
 
 (0.3798) 
 
(0.5467)  
           
    
Focused 
-0.01109              
(0.9602)          
    
Large Target 
0.55282**  0.23278 1.15676**     1.79814*** 0.11553  1.81542 ** 1.13050  
(0.0322)  (0.4380) (0.0186)     (0.0010)
 
(0.8251)
 
 (0.0296) 
 
(0.4246)  
Cash 
0.06008  -0.44544 0.93380**  0.60107 1.40229        
(0.8033)  (0.1390) (0.0224)  (0.3143) (0.1168)  
  
    
Stock 
-0.21561  -0.77338** 1.02930*  -0.20995 1.44494        
(0.4300)  (0.0131) (0.0659)  (0.7039) (0.2637)  
  
    
Public Target 
-2.94443***  -3.14270*** -2.55982***  -5.25087*** -5.90894***  -1.46850*** -4.18094***  -2.49591 *** -2.22023  
(<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0050)
 
(0.0005)
 
 (0.0001) 
 
(0.2445)  
Private Target 
-0.68895**  -1.00323*** -0.21045  -1.49661** -0.39829  -0.36902 -1.23234  -0.70985 1.21807  
(0.0104)  (0.0031) (0.6341)  (0.0328) (0.7020)  (0.4040)
 
(0.3098)
 
 (0.2526) 
 
(0.4712)  
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Table 5.9 Continued 
 
     Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 
Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Focused  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 
(1)  (2) (3)  (4) (4)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Market Value 
-0.28393***  -0.24951*** -0.35895***  -0.13705 -0.55924**  0.00088 -0.23908 *  -0.21265 -0.17311 
(<.0001)  (0.0013) (0.0017)  (0.3211) (0.0276)   (0.9945) (0.0845)  (0.1553) (0.5765) 
Cross-Border 
-0.12849  -0.19566 -0.15458  0.26931 -0.13907   -0.16014 -2.03136 **  0.07809 -0.91728 
(0.6887)  (0.6179) (0.7809)  (0.7361) (0.9144)   (0.7570) (0.0391)  (0.9012) (0.5787) 
Hostile 
0.41113  1.23747 -0.62338  1.31560 2.09467   1.84016 -2.96044  1.14296 -2.61442 
(0.6483)  (0.3472) (0.5625)  (0.4574) (0.1407)   (0.1425) (0.2821)  (0.5500) (0.5537) 
                       
                       
N 6,169  4,084 2,085  1,406 610   1,291 1,309  744 428 
F-Statistics 24.04***  17.84*** 7.81***  15.71 *** 8.15***  3.78*** 11.84 ***  4.20*** 1.90 *** 
R2 (%) 3.30  3.79 3.28  8.25 9.79   2.02 5.99  3.84 3.08 
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.15  3.58 2.86  7.73 8.59   1.48 5.48  2.93 1.46 
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The variable of interest is the Growing industry dummy. Similar to the univariate 
results, the coefficient suggests a higher return of 0.83 percentage points if the acquirer 
operates in a growing industry than compared to an acquirer in a declining industry. The 
p-value indicates a statistical significance level of 1 per cent. This result supports the 
main hypothesis (H1) that industry prospects have a significant effect on the acquirer’s 
returns and the effect is still present after controlling for influential M&A factors.69 
The discussion proceeds by focusing on the estimates of the Growing industry 
dummy and comments on control variables if these show a significant difference from 
model (1). 
By splitting the sample by focused and diversifying deals, regressions (2) and (3) 
examines the effect of industry prospects on such deals. The Growing dummy suggests 
that acquirers in focused deals earn 0.99 percentage points more in growing industry 
than in declining industry, which is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. On the 
other hand, the test statistics suggest that diversifying deals generate similar results in 
growing and declining industries. The coefficient indicates that such deals earn 0.58 
percentage points more in growing than declining industries, however, the estimate is 
not statistically significantly different from 0. Consistent with hypotheses (H2.1) and 
(H2.2), industry prospects have a greater impact on focused than diversifying deals. 
Arguably, the dependence on the acquirer’s future industry growth is enhanced in 
focused deals and therefore, industry prospects play an important role for the future 
success of the company. On the contrary, the acquirer’s industry prospects play a less 
significant role in diversifying deals because the acquiring company spreads with a 
more diversified business the growth potential to new industries.70 
Model (4) and (5) test the impact of industry prospects on focused and diversifying 
                                                                                                              
69 The results on the full sample and results based on the 3- and 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. 
70 The results on the full sample and results based on the 3-days CARs are qualitatively similar. The 11-days CARs on the full 
sample are also qualitatively similar. Based on a direct comparison, the impact of industry prospects on the statistically significant in 
focused and diversifying deals and have a similar impact. 
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deals based on large target takeovers. The key variable suggests that returns are 1.61 
percentage points higher in focused deals if the acquirer operates in a growing industry, 
which is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Compared to the full sample (1) 
and the focused deals subsample (2), the coefficient increases substantially. As 
proposed, large targets magnify the industry’s prospects in focused deals. For 
diversifying deals, the coefficient is also positive, but statistically insignificant. Possibly 
due to the acquisition of new growth opportunities outside of the acquirer’s industry, 
diversification strategies may be appreciated in growing, as well as, declining 
industries. Overall, these findings again confirm that industry growth prospects play a 
greater role in industry-related than industry-unrelated acquisitions. 
Regression (6) to (9) examine the impact of industry prospects on the gains to 
acquiring companies in focused and diversifying and by the mode of payment. The 
results based on cash and stock payments in focused deals are presented in models (6) 
and (7). Regression (6) shows that deals with cash payments in growing industries lead 
to higher returns of 0.64 percentage points. The test statistics indicate a significance 
level of 10.51 per cent. Similarly, regression (7) indicates that deals with stock 
payments generate higher returns of 1.15 percentage points if focused deals are 
announced in growing industries. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent level. Both Growing industry growth coefficients suggest that the valuation signal 
of the payment method, as well as, industry prospects are reflected in the gains to 
acquirers from focused deals.71 These findings align with the presented results from the 
univariate framework and confirm hypothesis (H4.1). 
Model (8) and (9) present the results from diversifying deals and by the mode of 
payment. For cash deals, the Growing industry dummy is 0.47 percentage points and 
statistically insignificant. In stock deals, the Growing industry dummy is 0.60 
                                                                                                              
71 The results on the full sample and the 11-days CARs on the full sample are also qualitatively similar. In case of the 3-days CARs 
and the 11-days CARs, industry prospects are in both regression models statistically significant. 
Chapter 5: Industry Prospects and the Impact on Acquirers’ Gains 133 
  
percentage points and also statistically insignificant. Large p-values confirm hypothesis 
(H4.2) that industry prospects have a less pronounced effect on the returns to acquiring 
companies in diversifying deals. Investors may realise that operational synergies are 
limited from acquisitions of industry-unrelated targets and the managers’ expertise 
might not cover the newly acquired industry requirements.72 As a whole, the regressions 
show that the impact of industry prospects is robust to other influential M&A factors. 
As expected, the results suggest that industry prospects have a greater impact on the 
returns from focused deals. 
Having confirmed a significant impact of industry prospects on the returns in a multi-
factor framework, the magnitude of the impact is investigated in Table 5.10. The same 
regression models as reported above are used, but a Declining industry dummy is 
added.73 The Growing variable is equal to 1 if the deal is announced in a growing 
industry, otherwise 0. The Declining dummy takes on the value of 1 if the deal is 
announced in a declining industry, otherwise 0. The F-statistics and adjusted R
2
 remain 
at similar levels across regression (1) to (9). 
 
                                                                                                              
72 The regressions on the full sample confirm the presented results. The Growing Industry coefficients exhibit qualitatively similar 
magnitudes and statistical significance. The 3-days CARs, industry prospects are statistically insignificant as well. In case of the 11-
days CARs, industry prospects in diversifying deals with cash payments are statistically significant. 
73 Control variables are commented  if they are qualitatively different to previous reported results. 
  
  
C
h
ap
ter 5
: In
d
u
stry
 P
ro
sp
ects an
d
 th
e Im
p
act o
n
 A
cq
u
irers’ G
ain
s 
1
3
4
Table 5.10: Multivariate Framework: Industry Prospects (Full Sample, Growing and Declining Industry Prospects Variable) (-2, +2) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 5-days abnormal returns (-2, +2) to US acquirers and is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. For the prospect classification, moving medians over 9 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above 
the moving median and the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the 
industry is classified as a declining industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. Growing is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a growing industry and 0 otherwise. 
Declining is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a declining industry and 0 otherwise. A Relatively Large Target is the group of the largest relative target size ratios, which was split 
into three equally-weighted groups. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private Target is held by private 
investors. Market Value is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal is indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-
values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
3.57005***  3.57987*** 3.49250***  4.90444*** 6.92542***  2.35670 *** 3.72684 ***  3.22346*** 4.83154*** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0011)
 
                 
Growing 
0.33328**  0.41337** 0.23294  0.70743** 0.58500  0.21311 0.43140  0.30092 0.64663 
(0.0201)
 
 (0.0173)
 
(0.3584)
 
 (0.0364)
 
(0.2964)
 
 (0.4555) 
 
(0.1589) 
 
 (0.4010)
 
(0.3338)
 
Declining 
-0.50752***  -0.60062*** -0.31799  -1.02610** 0.08597  -0.44587 -0.80257 *  -0.15336 0.11003 
(0.0086)
 
 (0.0098)
 
(0.3552)
 
 (0.0152)
 
(0.9089)
 
 (0.1815) 
 
(0.0793) 
 
 (0.7475)
 
(0.9030)
 
                
Focused 
-0.02769               
(0.8327)
               
Large Target 
0.56404***  0.40816** 0.84156***     1.36899 *** -0.58568 *  1.63472*** -0.37913 
(0.0002)
 
 (0.0251)
 
(0.0025)
 
 
  
 (<.0001) 
 
(0.0972) 
 
 (0.0006)
 
(0.6246)
 
Cash 
0.06382  -0.25498 0.62275***  0.34967 1.19296**         
(0.6518)
 
 (0.1509)
 
(0.0080)
 
 (0.3205)
 
(0.0203)
         
Stock 
-0.30824*  -0.66065*** 0.46545  -1.05710*** -0.02883         
(0.0722)
 
 (0.0009)
 
(0.1645)
 
 (0.0035)
 
(0.9685)
         
Public Target 
-2.67442***  -2.85781*** -2.30610***  -4.31288*** -4.11375***  -0.92919 *** -3.50858 ***  -1.66558*** -2.38869** 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0026)  (<.0001)   (<.0001) (0.0250) 
Private Target 
-0.44030***  -0.63456*** -0.13511  -0.83934** -0.73211  -0.43460 * -0.60748  -0.33736 0.23321 
(0.0046)  (0.0014) (0.5899)  (0.0422) (0.2043)  (0.0972)  (0.4201)   (0.3279) (0.8129) 
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Table 5.10 Continued 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Market Value 
-0.25874***  -0.20748*** -0.34259 ***  -0.26958*** -0.71000***  -0.15054 ** -0.22742**  -0.26065*** -0.44475 ** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0022)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0396) (0.0161)   (0.0062) (0.0122) 
Cross-Border 
0.05230  0.37828 -0.55161 *  0.98380* -1.39610**  -0.07735 -0.21831   -0.04551 -3.20598 *** 
(0.7913)
 
 (0.1396) (0.0752)  (0.0766)  (0.0477)   (0.8077) (0.7751)   (0.9033) (0.0004) 
Hostile 
0.72054  1.52021 -0.15280  1.91197  1.24734   2.15327 * -3.62855   -1.71419** 2.01331 
(0.2417)
 
 (0.1417) (0.8234)  (0.1546)  (0.1926)   (0.0925) (0.1127)   (0.0464) (0.5959) 
                   
                   
N 16,202  10,513 5,689  3,627  1,774  3,507 2,949   2,140  1,109  
F-Statistics 43.74***  34.90*** 16.26 ***  32.31*** 13,82***  7.02 *** 19.99***  8.52*** 5.72 *** 
R2 (%) 2.89  3.22 2.78  7.44  6.59  1.58 5.16   3.10  3.99  
Adjusted R2 (%) 2.82  3.12 2.61  7.21  6.11  1.35 4.90   2.73  3.29  
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In model (1), which uses the full sample, deals with growing industries prospects 
earn 0.33 percentage points more, whereas the in declining industries acquirers earn       
-0.51 percentage points less. Both coefficients are statistically significant, the Growing 
industries coefficient at the 5 per cent level and the Declining industries coefficient at 
the 1 per cent level. This suggests that both industry prospects have a significant effect 
on the announcement returns. Further, the coefficients indicate that a negative outlook 
has a slightly greater impact.74 
In model (2) and (3), the sample is split by the industry relation between acquirer and 
target to analyse the magnitude of the impact. In focused deals, acquirers generate 
higher returns of 0.41 percentage points in growing industries and in declining 
industries the return is by -0.60 percentage points lower. The Growing industry dummy 
is again significant at the 5 per cent level and the Declining industry variable at the 1 
per cent level. On the other hand, diversifying deals in growing industries generate 
higher returns of 0.23 percentage points and lower returns of -0.32 percentage points in 
declining industries. The test statistics suggest that both coefficients are statistically not 
different from 0. This again provides evidence that focused deals experience generally a 
greater impact by industry prospects. Moreover, the estimates suggest that declining 
industry prospects have a slightly larger impact on the acquirers’ gains.75
 
The magnitude of the impact based on relatively large targets is examined in model 
(4) and (5). Focused deals earn statistically significantly higher returns by 0.71 
percentage points in growing industries and significantly lower gains of -1.03 
percentage points in declining industries. The test statistics suggest that diversifying 
takeovers of large targets in growing industries lead to higher returns of 0.59 percentage 
points, which is statistically insignificant. A statistically insignificant estimate of 0.09 
                                                                                                              
74 The results of the 3- and 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. Indeed, the results suggest that the impact increases with longer 
event windows. 
75 The results of the 3-days CARs are qualitatively similar. The declining industry coefficient based on the 11-days CARs in 
diversifying deals exhibit a statistically significance. 
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indicates that a declining industry environment have hardly any impact on the acquirer’s 
gains from diversifying deals with large targets. A comparison of the estimates from 
focused deals suggests that negative industry prospects have a greater impact than 
positive industry prospects on the gains. Despite statistically insignificant coefficients, 
some economic relevance can be attributed to a greater impact of growing industry 
prospects on the returns from diversifying deals. Moreover, the results support the 
hypothesis and previous findings that industry prospects have a greater impact on 
focused deals than diversifying deals and the relative target size has an enhancing effect 
in focused deals.76 
In model (6) to (9), the focus lies on the impact of industry prospects based on the 
mode of payment in focused (regression 6 and 7) and diversifying deals (regression 8 
and 9). Similar to previous observations, declining industries have a greater impact than 
growing industries on the gains from focused deals. In detail, focused deals with cash 
payments generate higher returns of 0.21 percentage points in growing industry 
conditions and lower returns of -0.45 percentage points if such deals are announced 
within declining industry prospects. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 
per cent level. With respect to stock payments in focused deals, such deals earn 0.43 
percentage points more in growing industries prospects. However, the test statistics 
indicates a statistically insignificant coefficient. The Declining industry prospects 
variable indicates that focused deals in such industries earn -0.80 percentage points less 
if the target is paid in stocks, which is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
For diversifying deals, regressions (8) and (9) show a similar pattern first observed in 
model (5) that positive industry prospects have a greater impact than compared to 
negative prospects. The Growing industry variable has coefficients of 0.30 in cash and 
of 0.65 in stock payments. On the other hand, cash payments underperform by -0.15 
                                                                                                              
76 The results of the 3- and 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. Further, the results suggest that the relatively large targets have 
a magnifying effect once the event windows are increased. 
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percentage points in declining industry prospects, whereas the same industry condition 
has a positive impact of 0.11 percentage points in deals with stock offers. The p-values 
suggest that all coefficients are not statistically different from 0.77  
As a whole, the results confirm the earlier reported findings that the acquirer’s 
industry prospects have a significant impact on the announcements gains. Moreover, the 
regression results suggest that a negative industry outlook has a greater impact than a 
positive outlook in focused deals. Investors might be sceptical about an acquisition of 
an industry-related target to react to a declining industry environment. On the other 
hand, economically relevant estimates suggest that growing industry prospects have a 
greater impact in diversifying deals. This acquisition strategy might be considered to 
promote further future growth, once the current acquirer’s main industry returns to 
normal growth rates. Further, statistically insignificant variables suggest that investors 
might not be reluctant to diversifying acquisition strategies in declining industry 
environment. 
5.5 Conclusion 
M&A research focusing on external factors, such as market conditions, has identified 
significant effects on deal characteristics and gains. This study contributes to this area 
by investigating the investors’ perception of information on an industry level, as well as, 
their preferences on acquisition strategies based on the prevailing industry prospects. 
Examining a large sample of 16,202 US deals over a time period of more than 30 
years and quarterly industry P/E multiples as a proxy of the growth potential shows that 
acquiring firms earn significantly more if they operate in growing industries than 
compared to declining industries. 
                                                                                                              
77 The results of the 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. In the case of the 3-days CARs, the Growing industry coefficient in 
focused deals with stock payments is statistically significant. 
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Once the impact by the industry relation between acquirer and target is investigated, 
the results indicate that focused deals are predominately affected by industry prospects. 
Focused deals earn significantly more in growing industries than declining industries. 
Arguably, acquiring companies emphasise their strategic orientation on their core 
business with an industry-related target. As a result, industry growth plays an important 
role on the future performance of the company. On the other hand, diversifying deals 
generate similar results irrespective the prevailing industry prospects, as an acquisition 
of an industry-unrelated target diversifies future growth opportunities to new industries.  
The results also show that acquirers earn similar returns by focusing or diversifying 
their business activities in growing industries. In both deal types, acquirers earn 
significant positive abnormal returns. These results suggest that acquirers are expected 
to continue the past performance and create more wealth by engaging in acquisitions. 
Some evidence for a behavioural bias regarding the information content is found in 
declining industries. Investors prefer diversifying acquisitions over focused deals in 
declining industries, which implies that investors appreciate that acquiring companies 
with declining industry prospects seek new growth opportunities in new industries. A 
acquisition strategy to strengthen their market share by a takeover of an industry-related 
target might not be considered as appropriate. 
Further support provides the results on the relative target size and the mode of 
payment. The relative target size, as a proxy of deal’s impact on the future performance, 
shows a significant difference in the returns from focused acquisitions of large 
companies between growing and declining industries. The findings suggest that large 
targets lead to more pronounced effects of industry prospects in focused deals. On the 
other, industry prospects seem to play a minor role in diversifying deals. 
The results of the mode of payment support the argument that these signal the 
acquiring managers’ perception on the current valuation of their company to market. 
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Both, the perceived information of the payment method and industry prospects are 
reflected in the abnormal returns. In diversifying deals, some evidence is found 
supporting the risk transfer hypothesis of the payment method. The results are robust to 
a multivariate framework. Further regression analysis also reveals that overall the 
impact of declining industry prospects is slightly greater in focused deals, but growing 
industry prospects have a greater impact on the returns to acquiring companies from 
diversifying deals. 
Overall, the findings of this study provide evidence that investors appreciate 
information on industry growth potential and have preferences on acquisition strategies 
based on the acquirer’s industry prospects. As in the opening quote stated, an 
acquisition might be a response to adjust the business strategy to the prevailing industry 
prospects. Based on the results of the returns, corporate managers can actively create 
wealth by considering the outlook of an industry. 
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6. Investor Sentiment and the Impact on 
Acquirers’ Gains 
6.1 Introduction 
The behavioural aspect of why managers undertake M&A has been the focus of 
research for a considerable time now. Roll (1986), for example, argues that some 
managers are driven by hubris. Accordingly, managers are subject to excessive self-
confidence in takeovers believing they are able to create value, even if the acquisition 
price exceeds the fair value of the target. Jensen (1986a) argues that managers with 
substantial free cash flows and unused debt capacities tend to engage in value-
destroying transactions. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) present an entrenchment model in 
which managers undertake investments that reduce the probability of being replaced, 
even if the investments do not create shareholders’ wealth.  
A relatively new stream of M&A research investigates on how managers reacting to 
stock market valuation. A model by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), for instance, 
shows that merger activity is correlated to the acquiring firms’ valuations. In Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswananthan (2004), models demonstrate 
that the market valuation affects the probability of mergers taking place and the mode of 
payment used in the transaction. Rhodes–Kropf et al. (2005) provide empirical evidence 
that misvaluations have an impact on the merger activity and the choice of payment. 
Further, Bouwman et al. (2009) find that short-term announcement returns are 
significantly higher during high-valuation markets than during low-valuation markets. 
Their findings also suggest that herding behaviour of managers causes M&A activity. 
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To the author's best knowledge, no study has, however, examined the impact of 
investor sentiment on the shareholders’ wealth surrounding M&A announcements. 
Together with limited arbitrage, investor sentiment provides the foundations of 
behavioural finance (Shleifer 2000b). Investor sentiment causes disturbances to prices 
and limited arbitrage prevents prices being driven back to efficiency. A growing body of 
studies link investor sentiment to trading activity and trading behaviour. For instance, 
Chau et al. (2011) finds evidence for investor sentiment in momentum trading and 
Blasco et al. (2012) documents that investor sentiment affects herding activity. 
Investor sentiment has been found to also be important in several corporate finance 
related research areas. For example, Brown and Cliff (2004) find evidence for sentiment 
in IPOs78, Baker and Wurgler (2006) in the dividend premium, Gemmill and Thomas 
(2002) for closed-end funds79 and Frazzini and Lamont (2008) for mutual funds flow80. 
With respect to M&A, Rosen (2006) finds ‘momentum’ in the gains to acquiring 
companies. This effect disappears in the long run and he argues that merger momentum 
is caused by investors’ overoptimism. Antoniou et al. (2008) find similar results for the 
UK and suggest that investor sentiment may drive the gains to bidding companies. 
However, they do not directly test investor sentiment in their study. 
As stated in the opening quote, sentiment about the future gains from M&A may 
change over time and changes in sentiment are expected to have a significant impact on 
the returns to acquiring companies. A significant impact of investor sentiment on the 
short-term wealth effects would imply that the gains are not only the reflection of newly 
available information from the merger announcement, but also that irrational behaviour 
influences these gains.  
This study reveals strong evidence that changes in sentiment have a significant effect 
                                                                                                              
78 See also, for example, Brown and Cliff (2005) 
79 See also, for example, Swaminathan (1996), Elton et al. (1998), Sias et al. (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) 
80 See also, for example, Indro (2004) 
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on the returns to acquiring firms. Overall, acquiring firms gain significantly higher 
returns during positive sentiment changes than during negative sentiment changes. Key 
M&A factors confirm the effect of investor sentiment on the returns around the merger 
announcement. As suggested by sentiment research, similar patterns are found in this 
study that irrational investors are sensitive to information asymmetries and valuation 
signals. Transactions with stock payments experience a significant response to changes 
in investor sentiment, whilst cash deals are relatively less affected. The results suggest 
that cash payments are a positive valuation signal irrespective of the current sentiment. 
Stock payments are, however, a bad signal that acquirers perceive themselves as 
overvalued and the prevailing sentiment has an enhancing effect on the returns. Further, 
sentiment has a greater impact on the gains from takeovers of private than public 
targets. The findings imply that greater information asymmetries are the potential source 
of this effect. Similarly, the results indicate that gains to smaller acquirers are more 
greatly affected by changes in sentiment than are those to larger acquirers. Further, 
sentiment changes significantly impact the returns to overvalued acquirers, whereas the 
returns to undervalued acquirers do not show a significant response to sentiment, but a 
general revaluation effect. The stated results are robust to a multivariate framework, as 
well as, several event windows. As a whole, the findings support the view that investor 
sentiment significantly influences prices and the returns from M&A deals are not 
always subject to pure rational behaviour. This study establishes a significant link 
between investor sentiment and the returns to acquiring firms.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section builds the arguments 
with regards to the potential effects of investor sentiment by several significant deal 
features. Each argument offers a testable hypothesis. Section 6.3 sets out the data and 
methodology used to test the proposed hypotheses. Section 6.4 presents and discusses 
the results and Section 6.5 summarises the findings and draws the conclusion. 
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6.2 Investor Sentiment and Acquirers’ Gains - 
Hypotheses Development 
6.2.1 Investor Sentiment and the Impact on Gains to Acquirers 
As research indicates, investor sentiment has a significant impact in many finance 
areas and similar evidence is expected on the returns to acquiring firms. From the 
perspective of a sentimental investor, an inverse relationship between the level of 
confidence and risk aversion should exist. During increasing levels of sentiment, 
investors may be overoptimistic on the value-creating effect of acquisitions and pay less 
attention to the risk aspects involved in a merger. As a result, the investors’ 
overoptimism translates into increasing returns to acquiring firms when sentiment 
increases. In contrast, the risk awareness is expected to increase during decreasing 
levels of sentiment. Increasing risk aversion may lead investors to be more sceptical 
about a profitable outcome of the merger. In fear of potential losses, investors become 
pessimistic and returns to acquiring firms decrease during decreasing sentiment. As a 
result,  
(H1) Investor sentiment has a significant impact on the abnormal returns to 
acquiring companies.  
6.2.2 Investor Sentiment and Mode of Payment 
Further evidence on the impact of investor sentiment is expected to influence the returns 
based on the mode of payment in M&A. An argument explaining the returns to 
acquirers regarding the payment method states that the acquiring management signals 
their perception of their firm’s current valuation by the choice of the payment method. 
Similar to Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory, a stock payment resembles 
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an equity issuance. If the acquiring managers consider their stock as overvalued, they 
favour stock payments to settle with target shareholders. If managers perceive their own 
stock as undervalued, then the preferred payment method is cash. In summary, a stock 
payment is a bad signal, whereas a cash payment implies positive news. As mentioned, 
sentimental investors tend to irrationally value perceived information (Barberis et al. 
1998). In the search for new information (Black 1986), investors may consider the 
signal from the mode of payment at the merger announcement, because they may 
consider managers to have better insights on the fair value of the firm. 
When investor sentiment decreases, investors’ perception of risk should increase and 
confidence diminishes. The negative signal of the stock payment may have an 
additional detrimental effect on the returns because investors are more nervous and 
more risk averse during declining sentiment. However, when investor sentiment 
improves, so should the investors’ confidence and optimism. The attitude shifts from 
risk aversion to risk seeking and investors may pay less attention to this signal during 
increasing sentiment. As a result, returns in stock payments should exhibit clear signs of 
investor sentiment. 
Cash payments are a positive signal because it signals that acquiring managers 
consider their stock as undervalued. This should lead to an overall positive reaction as 
this payment method reveals a potential investment opportunity. Even during decreasing 
sentiment, deals with cash payments may still experience positive returns. Therefore, 
the impact of investor sentiment on the returns from cash deals should be less 
pronounced. Therefore,  
(H2) Investor sentiment has a greater impact on the abnormal returns to 
acquirers with stock-only than cash-only deals. 
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6.2.3 Investor Sentiment and Target Listing Status 
M&A deals with greater information asymmetries are expected to exhibit a greater 
impact of investor sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2007) state a company’s sensitivity to 
sentiment depends on the subjectivity to determine the true value. If information 
asymmetries contribute to subjectivity in value estimations, the target’s listing status 
should provide further evidence.  
As a result of lower reporting requirements and regulatory standards, information 
asymmetries should be greater for private companies and impede the valuation, as well 
as, affect the accuracy of their estimated fair values (Fuller et al. 2002; Ekkayokkaya et 
al. 2009b). Consequently, bidders may not capture the complete picture about a private 
target’s financial situation before the actual takeover. The lack of full information is, 
therefore, expected to make private target takeovers more prone to investor sentiment. 
During increasing sentiment, investors should be more enthusiastic and pay less 
attention to risk stemming from asymmetric information between acquirers and private 
targets. On the other hand, during decreasing sentiment, investors are expected to be 
overly cautious and higher levels of potential information asymmetries may increase the 
perceived risk in private target takeovers. Due to a more pronounced effect from 
overconfidence (Daniel et al. 1998) and overoptimism in private target takeovers, 
acquiring firms are expected to experience greater gains during increasing than 
decreasing sentiment.  
In contrast, financial information on listed targets should be readily available. Due to 
listing requirements, public companies disclose financial reports on a regular basis. 
Further, listed companies are scrutinised by the media and analysts, which should also 
have a positive effect on the transparency of these companies. Therefore, listed target 
takeovers should exhibit smaller information asymmetries. Sentiment might still cause a 
disproportionate reaction to M&A announcements, but on the basis of higher 
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transparency, investor sentiment should have a smaller impact on the returns from listed 
target takeovers. Hence,  
(H3) Investor sentiment has greater impact on the abnormal returns to acquirers 
of private than public targets. 
6.2.4 Investor Sentiment and Acquirer’s Size 
Further evidence on the sentiment’s impact is expected regarding the acquirer’s size. 
Baker and Wurgler (2007) state that difficult-to-value companies81 are especially prone 
to investor sentiment. Among other characteristics, they propose that small companies 
are more sensitive to broad waves of investor sentiment. Lee et al. (1991) find that small 
firms are disproportionately held by individuals and individual investors are 
predominantly noise traders. Lee et al. (2002) document similar results that shareholders 
of small capitalisation stocks are predominantly individuals. Using a database of retail 
investor transactions, Kumar and Lee (2006) show that the trading behaviour of 
individuals is systematically correlated. Further, they find that the trading behaviour co-
moves with the returns of stocks with high retail concentration.82 Research also suggests 
that smaller companies can be characterised by higher levels of information 
asymmetries (Banz 1981; Barry and Brown 1984). Due to less available information, 
smaller companies may be perceived as riskier. 
Given the evidence that small firms exhibit more information asymmetries and are 
disproportionally held by individual investors, gains to smaller acquirers are also 
expected to experience a significant impact to changes in investor sentiment. During 
decreasing sentiment, irrational investors should become less confident about a positive 
outcome of a merger, as well as, holding a perceived risky stock in the form of a small 
                                                                                                              
81 Stocks of low capitalisation, younger, unprofitable, high-volatility, non-dividend paying, growth companies or stocks of firms in 
financial distress 
82 Small-cap, value, lower institutional ownership and lower priced stocks 
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company in their portfolio. As a result, the returns to small acquiring companies 
decrease during a declining sentiment environment. The risk aspect should play a minor 
role during increasing sentiment, where overconfidence dominates the behaviour of 
irrational investors. As a whole, the returns to small acquirers should exhibit a 
significant impact of the prevailing sentiment.  
Due to greater public interest, information asymmetries on large companies should 
be consequently lower. Further, institutional investors are predominantly invested in 
large companies and should be less influenced by irrational mood swings in the market. 
Their professionalism and a considerable stake should also provide them with sufficient 
influence to request more information if required. However, large acquirers may not 
completely circumvent the sentiment’s impact, but a smaller magnitude on the returns 
should be observed compared to small acquirers. Therefore, 
(H4) A change in investor sentiment has greater impact on the abnormal returns 
to smaller acquirers than larger acquirers. 
6.2.5 Investor Sentiment and Over- and Undervalued 
Acquirers 
As mentioned, Baker and Wurgler (2007) argue that the main difference in the 
sensitivity of companies to sentiment lies in the difficultly and subjectivity to determine 
their true values. Companies that appeal to investors’ imaginations should be more 
sensitive to sentiment, leading to a more pronounced effect from investors’ 
overconfidence (Daniel et al. 1998) and extent of conservatism (Barberis et al. 1998). 
To the extent that overvaluation is driven by overconfidence and overoptimism, and 
that these are likely to be greater during periods of increasing sentiment than periods of 
decreasing sentiment, changes in sentiment are expected to impact markedly on the 
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gains to such firms from M&A. Following recent overconfidence and overoptimism on 
a specific firm that led to an overvaluation, a merger announcement during an 
increasing sentiment may further fuel the perception about this company’s prosperous 
future and the merger’s value creation potential. In the case of an announcement during 
decreasing sentiment, however, a negative sentiment shift may cause scepticism about 
current valuation levels, as well as, the gains from the merger. As a result, the gains to 
overvalued acquirers are expected to be significantly higher during increasing sentiment 
than during decreasing sentiment. 
Irrespective of the sentiment direction, an M&A announcement might trigger a 
revaluation of undervalued acquirers. In the vein of Fuller et al. (2002) and Paudyal and 
Draper (2008), the announcement of a merger might attract more public attention and 
release new information on the acquirer. The merger announcement might, therefore, 
reveal an investment opportunity leading to positive gains regardless of the current 
direction of investor sentiment. As a whole, investor sentiment should not have a 
substantial impact on the gains to undervalued acquirers. Therefore, 
(H5) Investor sentiment has greater impact on the gains to overvalued acquirers 
than undervalued acquirers. 
6.3 Methodologies and Data 
6.3.1 Investor Sentiment 
For the analysis, the monthly composite investor sentiment change index by Baker and 
Wurgler (2007) is used. 83  They apply a first principal component analysis of six 
commonly referred investor sentiment proxies.84 Specifically, the upper 50 per cent of 
                                                                                                              
83 Data is taken from Jeffrey Wurgler's hompage: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/ 
84 The closed-end fund discount, the NYSE share turnover, the number of IPOs, the average first-day returns, the equity share in 
new issues, and the dividend premium 
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positive changes of the index data from 1980 to 2010 are categorised as increasing and 
the lower 50 per cent of negative changes as decreasing investor sentiment. The 
remainder are pooled as neutral investor sentiment changes. The time period of the 
index data is identical to the M&A sample. To determine the sentiment when a deal is 
announced, the month of the deal announcement is matched with the investor sentiment 
classification of the previous month.85 
Sentiment change index for the sample period is plotted in Figure 6.1. The markers 
above the graph show the months of ‘increasing’ sentiment and below the months of 
‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The markers indicate that the relevant changes are 
relatively evenly distributed between ‘increasing’ and ‘decreasing’ sentiment. Of 372 
examined months (31 years), 96 months are classified as decreasing investor sentiment 
months and 90 months classified as relevant increasing investor sentiment months. Over 
time, the markers seem to cluster around the stock market crash in 1987 and its 
aftermath, around the crash in 2001 and finally since the beginning of the most recent 
financial crises period in about 2008. 
. 
                                                                                                              
85 In a robustness test, the methodology and calculations are repeated using the entire data of the investor sentiment change index 
(1965 to 2010). The results are qualitatively similar and presented in Appendix C.  
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of Investor Sentiment Months 
This figure shows the graphically the investor sentiment changes across the sample period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker 
and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes.  
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Figure 6.2 presents the annual distribution of deals by investor sentiment, as well as, 
the total annual distribution of deals. The sample exhibits three significant peaks. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, the first increase in merger activity coincides to what is 
referred to as the fourth merger wave during the early 1980s. This merger wave has 
been characterised by focused deals, hostile takeovers and corporate raiders. The next 
increase and highest number of deals occurred during the late 1990s. This period was 
highlighted by cross-border and mega-deals. The sixth and last merger wave86 took 
place during the mid-2000s. Here motives of M&A were dominated by globalisation 
and private equity (Owen 2006). 
In this sample, the peaks are in 1984 with 392 deals, in 1998 with 1,219 deals and 
finally in 2005 with 653 deals. The selection procedure yields 3,872 relevant deals 
during increasing investor sentiment and 3,672 relevant deals during declining investor 
sentiment. 
6.3.2 Univariate Framework 
To calculate the gains surrounding M&A announcements, an event study methodology 
using a market-adjusted model is applied. The value-weighted index provided by CRSP 
serves as the corresponding market benchmark. Chapter 3.1 outlines the event study 
methodology in greater detail. 
The average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) surrounding 5-days (-2, +2)87 of the 
announcement date is estimated as: 
 =


	 ,


 (3.4) 
                                                                                                              
86 Some speak (e.g. see KPMG) of a new (7th) merger wave currently taking place with focus on BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China and 
South Africa) countries. 
87 CARs surrounding 3-days (-1, +1) and 11-days (-5, +5) of the announcement date are also calculated and differences footnoted if 
appropriate. 
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where  is the average (cumulative) abnormal return over the multi-day interval t, , 
is the abnormal return of stock i at day t and  is the number of sample stocks whose 
abnormal returns are available at the multi-day interval t. 
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of Deals by Investor Sentiment 
This figure shows the annual distribution of deals by the investor sentiment across the sample period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of 
the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To 
determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. Qualifying deals are by US firms during the 
period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers are required that their primary listing is either on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ stock exchange. The targets’ public status is either public, private or a subsidiary and 
the deal value is US$ 1 million or greater. Further, the relative size of the target to the market value of the acquirer is more than 1 per cent. To ensure a change in control, acquirers are required to hold less than 50 per cent 
before and more than 50 per cent after the completed deal. The mode of payment is known and as either cash, stock or others categorised. Other payment types are grouped to the mixed payments. Announcements cannot 
fall on weekends as the stock price reaction cannot be reliably measured. SIC codes are required to categorise the deals as focused or diversifying transactions. Acquirers or targets identified as a holding company by the 2-
digit SIC code ‘67’ are deleted from the sample. Acquisition techniques related to MBO/MBI, reverse takeovers or employees are excluded. The same accounts for deal types such as minority stake purchases, acquisitions 
of remaining interest, privatisations, leveraged buyouts, self-tenders, and share repurchases. 
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6.3.3 Multivariate Framework 
Besides a univariate analysis, the effects of the investor sentiment is investigated by 
examining the bidders’ 5-day88 (-2, +2) cumulative abnormal returns in a multivariate 
framework as in equation (6.1): 
 −  = 	 + 	∑ 

  +  (6.1) 
where Ri is the cumulative return to acquirer i over the specific event window and Rm is 
the corresponding CRSP market return. The intercept (α) can be regarded as a measure 
of abnormal return after controlling for the effects of vector Xi of explanatory variables. 
The following explanatory variables test the proposed hypotheses in a regression 
framework:  
In Table 6.7, the dummy variable Increasing Sentiment takes on the value of 1 if the 
month of the deal announcement matches the upper 50 per cent of positive changes of 
the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly investor sentiment change index of the previous 
month and the value of 0 if the deal is announced in a decreasing sentiment month. In a 
comparison of the impact’s magnitude in Table 6.8, the models contain Increasing and 
Decreasing Sentiment variables. Both variables are dummies, which have the value of 1 
if the deal is announced during increasing or decreasing sentiment, respectively, 
otherwise the value of the dummies is 0. 
Cash and Stock are dummy variables which take on the value of 1 if the payment 
method is a 100 per cent in cash or stock, respectively. If the target is publicly listed 
then the variable Public Target takes on the value of 1, otherwise the value of 0. If the 
deal information indicates that the target is privately held, then the variable Private 
Target is 1, otherwise 0. The Acquirer Size is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market 
capitalisation. Acquirer’s B/M is the natural logarithm of acquirer’s book-to-market 
                                                                                                              
88 Regressions using the 3- and 11-days CARs as the dependent variable are also calculated and the results footnoted where 
appropriate. The full sets of results are reported in Appendix C. 
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ratio. This ratio, favoured by Fama and French (1992), states the book value of common 
equity to its market value. Firms with poor prospects have low stock prices relative to 
their equity book value (hence, high book-to-market ratios), on the other hand, 
companies with a prosperous future have high stock prices relative to their book value 
of equity (hence, low book-to-market ratios). The Fama and French definition 89  is 
followed to calculate the ratio: “Market equity (size) is price times shares outstanding. 
Price is from CRSP, shares outstanding are from Compustat (if available) or CRSP. 
Book equity is constructed from Compustat data and is the book value of stockholders’ 
equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), minus 
the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, the redemption, 
liquidation, or par value (in that order) is used to estimate the book value of preferred 
stock. Stockholders’ equity is the value reported by Compustat, if it is available. If not, 
we measure stockholders’ equity as the book value of common equity plus the par value 
of preferred stock, or the book value of assets minus total liabilities (in that order).“ 
Companies with a ratio of less than 1 are considered as overvalued and higher than 1 as 
undervalued. 
Relative Target Size: The target’s size is expected to have a direct influence on the 
dollar returns from the acquisition and is a significant contributor to the future financial 
results (Asquith et al. 1983).90 The Relative Target Size is calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the deal value91 to the acquirer’s market value measured 15 trading days 
before the announcement. 
Industry Relation: Theory, as well as, empirical studies have not arrived at a 
consensus weather corporate diversification benefits or harms shareholders’ wealth.92 
                                                                                                              
89 Kenneth French provides a detailed definition of this ratio and its components on his homepage: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/variable_definitions.html. 
90 See also Fuller et al. (2002) for empirical results. 
91 Provided by SDC Platinum 
92 See, for example, Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) (Extended portfolio theory), Lewellen (1971) (Coinsurance effect), Williamson 
(1970) (Internal capital market) and Baumol (1967) (Regulation) for supportive literature. For opposing arguments see, e.g., Jensen 
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To control for a potential influence on the returns, the dummy variable Focused takes 
on the value of 1 if the acquirer and target have a matching 2-digit SIC, otherwise the 
value of 0. 
Geographical Diversification: Several studies investigate a cross-border effect in 
M&A (e.g. Morck and Yeung 1992; Doukas and Travlos 1988; Moeller et al. 2005). 
Acquirers may try to generate further growth by acquiring a target abroad. To control 
for this effect, the control variable Cross-Border is added which is a binary dummy 
variable which takes on the value of 1 if the target’s nation is not the United States, 
otherwise the value of 0.  
Hostile Attitude: Berle and Means (1933) argue that conflicts may arise by the 
appointment of managers which might not always be in the best interest of shareholders. 
Jensen (1986a) states that hostile takeovers may have a disciplinary effect on managers 
who do not use available resources efficiently.93 Hostile is a binary variable which takes 
on the value of 1 if the is deal is indicated as a hostile takeover.  
Financial data is known to often exhibit a non-constant volatility. This may lead to a 
violation of the assumptions regarding linear regression models of a constant variance 
in the error terms. A violation of this assumption may produce biased estimates, 
however, the main concern are biased standard errors. As a result, a wrong conclusion 
may be drawn about the validity of the hypotheses. To reduce the risk of Type I and 
Type II errors and ensure a constant variance of error terms (homoskedasticity), White-
corrected94 standard errors are calculated to arrive to reliable p-values. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
(1986a,b) (Agency theory) and Stein (1997) (Managerial capabilties). For example, Denis et al. 2002, and Doukas et al. 2002 
suggest that corporate diversification destroys shareholders’ wealth. Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) find that returns vary over time. 
93 See also, for example, Travlos (1987), Morck et al. (1989) or Mitchell and Lehn (1990) 
94 See White (1980) 
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6.3.4 Data and Sample Description 
Similar to Chapter 5, the US market serves to test the proposed hypotheses in this 
empirical chapter. For this reason, the data and sample selection of Chapter 5 were 
reused and reapplied for this study, the only difference being a shorter sample period of 
one year (01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010). 
As presented in Table 6.1 (Panel A), the final sample consists of 15,827 deals. The 
average market value of an acquirer is US$ 2.9 billion. The average target size (deal 
value) is US$ 386 million and targets worth about US$ 6,115 billion are acquired in 
total over the entire sample period. The target size is on average95 roughly a quarter of 
the acquirer’s size.  
Panel B indicates that roughly 24 per cent of the deals took place during a growing 
sentiment and roughly 23 per cent during a declining sentiment. The average acquirer’s 
market capitalisation is US$ 3.2 billion during declining sentiment and about US$ 200 
million bigger than during increasing sentiment. The total and average deal value shows 
a similar picture. In total, targets worth about US$ 1,635 billion were taken over during 
declining sentiment compared to US$ 1,495 billion during increasing sentiment. The 
average target is also more than US$ 50 million larger during a declining sentiment. 
However, the relative size of the targets compared to the size of the acquirers is during 
both sentiment changes relatively similar with about 25 per cent. 
Panel C shows the descriptive statics by the investor sentiment and the mode of 
payment. During both sentiment changes, the distribution of the chosen payments is 
relatively similar. Cash are used in about 8 per cent of the deals. Mixed payments 
account for roughly 10 per cent and stock payments for about 6 per cent. The average 
sizes of an acquirer and a target is again larger during declining investor sentiment. The 
average target is substantially larger in in stock deals than cash deals and so is the 
                                                                                                              
95 Calculated as the cross-sectional average 
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average size of an acquirer. 
The distribution of the target listing status (Panel D) is again fairly similar during 
increasing and declining sentiment. Private and public targets, as well as, subsidiaries 
account for roughly 11, 6 and 6 per cent of the deals during increasing and declining 
sentiment, respectively. The average acquirer and target is again larger during declining 
sentiment. For increasing and declining sentiment, public targets are more than 10 times 
the size of a private target. The relative target size confirms the pattern that public 
targets are larger than private targets. The ratio suggests that a public target is about 
twice the size relative to the acquirer than a private target. 
Panel E presents the descriptive statistics of the acquirer’s size categorised in three 
groups. Large acquirers are worth on average US$ 8,222 million during increasing and 
US$ 9,062 million during declining sentiment. Medium-sized acquirers have an average 
market capitalisation of US$ 476 million and US$ 493 million during increasing and 
decreasing sentiment, respectively. Acquirers grouped as small are US$ 86 million in 
increasing and US$ 94 million in declining sentiment. Further, large acquirers take over 
targets which are on average between US$ 1,044 million and US$ 1,210 million during 
increasing or declining sentiment. In comparison, the average deal size of a small 
acquirer is US$ 22 and 29 million during increasing and declining sentiment, 
respectively. The relative target size suggests that small acquirers purchase relatively 
larger targets than large acquirers. The numbers indicate that targets are between 35 and 
39 per cent of a small acquirer’s market capitalisation and between 16 and 17 per cent 
of a large acquirer. 
Finally, the descriptive statistics with regards to the acquirer’s valuation are shown in 
Panel F. The figures suggest that predominantly overvalued acquirers engage in 
takeovers. These deals account for more than 90 per cent of the sample. An overvalued 
acquirer is roughly US$ 2.5 billion larger during decreasing sentiment, whereas 
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undervalued acquirers are about by the same amount larger during increasing sentiment. 
Similar are the numbers for the deal value. Targets taken over by overvalued acquirers 
are on average at least three times larger than by undervalued acquirers. The relative 
target size indicates that undervalued acquirers merge with proportionally larger targets. 
Chapter 6: Investor Sentiment and the Impact on Acquirers’ Gains 161 
  
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the sample over a period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The upper 50 per cent of 
positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor 
sentiment changes. Qualifying deals are by US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers are required 
that their primary listing is either on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ stock exchange. The targets’ public status is either public, 
private or a subsidiary and the deal value is US$ 1 million or greater. Further, the relative size of the target to the market value of the 
acquirer is more than 1 per cent. To ensure a change in control, acquirers are required to hold less than 50 per cent before and more 
than 50 per cent after the completed deal. The mode of payment is known and as either cash, stock or others categorised. Other 
payment types are grouped to the mixed payments. Announcements cannot fall on weekends as the stock price reaction cannot be 
reliably measured. SIC codes are required to categorise the deals as focused or diversifying transactions. Acquirers or targets 
identified as a holding company by the 2-digit SIC code ‘67’ are deleted from the sample. Acquisition techniques related to 
MBO/MBI, reverse takeovers or employees are excluded. The same accounts for deal types such as minority stake purchases, 
acquisitions of remaining interest, privatisations, leveraged buyouts, self-tenders, and share repurchases. Market and deal values are 
in US$ millions. The  relative target size is in per cent. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Full Sample 
     
Acquirer’s 
 
 
 
Relative  
Market Value Deal Value Target Size 
  
N % 
 
Sum Mean 
 
Sum Mean 
 
Mean 
Full sample  15,827 100.00 
 
47,055,793 2,973.13 
 
6,114,715 386.35 
 
26.11 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Investor Sentiment 
     
Acquirer’s 
 
 
 
Relative  
Market Value Deal Value Target Size 
Sentiment  N % 
 
Sum Mean 
 
Sum Mean 
 
Mean 
Increasing  3,872 24.46 
 
11,340,613 2,928.88 
 
1,495,343 386.19 
 
24.17 
Neutral  8,279 52.31 
 
23,894,397 2,886.15 
 
2,984,227 360.46 
 
27.45 
Declining  3,676 23.23  11,820,782 3,215.66  1,635,145 444.82  25.12 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics by Investor Sentiment and Mode of Payment 
 
 
   
Acquirer’s 
 
 
 
Relative  
Mode of Market Value Deal Value Target Size 
Sentiment Payment N % 
 
Sum Mean  Sum Mean  Mean 
Increasing 
Cash 1,210 7.65  3,774,129 3,119.12  246,793 203.96  17.56 
Mixed 1,612 10.19  3,818,975 2,369.09  672,350 417.09  30.82 
Stock 1,050 6.63  3,747,509 3,569.06  576,200 548.76  21.60 
Neutral 
Cash 3,019 19.07  11,335,800 3,754.82  698,275 231.29  18.88 
Mixed 3,178 20.08  7,287,217 2,293.02  1,243,492 391.28  33.14 
Stock 2,082 13.15  5,271,380 2,531.88  1,042,459 500.70  31.18 
Declining 
Cash 1,214 7.67  4,149,261 3,417.84  281,725 232.06  19.88 
Mixed 1,555 9.82  3,599,118 2,314.55  688,144 442.54  30.54 
Stock 907 5.73  4,072,403 4,489.97  665,276 733.49  22.85 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics by Investor Sentiment and Target Public Status 
 
 
   
Acquirer’s 
 
 
 
Relative 
Target Market Value Deal Value Target Size 
Sentiment Listing Status N %  Sum Mean  Sum Mean  Mean 
Increasing 
Private 1,857 11.73  2,077,656 1,118.82  133,405.20 71.84  18.29 
Public 1,032 6.52  6,952,161 6,736.59  1,125,983.92 1,091.07  34.03 
Subsidiary 983 6.21  2,310,797 2,350.76  235,954.20 240.03  24.95 
Neutral 
Private 3,964 25.05  4,818,392 1,215.54  295,117.75 74.45  21.71 
Public 2,109 13.33  13,554,248 6,426.86  2,168,225.76 1,028.08  38.51 
Subsidiary 2,206 13.94  5,521,757 2,503.06  520,883.04 236.12  27.18 
Declining 
Private 1,735 10.96  2,406,730 1,387.16  143,033.16 82.44  18.16 
Public 949 6.00  6,759,589 7,122.85  1,242,844.54 1,309.64  37.21 
Subsidiary 992 6.27  2,654,462 2,675.87  249,267.23 251.28  25.74 
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Table 6.1 continued 
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics by Investor Sentiment and Acquirer’s Size 
 
 
   
Acquirer’s 
 
 
 
Relative 
Size of Market Value Deal Value Target Size 
Sentiment Acquirer N % 
 
Sum Mean 
 
Sum Mean 
 
Mean 
Increasing 
Large 1,291 8.16 
 
10,614,434 8,221.87 
 
1,348,293 1,044.38 
 
16.06 
Medium 1,291 8.16 
 
615,718 476.93 
 
118,435 91.74 
 
21.26 
Small 1,290 8.15 
 
110,461 85.63 
 
28,615 22.18 
 
35.21 
Neutral 
Large 2,760 17.44 
 
22,305,983 8,081.88 
 
2,634,453 954.51 
 
14.98 
Medium 2,760 17.44 
 
1,341,296 485.98 
 
275,373 99.77 
 
21.30 
Small 2,759 17.43 
 
247,118 89.57 
 
74,401 26.97 
 
46.06 
Declining 
Large 1,225 7.74 
 
11,100,841 9,061.91 
 
1,481,954 1,209.76 
 
16.46 
Medium 1,226 7.75 
 
604,887 493.38 
 
117,692 96.00 
 
20.52 
Small 1,225 7.74 
 
115,054 93.92 
 
35,499 28.98 
 
38.40 
Panel F: Descriptive Statistics by Investor Sentiment and Acquirer’s Valuation (Book-to-Market) 
 
 
   
Acquirer’s  
 
 
 
Relative  
Acquirer’s Market Value Deal Value Target Size 
Sentiment Valuation N % 
 
Sum Mean 
 
Sum Mean 
 
Mean 
Increasing 
Overvalued 3,095 22.27 
 
10,585,474 3,420.19 
 
1,319,381 426.29 
 
20.05 
Undervalued 270 1.94 
 
273,979 1,014.74 
 
74,594 276.28 
 
43.27 
Neutral 
Overvalued 6,821 49.09 
 
22,365,796 3,278.96 
 
2,638,620 386.84 
 
21.35 
Undervalued 483 3.48 
 
408,217 845.17 
 
113,788 235.59 
 
76.79 
Declining 
Overvalued 2,955 21.27 
 
10,925,970 3,697.45 
 
1,315,370 445.13 
 
20.87 
Undervalued 272 1.96 
 
199,245 732.52 
 
42,434 156.01 
 
36.48 
 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Investor Sentiment and the Impact on the Gains to 
Acquirers 
This subsection begins by examining the key hypothesis (H1) that investor sentiment 
has a significant impact on the acquirers’ gains. Table 6.2 shows the returns to acquiring 
companies during increasing, neutral and decreasing investor sentiment.  
During increasing investor sentiment, acquirers earn between 1.36 and 2.42 per cent. 
The returns are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level for all three examined 
event windows. During neutral sentiment changes, the returns are between 1.00 and 
1.50 per cent. The statistical tests indicate again a significance level of 1 per cent. The 
returns to acquiring companies during declining sentiment are between 0.63 and 0.90 
per cent and also statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The differences in 
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returns between increasing and decreasing sentiments are 0.73, 0.90 and 1.52 
percentage points for the 3-, 5- and 11-days event windows, respectively. All return 
differences are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Table 6.2: Investor Sentiment: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining 
industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the 
announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the 
rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of 
positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor 
sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the month of the deal announcement was 
matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied 
to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has 
been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Investor Sentiment N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Increasing 3,881 1.35547*** <.0001  3,872 1.68618*** <.0001  3,879 2.41669*** <.0001 
Neutral 8,260 0.99577*** <.0001  8,279 1.20994*** <.0001  8,254 1.50357*** <.0001 
Decreasing 3,686 0.62647*** <.0001  3,676 0.78882*** <.0001  3,694 0.89876*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. 
Decreasing 
 0.72900*** <.0001 
 
 0.89736*** <.0001 
 
 1.51793*** <.0001 
  
These first findings clearly support the main hypothesis (H1) that investor sentiment 
has a significant impact on the gains to M&A. The returns show that a positive change 
in investor sentiment leads to larger returns than during a negative sentiment change. 
Highly statistically significant test results confirm these findings. Further, the 
magnitude of this impact also underpins the economic relevance. As mentioned, the 
return and risk perception of investors may change during a sentiment change. In a 
positive environment, investors might be overconfident that mergers create wealth and 
pay less attention to risk. During a negative change, investors become more risk averse 
and doubt that the merger might be as profitable as they believe during an increasing 
sentiment. As confidence decreases, so do the returns to acquiring companies. 
6.4.2 Investor Sentiment and Mode of Payment 
This subsection examines investor sentiment and its effect on the returns by the mode of 
payment. When sentiment changes, the signal from the mode of payment is expected to 
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have an enhancing effect on the returns. Specifically, the impact is expected to manifest 
itself in a more pronounced way in stock payments than in cash payments. 
In Table 6.3, cash-only deals earn between 1.42 and 2.02 per cent during increasing 
sentiments and between 1.35 and 1.73 per cent during decreasing sentiment. All 
individual returns are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The differences in 
returns for cash-only deals are between 0.08 and 0.29 per cent. The statistical results 
indicate no significant impact by investor sentiment. Small differences in the returns 
during increasing and declining sentiment suggest hardly any economic relevance, 
which is in line with the prediction. 
Stock-only deals, on the other hand, show a different pattern. During increasing 
sentiment, the returns are between 0.57 and 2.03 per cent. The results of the 3-days 
event window indicate a statistical significance at the 5 per cent level and the 5- and 11-
days event windows are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Stock deals 
during decreasing sentiment have small positive or negative, as well as, statistically 
insignificant returns between -0.36 and 0.18 per cent. The differences in returns 
between increasing and decreasing sentiment levels range from 0.94 to 1.85 per cent. 
All examined event windows indicate a statistical significance of 1 per cent. 
Economically and statistically significant results confirm the the expected results that 
investor sentiment has a significant impact on stock-only deals. Moreover, a 
substantially greater effect on stock-only than on cash-only deals is in line with the 
prediction (H2). 
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Table 6.3: Investor Sentiment and Mode of Payment: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. Cash are deals with cash only offers and are deals with stock only offers are stock. A combination of both is 
considered as mixed. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has 
been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Mode of Payment Investor Sentiment N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Cash 
Increasing 1,214 1.42332*** <.0001  1,210 1.62833*** 0.0000  1,211 2.01566*** <.0001 
Neutral 3,013 1.21102*** <.0001  3,019 1.28854*** 0.0000  3,012 1.65395*** <.0001 
Decreasing 1,214 1.34623*** <.0001  1,214 1.46084*** 0.0000  1,212 1.72767*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.07709 0.7568   0.16749  0.5683   0.28799 0.4569 
Mixed 
Increasing 1,614 1.81527*** <.0001  1,612 2.05348*** 0.0000  1,612 2.96871*** <.0001 
Neutral 3,174 1.23706*** <.0001  3,178 1.63891*** 0.0000  3,176 1.77499*** <.0001 
Decreasing 1,558 0.64678*** 0.0003  1,555 0.74457*** 0.0003  1,568 0.67462** 0.0137 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  1.16849*** <.0001   1.30891*** <.0001   2.29409*** <.0001 
Stock 
Increasing 1,053 0.57249** 0.0139  1,050 1.18895*** 0.0000  1,056 2.03391*** <.0001 
Neutral 2,073 0.31347** 0.0334  2,082 0.44119** 0.0104  2,066 0.86710*** <.0001 
Decreasing 914 -0.36418 0.1597  907 -0.03481  0.9053  914 0.18412  0.6177 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.93667*** 0.0070   1.22376*** 0.0026   1.84979*** 0.0004 
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Mixed payments, which are likely to contain stocks, show similar results as stock-
only deals. Deals with a mixed payment lead to positive gains between 1.82 and 2.97 
per cent during increasing sentiment and between 0.65 and 0.74 per cent during 
decreasing sentiment. All individual returns are highly statistically significant. The 
differences of gains from mixed payments in increasing and decreasing sentiment are 
between 1.17 and 2.29 percentage points, which are statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent level. These results support the hypotheses on the gains from stock payments. 
Overall, the results are in line with hypothesis (H2) that investor sentiment does not 
impact the returns from deals with cash payments to a great extent, but the returns from 
deals with stock payments exhibit a significant impact. Irrational investors may treat 
information differently, especially if they regard it as insider information. A cash 
payment is a positive sign that managers consider their own firm as undervalued. 
Irrespective of the sentiment direction, this signal indicates a lucrative investment 
opportunity and leads to large and highly significant positive returns during increasing 
and decreasing sentiment changes. Following this logic, a stock payment is a warning 
signal that managers opt to pay in stocks as they consider their company as currently 
overvalued. During increasing sentiment, this signal might have less strength, as 
irrational investors tend to be highly confident and risk seeking. However, a declining 
sentiment may have a fuelling effect. Investors are more sensitive to risk and less 
confident and if a merger announcement then contains a stock payment investors may 
overreact to this signal.  
6.4.3 Investor Sentiment and Target Listing Status 
This subsection examines the returns to acquirers considering investor sentiment and the 
target’s listing status. As discussed, research shows that information asymmetries have a 
significant impact on the returns from M&A. Similarly, empirical evidence indicates 
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that companies which exhibit information asymmetries are more likely to be affected by 
investor sentiment. Therefore, takeovers of private targets are expected to experience a 
greater impact of investor sentiment changes than public target takeovers. The results 
are presented in Table 6.4. 
The results are qualitatively similar to findings on the target listing status in the 
M&A literature. For instance, Fuller et al. (2002) find within a sub-period (1990 to 
2000) of the sample that acquirers of public targets lose on average statistically 
significant -1.00 per cent, whereas, the acquisition of a private target leads on average to 
a statistically significant gain of 2.08 per cent. 
In this study, acquirers of public targets lose between -0.60 and -0.24 per cent during 
increasing investor sentiment. Statistical tests suggest a significance level of 1 per cent 
for the 3- and 5-days event windows. The results of the 11-days event window are 
statistically not different from 0. During decreasing sentiment, public targets lead to 
losses of between -1.22 and -0.36 per cent. Similar to the returns in increasing 
sentiment, the 3- and 5-days event windows are significant at the 1 per cent level. The 
returns over the 11-days window are statistically insignificant. Overall, the differences 
in returns decrease with an increasing length of the event windows. The 3-days event 
window with a return difference of 0.64 percentage points is statistically significant at 
the 5 per cent level and longer event windows suggest statistically insignificant results. 
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Table 6.4: Investor Sentiment and Target Listing Status: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. Public target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private target is held by private investors. Subsidiary is 
if the target is labelled as a subsidiary by SDC Platinum. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in 
means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Target Listing Status Investor Sentiment N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Public 
Increasing 1,031 -0.58050*** 0.0039  1,032 -0.60159 *** 0.0093  1,040 -0.23764 0.4244 
Neutral 2,104 -0.65763*** <.0001  2,109 -0.66837 *** <.0001  2,114 -0.46511*** 0.0097 
Decreasing 948 -1.22207*** <.0001  949 -1.02096 *** <.0001  957 -0.35804 0.2516 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.64157** 0.0275   0.41937 0.2123   0.12040 0.7800 
Private 
Increasing 1,862 1.91396*** <.0001  1,857 2.29852 *** <.0001  1,857 3.22795*** <.0001 
Neutral 3,955 1.43955*** <.0001  3,964 1.70549 *** <.0001  3,944 2.00713*** <.0001 
Decreasing 1,747 0.98336*** <.0001  1,735 1.28538 *** <.0001  1,739 1.14306*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.93060*** <.0001   1.01314 *** 0.0004   2.08489*** <.0001 
Subsidiary 
Increasing 988 2.32318*** <.0001  983 2.93120 *** <.0001  982 3.69366*** <.0001 
Neutral 2,201 1.77887*** <.0001  2,206 2.11521 *** <.0001  2,196 2.49436*** <.0001 
Decreasing 991 1.76563*** <.0001  992 1.65168 *** <.0001  998 1.67824*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.55755* 0.0654   1.27952 *** 0.0004   2.01542*** <.0001 
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The acquisition of a private target during increasing investor sentiment generates 
statistically significant positive returns between 1.91 and 3.23 per cent and between 
0.98 and 1.29 per cent during decreasing sentiment. Each abnormal return is statistically 
significant the 1 per cent level. Statistically significant differences between 0.93 and 
2.08 confirm the relevance of the investor sentiment’s impact on the returns to acquiring 
companies. Highly statistically, as well as, economically significant differences in 
returns from deals involving private targets suggest a significant investor sentiment 
impact. In comparison, the returns to acquirers based on the target listing status confirm 
the prediction (H3) that investor sentiment has a greater effect on the returns from 
private target than on public target takeovers.  
Primarily due to a size and marketability effect, Fuller et al. (2002) describe 
acquisitions of subsidiaries as very similar to private target takeovers. The results in this 
study confirm their findings. During increasing sentiment, the purchase of a subsidiary 
leads to positive gains between 2.32 and 3.69 per cent, whereas similar targets lead to 
positive gains between 1.65 and 1.77 per cent during decreasing sentiment changes. All 
individual returns are significant at the 1 per cent level. The differences in returns range 
from 0.56 to 2.02 percentage points and the test statistics suggest a significance level of 
10 per cent for the results of the 3-days event window and the 1 per cent level for the 
remaining 5- and 11-days event windows. In the vein of Fuller et al.’s (2002) notion, the 
results provide further evidence on the predictions of the impact of investor sentiment 
on private target takeovers and associated information asymmetries. 
As a whole, the results support hypothesis (H3) that the returns from private target 
takeovers experience a greater impact from investor sentiment changes than compared 
to public target acquisitions. Research shows that companies which exhibit potentially 
high levels of information asymmetries are more likely to experience an impact if 
investor sentiment changes. M&A research has found similar results with regards to 
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information asymmetries affecting returns around the merger announcement. As private 
targets are not required to constantly disclose financial information and are not under 
close scrutiny (e.g. analysts), private target takeovers exhibit a greater impact if investor 
sentiment changes. The results are consistent with the view that when sentiment in the 
market changes, irrational investors change their perception of risk. In bullish markets, 
these investors seem to be overly confident and risk seeking. On the other hand, 
investors fear losses during declining investor sentiment and at the same time, change 
their perception of available information. They are more apprehensive of incomplete 
information, such as in private target takeovers. As a result, private target acquisitions 
experience a greater magnitude of investor sentiment changes than public target 
takeovers. 
6.4.4 Investor Sentiment and Acquirer’s Size 
Research on investor sentiment suggests that smaller firms experience a greater impact 
then larger companies. Since smaller firms are considered to have greater information 
asymmetries, returns to smaller acquirers are expected to be more affected by investor 
sentiment than larger acquirers. In Table 6.5, the results of the returns based on 
acquirer’s size are presented. 
   
C
h
ap
ter 6
: In
v
esto
r S
en
tim
en
t an
d
 th
e Im
p
act o
n
 A
cq
u
ire
rs’ G
ain
s 
1
7
1
Table 6.5: Investor Sentiment and Acquirer’s Size: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. Acquirer’s size is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values, sorted by size and split into three equally-sized 
groups. The upper group is categorised as large, the middle group as medium and the lowest group as small. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal 
returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Acquirer’s Size Investor Sentiment N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Large 
Increasing 1,294 0.33732** 0.0402  1,291 0.56532*** 0.0036  1,293 1.01514*** 0.0001 
Neutral 2,753 0.32971*** 0.0011  2,760 0.39201*** 0.0008  2,751 0.60233*** 0.0001 
Decreasing 1,229 -0.19303 0.2720  1,225 0.03133  0.8751  1,231 0.46636* 0.0683 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.53035** 0.0273   0.53399* 0.0547   0.54878 0.1368 
Small 
Increasing 1,293 2.17801*** <.0001  1,290 2.36016*** 0.0000  1,293 3.47607*** <.0001 
Neutral 2,753 1.75674*** <.0001  2,759 2.17556*** 0.0000  2,751 2.55755*** <.0001 
Decreasing 1,228 1.41498*** <.0001  1,225 1.46701*** 0.0000  1,231 1.53585*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.76303** 0.0148   0.89315** 0.0147   1.94022*** <.0001 
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During increasing investor sentiment, large acquirers gain between 0.34 and 1.02 per 
cent. The returns during the 3-days event window are statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level and the 5- and 11-days event windows are statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent level. During decreasing sentiment, the returns to large acquirers range from -0.19 
to 0.47 per cent. Only the 11-days event window indicates a statistical significance level 
of 10 per cent. The differences in gains between increasing and decreasing sentiment are 
between 0.53 and 0.55 percentage points. The 3- and 5-days event windows are 
statistical significant at the 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
Small acquirers experience positive gains of between 2.18 and 3.48 per cent during 
positive sentiment changes and between 1.41 and 1.54 per cent during decreasing 
sentiment. The individual returns are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The 
differences in returns of between 0.76 and 1.94 percentage points indicate not only 
economic relevance, but are also all statistically significant at least at the 5 per cent 
level. 
As proposed in hypothesis (H4), economically and statistically significant results 
show that small acquirers experience a greater impact by changes in sentiment than 
larger acquirers. Arguably higher information asymmetries induce investors to shift 
their investments from smaller companies to perceived safer assets during a negative 
sentiment change. Due to higher transparency, larger companies may be considered less 
risky. Larger firms are usually followed by more analysts and are under constant 
scrutiny by the media and public. Additionally, the size effect makes them ‘too big to 
fail’ and investors may place a premium on this characteristic. As mentioned earlier, 
research shows that the shareholder structure is considerably different in small and large 
firms. Small firms are disproportionally held by individual investors, whereas 
institutional predominantly invest in larger firms. This aspect might expose smaller 
companies more to investor sentiment as individuals may follow a behavioural 
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investment style. Moreover, research shows that small companies are more likely to be 
overvalued and that such firms are more prone to sentiment changes. In the case of 
declining sentiment, irrational investors may panic or may not expect these firms to 
engage in value-creating acquisitions. In a bullish market environment, investors are 
overconfident about the future of the company and the outcome of an acquisition. The 
analysis in the next subsection will explore the impact on over- and undervalued 
acquirers in more detail. It should be emphasised that the results also indicate a 
significant impact of investor sentiment on the returns to large acquirers, even though 
the magnitude of about 0.5 percentage points is only a third of the impact on small 
acquirers.  
6.4.5 Investor Sentiment and Over- and Undervalued 
Acquirers 
The proposition that overvalued acquirers are likely to show an impact of investor 
sentiment, whereas undervalued acquirers experience a revaluation at the merger 
announcement is the focus of the last univariate test. If this argument is correct, then a 
greater impact on the returns to overvalued than undervalued acquirers is expected. 
Table 6.6 presents the results of the sentiment’s impact concerning the acquirer’s 
valuation.  
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Table 6.6: Investor Sentiment the Acquirer’s Valuation: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. The acquirer’s valuation is book-to-market ratio of the previous reported quarter. If the book-to-market is smaller 
than 1 then the acquirer is categorised as overvalued, if smaller than 1 then the acquirer is categorised as undervalued. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the 
abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Acquirer’s Valuation Investor Sentiment N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Overvalued 
Increasing 3,101 1.14895*** <.0001  3,095 1.51206*** <.0001  3,101 2.14517*** <.0001 
Neutral 6,813 0.90430*** <.0001  6,821 1.10081*** <.0001  6,810 1.37080*** <.0001 
Decreasing 2,960 0.39830*** <.0001  2,955 0.60964*** <.0001  2,964 0.77649*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.75065*** <.0001   0.90242*** <.0001   1.36868*** <.0001 
Undervalued 
Increasing 269 1.62252*** <.0001  270 1.63319*** <.0001  265 2.41808*** 0.0005 
Neutral 482 1.03238*** <.0001  483 1.43021*** <.0001  483 2.09334*** <.0001 
Decreasing 271 1.56941*** <.0001  272 1.52091*** <.0001  273 1.50555** 0.0197 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.05311 0.9282   0.11228 0.8763   0.91253 0.3327 
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During increasing sentiment, overvalued acquirers earn between 1.15 and 2.15 per 
cent, which are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The returns to overvalued 
acquirers during decreasing sentiment are between 0.40 and 0.78 per cent and also are 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The return differences between increasing 
and decreasing sentiment range between 0.75 and 1.37 percentage points. Across all 
three examined event windows, the results of statistical tests at the 1 per cent level 
suggest a highly significant effect of investor sentiment on the returns to overvalued 
acquirers. 
The returns to undervalued acquirers are slightly higher. During increasing 
sentiment, undervalued acquirers generate abnormal returns between 1.62 and 2.42 per 
cent, which are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. During decreasing 
sentiment returns are between 1.51 and 1.57 per cent. The 3- and 5-days event windows 
are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level and the 11-days event window 
indicates a statistical significance level of 5 per cent. The differences in returns are 
statistically insignificant, suggesting no relevant sentiment impact on the returns to 
undervalued acquirers. However, the aspect that the gains to undervalued acquirers are 
consistently higher supports the argument that undervalued acquirers experience a 
revaluation around the merger announcement. 
The presented results confirm the prediction of hypothesis (H5) that overvalued 
acquirers experience a greater impact during sentiment changes than undervalued 
acquirers. Due to more pronounced behavioural effects, the results suggest that the gains 
to overvalued companies are prone to investor sentiment. After a period of 
overconfidence on a specific firm leading to an overvaluation, a merger announcement 
during a broad positive sentiment change might further support this perception. In the 
case of an announcement during a decrease in sentiment, investors may become 
sceptical about current valuation levels, as well as, the gains from the merger. The gains 
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to undervalued acquirers, on the other hand, do not show an impact by sentiment. In 
fact, similar evidence earlier found by Draper and Paudyal (2008) suggest that 
undervalued acquirers experience a revaluation. A merger announcement may receive 
more attention by the public than other corporate events and at the same time, may 
release new information on the acquirer. Positive returns during increasing and 
decreasing sentiment, similar in magnitude and statistical significance, suggest that the 
undervalued acquirer gains investors’ focus again as an attractive investment 
opportunity.96 
6.4.6 Multivariate Framework 
The univariate results show that investor sentiment significantly affects the 
announcement returns to acquirers. The hypotheses are re-examined in a multivariate 
framework as in equation (6.1) and the results are presented in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8. 
A regression analyses verifies the significance of the investor sentiment effect on the 
returns to acquiring companies after controlling for other relevant M&A factors. To 
verify the significance of the sentiment impact, only deals announced during increasing 
and decreasing sentiment are examined in Table 6.7. For this purpose, models (2) to (9) 
use the specific subsamples and the Increasing Sentiment dummy. The variable takes on 
the value of 1 if the deal is announced in an increasing sentiment month and the value 0 
if the deal is announced in a decreasing sentiment month. In Table 6.8, Increasing 
Sentiment and Decreasing Sentiment dummies are added to the models to examine the 
magnitude of each sentiment direction. As a consequence of the different aims of the 
regression analyses, the sample sizes in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 differ. More precisely, 
deals during neutral investor sentiment are dropped in Table 6.7 to verify the effect and 
existence of investor sentiment in M&A, whereas the models in Table 6.8 use the full 
                                                                                                              
96 Jeffrey Wurgler also provides data on an investor sentiment level index. Using the same methodology, the results are not as 
clear-cut. The overall picture suggests that returns are higher during low sentiment levels. The results are shown in the Appendix C. 
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sample to examine the magnitude of the increasing and decreasing investor sentiment 
impact. 
Model (1) of Table 6.7 uses all deals in increasing and declining investor sentiment 
to check the robustness of the results regarding the main hypothesis that investor 
sentiment has a significant impact on the returns acquiring companies. A statistically 
significant intercept of 2.76 suggests that after controlling for influential M&A factors, 
acquirers earn on average a positive return around the merger announcement. The 
results show that cash payments contribute to statistically insignificantly higher returns 
of 0.31 percentage points, whereas stock payments lead to statistically insignificantly 
lower returns of -0.37 percentage points. The coefficients of the public and private 
targets suggests that both target types lead to statistically significantly lower returns of  
-2.95 and -0.41 percentage points, respectively. The acquirer’s size indicates a 
statistically significant negative relationship of -0.20 and so does the valuation proxy, 
the acquirer’s book-to-market ratio with -0.84. Relatively large targets lead to 
statistically significantly higher returns of 0.31 percentage points. The industry relation 
coefficient nearly breaks even with -0.10 percentage points and is statistically 
insignificant. Foreign targets lead to a statistically insignificant lower return of -0.49 
percentage points and a hostile takeover leads to a statistically insignificant higher 
return of 0.94 percentage points. The adjusted R
2
 from  regression (1) to (9) are between 
1.95 and 6.73 per cent. 
The variable of prime interest, the Increasing Sentiment dummy has a coefficient of 
0.88 percentage points after controlling for other return-influencing effects and is highly 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. This supports hypothesis (H1) that the 
prevailing investor sentiment has a significant impact on the returns to acquiring 
companies around the announcement. Deals announced during increasing sentiment 
generate higher returns than during decreasing sentiment, even after controlling for 
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other relevant factors.97 
The discussion of the results from model (2) to (9) concentrates on the coefficients of 
the Increasing Sentiment variable and control variables are commented if there is a 
significant difference from regression (1). 
 
                                                                                                              
97 The results based on the 3- and 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. 
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Table 6.7: Investor Sentiment: Multivariate Framework (Increasing and Declining Sentiment Deals Only) (-2, +2) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The dependent variable is the 5-days abnormal returns (-2, +2) to US acquirers and is regressed 
against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. The examined sentiment index period matches the sample period. Increasing 
Sentiment is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is taking place in an increasing sentiment environment and 0 if the deal is announced in a declining sentiment. The Relative Target Size is the natural logarithm 
of the deal value to acquirer’s market value. Focused is a binary variable which takes on 1 if the acquirers and target’s 2-digit SIC code match, otherwise 0. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment 
offer is stock-only. Public target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private target is held by private investors. Acquirer Size is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Acquirer’s B/M is the natural 
logarithm of acquirer’s book-to-market ratio. Cross-border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal is indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer 
Undervalued 
Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
2.75819 ***  5.48386*** 2.73504***  1.82495* 3.85452***  -0.43354 2.11524***  1.98071*** 2.72846 
(<.0001) 
 
 (0.0009)
 
(0.0096)
 
 (0.0614)
 
(0.0034)
 
 (0.5535)
 
(0.0002)
 
 (0.0016)
 
(0.2376)
 
               
Increasing Sentiment 
0.87673 ***  1.36748*** 0.20888  1.08897*** 0.24315  0.91474** 0.46949*  0.94447*** 0.05622 
(<.0001) 
 
 (0.0008)
 
(0.4810)
 
 (0.0002)
 
(0.4664)
 
 (0.0138)
 
(0.0914)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.9369)
 
               
Cash 
0.30840     0.03760 0.98774**  1.03245** 0.15977  0.20949 0.68191 
(0.1683) 
 
 
  
 (0.9127)
 
(0.0227)
 
 (0.0161)
 
(0.6347)
 
 (0.3716)
 
(0.3661)
 
Stock 
-0.36625     0.14713 -1.09409***  0.58976 -0.36299  -0.29247 -0.36347 
(0.1764) 
 
 
  
 (0.7045)
 
(0.0084)
 
 (0.2482)
 
(0.3874)
 
 (0.2882)
 
(0.7946)
 
Public Target 
-2.95278 ***  -4.37086*** -1.42163***     -3.62307*** -2.55400***  -3.13157*** -1.74644* 
(<.0001) 
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0003)
 
 
  
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0750)
 
Private Target 
-0.41036 *  -1.18514 -0.58686*     -0.00789 -0.69595*  -0.34161 -0.79448 
(0.0977) 
 
 (0.2153)
 
(0.0991)
 
 
  
 (0.9861)
 
(0.0722)
 
 (0.1861)
 
(0.3622)
 
Acquirer Size 
-0.20287 ***  -0.28033* -0.24307**  -0.14984 -0.39733***     -0.13326** -0.32666 
(0.0019) 
 
 (0.0597)
 
(0.0192)
 
 (0.1891)
 
(0.0003)
 
 
  
 (0.0435)
 
(0.2240)
 
Acquirer’s B/M 
-0.83787 **  -0.72805 -0.89463  -1.72727*** 0.79953  -0.29549 -1.59864***    
(0.0122) 
 
 (0.4049)
 
(0.1380)
 
 (0.0003)
 
(0.2399)
 
 (0.5783)
 
(0.0056)
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Table 6.7 continued 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer 
Undervalued 
Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Relative Target Size 
0.30661***  -0.10220  0.55216 ***  0.68511*** -0.86753***  0.91299*** -0.21411  0.26774*** 0.39784  
(0.0014)   (0.6189)  (0.0007)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.1178)  (0.0071) (0.2742)  
Focused 
-0.09560   -1.24320** 0.07675  -0.52640* 0.10856  -0.61880 0.33494  -0.11058 0.04354  
(0.6457)   (0.0157)  (0.8013)  (0.0934) (0.7885)  (0.1250) (0.2753)  (0.6083) (0.9553)  
Cross-Border 
-0.49067   -2.37068*** 0.15324  -0.62086 -0.69677  -1.09222 0.12540  -0.37846 -1.76841  
(0.1177)   (0.0058)  (0.6998)  (0.2362) (0.2263)  (0.1451) (0.7461)  (0.2392) (0.2078)  
Hostile 
0.93822   -2.50119  1.36727  -11.14256* 2.31205**  1.81367 0.14474  0.59349 2.27362  
(0.3503)   (0.5103)  (0.3063)  (0.0746) (0.0272)  (0.5018) (0.8704)  (0.5682) (0.4466)  
                       
                       
N 6,592   1,671 2,209  3,093 1,782  2,196 2,198  6,050 542  
F-Statistics 21.65***  13.31*** 5.38 ***  6.81*** 8.86***  7.64*** 9.78***  22.68*** 1.28  
R2 (%) 3.49   6.73 2.15  1.95 4.31  2.38 4.28  3.62 2.35  
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.33   6.22 1.75  1.66 3.82  2.94 3.84  3.46 0.51  
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The univariate results on the impact of investor sentiment changes with regards to 
stock payments is verified in model (2) and cash payments in model (3). A greater 
impact on the returns from deals with stock payments than with cash payments is 
expected. The Increasing Sentiment dummy is in stock deals with 1.37 percentage 
points statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. In contrast, increasing investor 
sentiment in cash deals only contributes to higher returns of 0.21 percentage points and 
the test statistics indicate statistical insignificance for the coefficient. This is supportive 
evidence for hypothesis (H2) that stock-only deals experience a greater effect on the 
returns in M&A than cash-only deals. 98  As suggested, irrational investors may be 
sensitive to the valuation signal from the payment method. Irrespective of the direction 
of the sentiment change, a cash offer may signal that the acquiring managers consider 
their own stocks as currently undervalued and at the same time, the merger 
announcement reveals a new investment opportunity. A stock payment, on the other 
hand, may indicate that the acquiring managers perceive their company as currently 
overvalued. Due to changing levels of confidence and the perception of risk, sentimental 
investors may either pay less attention to that signal during increasing sentiment or an 
increased loss aversion may lead to a more pronounced effect on the gains during 
decreasing sentiment. 
In models (4) and (5), the effects of the investor sentiment by the target listing status 
are analysed. For this purpose, model (4) uses a subsample of private target takeovers 
and model (5) uses only listed target takeovers. The sentiment dummy indicates that 
private and listed target takeovers earn 1.09 and 0.24 percentage points more in 
increasing than decreasing sentiment. Further the sentiment coefficient suggests that 
investor sentiment has a statistically significant impact on private target deals at the 1 
per cent level, whereas listed target deals are statistically unaffected. These results 
                                                                                                              
98 The regression results based on the 3- and 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. 
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support hypothesis (H3) and arguably, greater investors’ sensitivity to information 
asymmetries when investor sentiment changes may lead to a greater impact on the gains 
from private target takeovers than from listed target deals.99  
The hypothesis regarding the acquirer’s size are re-examined in regression (6) and 
(7). By filtering the sample for small acquirers in model (6) and for large acquirers in 
model (7), a greater impact from a change in investor sentiment on the returns to smaller 
than to larger acquirers is expected to be found. The key variables show that small and 
large acquirers experience a statistically and economically significant effect from 
changes in investor sentiment. Small acquirers gain 0.91 percentage points more during 
increasing sentiment than during negative changes in sentiment. The coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Large acquirers generate higher returns of 
0.47 percentage points during increasing sentiment than compared to decreasing 
sentiment, which is significant at the 5 per cent level. The findings show that investor 
sentiment has a significant impact on the returns to acquiring companies considering the 
acquirer’s size. The results also indicate that investor sentiment has greater impact on 
smaller than larger acquirers, which confirms hypothesis (H4).100 Arguably, smaller 
acquirers may exhibit more information asymmetries, making such companies more 
prone to investor sentiment. 
The last regression models (8) and (9) analyse the investor sentiment’s impact on the 
returns based on the acquirer’s valuation. All overvalued acquirers are pooled in 
regression (8). Regression (9) contains all acquirers which were undervalued when the 
merger was announced. As proposed in hypothesis (H5), changes in sentiment should 
have a greater impact on the returns to overvalued than undervalued acquirers. The 
coefficients of the sentiment dummy suggest that the returns of overvalued companies 
                                                                                                              
99 The regression results based on the 3- and 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. In addition, the sentiment variable in the 3-
days CARs regression of listed targets is statistically significant 
100 The regression results based on the 3- and 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. The sentiment variable in the 11-days CARs 
regression of large acquirers is statistically not different form zero. 
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experience a greater impact of 0.94 percentage points during increasing sentiment, 
which is statistically significant the 1 per cent level. In contrast, sentiment changes have 
hardly any effect on undervalued acquirers. The dummy coefficient is with 0.06 
percentage points statistically insignificant. This confirms the univariate results, as well 
as, hypothesis (H5) that investor sentiment has a greater effect on overvalued acquirers 
and that undervalued acquirers experience a revaluation around the merger 
announcement.101  
The multivariate results from Table 6.7 confirm the hypotheses, as well as, the 
univariate results that investor sentiment has a significant effect on the returns to 
acquiring companies after controlling for other influential deal characteristics. 
Acquiring companies gain statistically and economically higher returns during 
increasing than decreasing investor sentiment.102 Consistent with sentiment research, the 
findings suggest that irrational investors are sensitive to information asymmetries and 
valuation signals. 
In Table 6.8, the hypotheses are re-examined by adding two sentiment dummy 
variables, an Increasing and Decreasing Sentiment variable. The Increasing Sentiment 
variable takes on the value of 1 if the deal was announced during increasing sentiment 
and the Decreasing Sentiment variable takes on the value of 1 if the deal was announced 
during decreasing sentiment, otherwise the dummies are 0. In a direct comparison of the 
two coefficients, conclusions on the magnitude and significance of increasing and 
declining sentiment changes can be drawn. The remaining control variables are the 
same as presented in Table 6.7.103 
In model (1), the full sample serves to analyse the overall effect of investor 
sentiment. The coefficients suggest that an increasing sentiment change has a positive 
                                                                                                              
101 The regression results based on the 3- and 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. 
102 Except in regression (9), where an economically meaningful intercept provides support for a revaluation of undervalued 
acquires around the announcement.  
103 Control variables are commented  if appropriate. 
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impact of 0.47 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
The decreasing sentiment dummy, on the other hand, indicates a negative impact of  
-0.40 percentage points, which is significant at the 5 per cent level.104 The findings 
suggest that changes in sentiment statistically, as well, as economically impacts the 
gains to acquiring companies. Moreover, the results also indicate that an increasing 
sentiment has a greater impact on the overall returns from M&A. 
Model (2) and (3) investigate the investor sentiment’s impact based on the mode of 
payment. In deals with stock-only payments, the acquirer’s gains experience during 
increasing investor sentiment a positive effect of 0.84 percentage points. The p-value 
indicates a 1 per cent significance level. During decreasing sentiment, the returns are by 
-0.51 percentage points lower. However, the coefficient is statistically not different from 
0. In deals with cash offers, increasing and decreasing investor sentiment has a positive 
effect of 0.29 and 0.08 percentage points, respectively. However, both coefficients are 
statistically insignificant.105 Similar to regression (1), the magnitude of the coefficients 
also indicate that a positive sentiment change has a greater impact on the wealth effects 
to acquiring firms. Further deals with stock payments are more affected than deals with 
cash payments. This confirms and is consistent with the argument that the payment 
signals the managers’ perception of their company’s current valuation. 
 
                                                                                                              
104 The regression results based on the 3-days CARs are qualitatively similar. The regression results based on the 11-days CARs 
suggest that the impact on the returns is slightly greater during increasing sentiment. 
105 The regression results based on the 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. The regression results based on the 3-days CARs 
suggest that the impact on the returns in stock deals is greater during decreasing sentiment. 
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Table 6.8: Investor Sentiment: Multivariate Framework (Full sample, Increasing and Decreasing Sentiment Variable) (-2, +2) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The dependent variable is the 5-days abnormal returns (-2, +2) to US acquirers and is regressed 
against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. The examined sentiment index period matches the sample period. Increasing 
Sentiment is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is taking place in an increasing sentiment environment and 0 otherwise. Declining Sentiment is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is taking place 
in a declining sentiment environment and 0 otherwise. A Relative Target Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value to acquirer’s market value. Focused is a binary variable which takes on 1 if the acquirers and target’s 2-
digit SIC code match, otherwise 0. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private Target is held by private 
investors. Acquirer Size is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Acquirer’s B/M is the natural logarithm of acquirer’s book-to-market ratio. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal is 
indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer 
Undervalued 
Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
3.51291***  4.57935*** 2.27711***  2.36440 *** 3.78087***  0.92210* 1.99691***  2.73697*** 3.95295** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0007)
 
 (0.0002) 
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0670)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0153)
 
               
Increasing Sentiment 
0.46768***  0.83957*** 0.29473  0.60964 ** -0.04189  0.12459 0.14412  0.48537*** 0.21293 
(0.0033)
 
 (0.0097)
 
(0.2270)
 
 (0.0122) 
 
(0.8787)
 
 (0.6910)
 
(0.5238)
 
 (0.0033)
 
(0.7282)
 
Decreasing Sentiment 
-0.40303**  -0.50910 0.08474  -0.47654 ** -0.29355  -0.78507*** -0.30773  -0.45015*** 0.11115 
(0.0110)
 
 (0.1389)
 
(0.7212)
 
 (0.0486) 
 
(0.3016)
 
 (0.0099)
 
(0.1844)
 
 (0.0062)
 
(0.8502)
 
               
Cash 
0.13398     -0.06868 1.00649***  0.33313 0.09428  0.03295 0.61714 
(0.3674)
 
 
  
 (0.7576) 
 
(0.0006)
 
 (0.2443)
 
(0.6698)
 
 (0.8321)
 
(0.2346)
 
Stock 
-0.58246***     -0.01794 -0.98763***  0.04071 -0.53473*  -0.51355*** -0.74260 
(0.0011)
 
 
  
 (0.9433) 
 
(0.0005)
 
 (0.9032)
 
(0.0544)
 
 (0.0047)
 
(0.4228)
 
Public Target 
-2.57998***  -2.84439*** -1.18273***     -3.44938*** -2.07506***  -2.70410*** -1.88291*** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
  
  
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0050)
 
Private Target 
-0.34564**  -0.02257 -0.35436     -0.21418 -0.35868  -0.29042* -0.66242 
(0.0336)
 
 (0.9703)
 
(0.1079)
 
  
  
 (0.4779)
 
(0.1520)
 
 (0.0851)
 
(0.2817)
 
Acquirer Size 
-0.26223***  -0.32734*** -0.20818***  -0.20724 *** -0.37664***     -0.19257*** -0.53509*** 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0008)
 
(0.0015)
 
 (0.0049) 
 
(<.0001)
 
 
  
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0026)
 
Acquirer’s B/M 
-0.91146***  -0.42736 -0.88219**  -1.49287 *** 0.27392  -0.54440 -1.34371***    
(<.0001)
 
 (0.4505)
 
(0.0199)
 
 (<.0001) 
 
(0.5357)
 
 (0.1407)
 
(0.0003)
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Table 6.8 continued 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer 
Undervalued 
Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Relative Target Size 
0.29253***  -0.13056  0.61799***  0.66738*** -0.70347***  0.81983*** -0.13609  0.25951*** 0.31444
(<.0001)   (0.3641)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.1560)  (0.0001)  (0.2348)
Focused 
-0.05100   -0.74506** -0.08046  -0.20032  0.05589  -0.27861  0.23370  -0.07088  0.00758
(0.7081)   (0.0226)  (0.6796)  (0.3247)
 
(0.8363)  (0.2936)  (0.2349)  (0.6150)  (0.9887)
Cross-Border 
-0.05853   -1.61821*** 0.08443  -0.06034  -0.25187  -0.67190  0.26412  0.03567  -1.15303
(0.7781)   (0.0073)  (0.7425)  (0.8543)
 
(0.5460)  (0.1479)  (0.3300)  (0.8674)  (0.2009)
Hostile 
0.52924   -1.32099  -0.21397  -8.06384  1.66243**  0.69450  0.01029  0.29732  1.57994
(0.4339)   (0.5492)  (0.8153)  (0.1008)
 
(0.0176)  (0.6990)  (0.9884)  (0.6696)  (0.4561)
                       
                       
N 13,896  3,455  4,986  6,568 3,654  4,630  4,633  12,781  1,025
F-Statistics 40.33***  20.11*** 11.26***  11.47*** 13.12***  11.84*** 15.38***  39.89*** 3.42*** 
R2 (%) 3.37  5.52  2.21  1.72 3.48  2.74  3.53  3.30  3.58
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.29  5.24  2.02  1.57 3.21  2.51  3.30  3.22  2.53
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The impact of investor sentiment in private and listed target deals is examined in 
models (4) and (5). In private target takeovers, increasing and decreasing sentiment has 
a statically significant effect on the returns to acquiring companies. Acquirers gain 0.61 
percentage points more during a positive sentiment change and -0.48 percentage points 
less in decreasing sentiment. The p-values indicate for both coefficients a significance 
level of 5 per cent. In listed target takeovers, increasing sentiment has a negative impact 
with -0.04 percentage points and the test statistics suggest statistical insignificance. The 
decreasing sentiment dummy has of -0.29 percentage points a negative impact on the 
returns and is statistically insignificant, as well.106 Consistent with the view of varying 
sensitivity to information asymmetries, the findings confirm the significance of investor 
sentiment in private target takeovers and suggest a positive sentiment change has a 
greater impact on such takeovers.  
Models (6) and (7) analyse the effects by the acquirer’s size. Small acquirers 
experience a positive effect of 0.12 percentage points if the deal was announced during 
increasing sentiment. The test statistics suggest that the coefficient is not statistically 
different from 0. During negative changes of sentiment, similar acquirers suffer a 
statically significant negative effect of -0.79 percentage points. With 0.14 percentage 
points, large acquirers experience a small positive effect from increasing sentiment 
changes. During declining sentiment, large acquirers exhibit statistically insignificant 
lower returns of -0.31 per cent.107 The findings regarding the acquirers’ size indicate 
that small acquirers experience statistically and economically significant impact during 
decreasing sentiment, suggesting that irrational investors are sensitive to information 
asymmetries during decreasing sentiment. 
Finally, the impact of investor sentiment changes on over- and undervalued acquirers 
                                                                                                              
106 The regression results based on the 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. The regression results based on the 3-days CARs 
suggest that the impact on the returns in private target takeovers is greater during decreasing sentiment. 
107 The regression results based on the 5- and 11-days CARs are qualitatively similar. 
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is examined in model (8) and (9). An increasing investor sentiment has with 0.49 
percentage points a positive effect on overvalued acquirers. During a decreasing 
sentiment, returns to overvalued acquirers are -0.45 percentage points lower. Both 
estimates are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. Undervalued acquirers, on 
the other hand, experience a positive effect in increasing and decreasing sentiment with 
0.21 and 0.11 percentage points, respectively. However, the dummy variables are 
statistically insignificant. 108  Overall, the results economically and statistically 
significant results support hypothesis (H5) that overvalued acquirers are prone to 
investor sentiment. In the case of undervalued acquirers, positive gains during 
increasing and decreasing sentiment are rather consistent with the argument that 
acquirers experience a revaluation around the merger announcement. 
The results of this regression analysis suggest that firms, which are expected to be 
prone to investor sentiment, experience a greater impact of increasing sentiment. 
Overconfidence and a risk seeking attitude during bullish market conditions may 
disproportionally fuel the perception of such firms and their acquisitions, leading to 
higher gains from M&A. As a whole, the multivariate results confirm the findings of the 
previous section that investor sentiment has a significant effect on the returns to 
acquiring firms, even after controlling for other relevant M&A features. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The concept of an efficient market is probably the most dominant framework in 
explaining the functioning of the financial market. The efficient market hypothesis, as 
an underlying assumption of many models and arguments, facilitates the exploration of 
markets for academics, as well as, practitioners. It assumes investors who act rationally 
on the basis of the available information which is instantaneously reflected in the 
                                                                                                              
108 The regression results based on the 3-days CARs suggest that the impact on the returns to overvalued acquirers is greater during 
decreasing sentiment. 
Chapter 6: Investor Sentiment and the Impact on Acquirers’ Gains 189 
  
observed market prices. However, a significant number of studies in several areas of 
finance challenge this concept by revealing anomalies which cannot be explained by the 
neoclassical finance view, but suggest a behavioural aspect in investors’ actions. This 
study adds to this literature by examining the impact of investor sentiment on M&A. To 
be more specific, the effect of changes in investor sentiment on the returns to US 
acquirers is analysed in over 16,000 deals over a sample period of 31 years. 
The findings show that acquiring companies earn significantly higher returns during 
increasing than decreasing investor sentiment. Arguably, investors gain confidence 
about the outcome of a merger during a positive change in sentiment and overreact too 
such announcements. A risk seeking attitude may also contribute to an increase in 
returns. On the contrary, if the sentiment decreases so does the confidence of investors. 
As a result, the perception of risk shifts to risk aversion and investors are pessimistic 
about a profitable outcome of mergers.  
The mode of payment provides further support for the impact of investor sentiment. 
Cash deals show hardly any impact from sentiment changes, whereas stock transactions 
experience a significant impact. The results indicate that the returns from deals with 
stock payments reflect the overvaluation signal together with the positive or negative 
effect of the sentiment change. The combined effect leads to a significant impact on the 
returns between increasing and decreasing sentiment. In cash deals, the undervaluation 
signal is more dominant as it probably reveals a new investment opportunity.  
The results from the target’s public listing status also confirm the predictions. Private 
target takeovers experience a greater impact than the acquisition of listed targets. As 
sentiment decreases, investors become more risk averse and as private targets are 
required to disclose less financial information, they become more sensitive to 
information asymmetries. During increasing sentiment, the results are consistent with 
investors tending to be overly confident and risk seeking. As a result, information 
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asymmetries play a less significant role and the returns to acquiring firms are higher. 
Due to higher reporting standards, public targets should exhibit lower levels of 
information asymmetries and the results suggest that investor sentiment has a lower 
impact on the returns to acquiring companies of public targets. 
In line with investor sentiment research, small acquirers experience a greater effect 
than large acquirers. Smaller companies tend to be predominantly held by individual 
investors which makes the returns from M&A announcements prone to the sentiment in 
the market. Further, smaller companies are considered to have higher information 
asymmetries.  
With regards to the valuation of the acquirers, overvalued acquirers show a 
significant impact by investor sentiment, whereas the returns to undervalued acquirers 
in increasing and declining sentiment are not different. The returns to overvalued 
acquirers suggest that the overconfidence that led to an overvaluation is carried forward 
during increasing sentiment, whereas decreasing sentiment causes are scepticism. The 
gains to undervalued acquirers indicate a revaluation effect at the merger announcement 
irrespective by the sentiment change.  
The univariate results are robust to a multivariate framework and confirm the 
respective hypotheses that the returns to acquiring firms are significantly different 
during increasing and declining investor sentiment. A multivariate analysis on the 
magnitude of the impact reveals that acquirers, that are expected to be more affected by 
investor sentiment, experience a greater effect by positive changes in sentiment.  
Overconfidence and risk seeking of irrational investors in a bullish market may have 
stronger effect on the gains. 
Our findings confirm Bouwman et al.’s (2003) proposition that the returns to 
acquirers reflect investor sentiment. These findings add to a growing body of literature 
that stock price movements are also driven by irrational behaviour rather than by pure 
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rational responses to new information. The economic and statistical significance of the 
results suggests that M&A gains should be adjusted for investor sentiment in order to 
make more precise statements on the wealth creating effects. Moreover, the findings 
imply that event studies can serve as a useful tool to gain further knowledge on the 
influence of investor sentiment on share price movements.  
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7. Conclusion 
7.1 Background to the Thesis 
This thesis contributes to an understanding of information and information asymmetry 
research by analysing the gains to acquiring companies around merger announcements 
in a variety of contexts. Research suggests that new information is not solely 
responsible for price movements, but also other factors, such as information asymmetry 
and sentiment, may have an impact on prices. Due to the size of the M&A market and 
the frequency of M&A transactions, such deals provide an ideal setting for analysis of 
these issues. 
The contributions of this thesis are not limited to information, information 
asymmetry and M&A literature. The findings also relate to accounting, industry life 
cycle and sentiment research. 
The first empirical chapter examines the expected reduction of information 
asymmetries due the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the European Union. The second 
empirical chapter analyses the investors’ perception of information on industry 
prospects and their preferences regarding specific acquisition strategies. The third 
empirical chapter studies the impact of investor sentiment on the gains to acquiring 
companies. 
The main findings and their implications of each empirical chapter can be 
summarised as follows: 
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7.2 Summary of Findings and Implications 
7.2.1 The Adoption of IFRS had an Impact on the Bidders’ 
Gains in High Information Asymmetries Deals 
With the beginning of the financial year of 2005, all companies listed at a stock 
exchange within the European Union were required to disclose their financial reports 
using IFRS. The regulator’s aim was to promote an integrated European financial 
market by improving transparency of listed companies. Using M&A gains as indicator 
of the impact of the accounting change on information asymmetries, the success of the 
IFRS implementation in the European Union was examined.  
The results confirm that IFRS had a positive effect on high information asymmetry 
deals. The change in gains suggests that the accounting harmonisation has improved the 
transparency of foreign targets. In addition, substantially increased deal values of 
foreign acquisitions over the two periods suggest that acquirers have fewer problems in 
interpreting the financial statements of foreign targets in EU cross-border deals. As a 
consequence, acquirers are more willing to engage in potentially riskier transactions 
evidenced by larger relative target sizes. However, the results also indicate that some 
barriers remain as larger bidders in cross-border deals are still significantly larger after 
the adoption of IFRS. Secondly, a significant change in gains based on stock payments 
further indicates a reduction of information asymmetries. The results from a probit 
model also provide evidence that information asymmetries have been reduced. Based on 
the probability of the use of stock payments in M&A transactions, the findings indicate 
that stock payments served as a tool to manage risk evolving from the acquisition 
during the pre-IFRS era. After the adoption of IFRS, stocks are more likely being used 
to finance the deals. 
The findings imply that the adoption of IFRS has improved transparency in 
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potentially high information asymmetry deals and the results suggest that the regulator’s 
intention to promote and create a European financial market by reducing information 
asymmetries on listed companies was partly a success. 
7.2.2 Acquirers’ Gains reflect Industry Prospects 
The second empirical chapter investigates the question whether information related to 
broad industry factors is of importance to M&A gains. For this purpose, the M&A gains 
to acquiring companies based on their industry prospects and the investors’ preferences 
on different acquisition strategies are examined. 
The results show that investors value information on broad industry factors, such as 
industry prospects. A positive industry outlook leads to significantly higher returns than 
negative prospects. The findings also indicate that investors consider to the acquired 
industry growth prospects. The gains from acquisitions of related and unrelated targets 
reveal that the effect is persistent in focused deals but disappears in diversifying deals. 
The results suggest that in a focused deal, the acquirer emphasises its strategic 
orientation on its core business activity and therefore, the company’s growth rate 
remains highly correlated to the overall industry growth. In a diversifying deal, 
however, the acquirer diversifies the growth rate of the combined company by 
purchasing an industry-unrelated company. Further supportive evidence was found with 
regards to the relative target size, which can be considered as an indicator of the deal’s 
impact on future financial results. The findings suggest an enhancing effect in focused 
deals. On the other hand, the gains in diversifying deals remain relatively unaffected by 
industry prospects. The gains based on the mode of payment also confirm the effect of 
industry prospects and the mentioned pattern regarding corporate diversification. The 
returns suggest that the mode of payment conveys a valuation signal in focused deals, as 
well as, the growth prospects of the industry. Diversifying deals again remain relatively 
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unaffected by industry prospects. Using different event windows and regression 
analyses yield similar results. Finally, the gains also suggest a behavioural bias on the 
returns with respect to the perception of corporate diversification. Investors prefer 
companies with a negative industry outlook to diversify their business activity rather 
than to purchase an industry-related target. A diversifying acquisition may be 
considered as a strategic diversification to acquire new growth opportunities, whereas 
investors are less optimistic on a strategy to acquire market share to initiate growth 
within a declining industry. On the other hand, investors seem to have no particular 
preference in growing industries. Both deal types might be regarded as profitable, 
focused deals by initiating further growth in form of greater market share or realising 
operational synergies. In diversifying deals, this might be achieved by financial 
synergies to finance further growth or as a proactive response to seek future growth 
opportunities outside of the acquirer’s current industry.  
Overall, the results imply that investors value information on industry prospects, as 
well as, the acquired growth opportunities in the deal. Moreover, the results suggest that 
corporate managers can create wealth for their shareholders by diversifying their 
business activities regardless of the industry prospects. This is in stark contrast to the 
neoclassical finance view on corporate diversification that in an efficient market 
context, corporate diversification should not add any value since individual investors 
should be able to replicate this activity in their own portfolios.  
7.2.3 Investor Sentiment has an Impact on Acquirers’ Gains 
The last empirical chapter examines whether M&A gains are generally influenced by 
irrationality. Opposing to the neoclassical view on rationality and efficiency, a growing 
body of literature proposes a behavioural aspect in the functioning of financial markets. 
A behavioural impact on M&A gains would contribute new evidence that stock price 
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reactions are not purely caused by new information.  
The findings suggest that investor sentiment has a statistically, as well as, an 
economically significant impact. The overall gains are significantly higher during 
positive than during negative sentiment changes. Additional tests confirm the findings 
from investor sentiment research that irrational investors behave differently to 
information asymmetries and valuation signals when sentiment increases or decreases. 
For instance, the gains from stock payments experience a significant impact by changes 
in investor sentiment, while the returns from cash payments are relatively little affected. 
The results suggest that cash payments exhibit a positive valuation signal irrespective of 
the prevalent sentiment. However, stock payments represent a bad signal that acquiring 
companies perceive themselves as overvalued and sentiment changes have an additional 
enhancing effect on the returns. Further, sentiment has a greater impact on takeovers of 
private target than public targets. Similarly, the results indicate that smaller acquirers 
are greater affected by changes in sentiment than larger acquirers. In both cases, 
potentially greater information asymmetries on private and smaller companies may be 
the source of this effect. Finally, overvalued acquirers experience a significant impact 
by sentiment changes, whereas undervalued acquirers exhibit no significant effect. The 
returns to overvalued acquirers suggest that the overconfidence that led to an 
overvaluation is carried forward during increasing sentiment, whereas decreasing 
sentiment causes scepticism. The gains to undervalued acquirers indicate that investors 
revaluate these acquirers and positive gains irrespective of the sentiment direction 
suggest that undervalued acquirers are considered as a profitable investment 
opportunity. The univariate results are robust to several event windows and a 
multivariate framework.  
The findings establish a significant link between investor sentiment and M&A gains 
to acquiring companies. At the same time, it challenges the neoclassical view that the 
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announcement returns reflect the value of wealth creation from the merger. The results 
suggest that irrationality is present in M&A gains and has a significant impact on these 
returns. As the level of investors’ confidence changes, so does the perception of the 
ability of value creation from M&A.  
7.3 Direction of Future Research 
This thesis contributes to the literature in several finance areas. Naturally, new questions 
worthwhile for investigation arose during the course of these studies: 
Based on the results, the adoption of IFRS in the European Union contributed to an 
improved information environment. However, the results also indicate that 
predominately large companies profit from a common accounting standard. More 
research is needed to discover the remaining barriers that smaller companies can benefit 
from the merits of an integrated European financial market. More participants in the 
M&A market would not only promote competition, but might also serve as a monitoring 
tool for the performance of managers and companies. To gain further insights on this 
topic, the returns and premiums paid to target companies are also worthwhile 
examining. Following the development of the hypotheses that acquirers should be able 
to value target companies more accurately after the adoption of IFRS, then it is likely to 
find a direct effect of the accounting harmonisation on the premiums and returns to 
target companies. 
The second empirical work documents evidence that information on industry growth 
prospects is important to investors, as well as, their preferences on specific acquisition 
strategies as a responds to the industry prospects. Future research may analyse the long-
term performance of these deals to examine whether the acquiring firms can actually 
realise the perceived growth opportunities at the time of acquisition. Further, as the 
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focus is exclusively on mergers and acquisitions, divestitures might be also a reasonable 
strategy to respond to the industry growth prospects. Therefore, future studies in this 
area might incorporate the sell-side of the deals as an exit strategy of a declining 
industry. 
Finally, the third empirical study establishes a significant link between investor 
sentiment and the gains to acquiring companies. The results suggest that future M&A 
research should control for prevailing investor sentiment when examining the short-
term performance of M&A deals to draw more precise conclusions on the value creating 
effect of M&A. Long-term investor sentiment may also be worth examining. The 
investors’ perception and attitude towards some finance-related issues might change 
over time and explain some findings in the literature. For instance, returns in 
diversifying deals vary over time and future research may investigate to what extent 
investor sentiment can explain the variability in the returns. 
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Appendix A: 
Robustness Tests for Chapter 4 (IFRS) 
Appendix 1 to Appendix 6 provide robustness tests for the 4. Chapter ‘Information 
Asymmetries and the Impact of IFRS on Bidders’ Gains’. The event study is 
recalculated using a 3-days (-1, +1) and 11-days (-5, +5) event window. 
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Appendix 1: Multivariate Framework: IFRS (-1, +1) 
The table presents the regression results of acquirers based and listed within the European Union during the period from 01.01.1989 
to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 3-days cumulative abnormal return (−1, +1) to European bidders and is regressed 
against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The variables includes the relative target size, a dummy variable 
representing the business relation between bidder and target (focus versus diversifying deals). Further, the models include a dummy 
if the acquirer and target are from a €-currency country. A post-IFRS dummy includes all deals announced after the 01.01.2006. The 
intercept represents the average abnormal return to bidders after controlling for the effects of the explanatory variables. Regression 
(1) includes the full sample and regression (2) excludes UK-domestic M&A announcements. In parentheses are the corresponding t-
stats. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Non UK Domestic Sample 
 (1)  (2) 
Intercept 
-0.02447   -0.08710  
(-0.06)   (-0.13)  
 
    
Relative Target Size 
0.09298   0.55495* 
(0.24)   (1.71)  
 
    
Focused Deal 
-0.6177   -0.53513  
(-1.31)   (-0.88)  
 
   
Eurozone 
0.33842   0.01835  
(0.69)   (0.03)  
    
Post-IFRS 
-0.02344   0.67575  
(-0.05)   (1.06)  
     
      
N 465   208  
F-Statistics 0.49   0.67  
R2 (%) 0.43   1.31  
Adjusted R2 (%) -0.44   -0.64  
.
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Appendix 2: Multivariate Framework: IFRS and Cross border (-1, +1) 
 
The table presents the regression results of acquirers based and listed within the European Union during the period from 01.01.1989 
to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 3-days cumulative abnormal return (−1, +1) to European bidders and is regressed are 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The pre-IFRS regressions contain all M&A deals from 
01.01.1989 to 31.12.2005 and the post-IFRS regressions all deals from 01.01.2006 to 31.12.2011. The pooled regressions contain 
interactive post-IFRS dummies of the respective variable. These IFRS-change dummies are denoted as ‘D_’. The set of explanatory 
variables includes the relative target size, a dummy variable representing the business relation between bidder and target (focus 
versus diversifying deals). Further, the models include a dummy if the acquirer and target are from a €-currency country, as well as, 
a dummy if the deal is a cross-border M&A. The intercept represents the average abnormal return to bidders after controlling for the 
effects of the explanatory variables. Regression (3) includes the full sample and regression (4) excludes UK-domestic M&A 
announcements. In parentheses are the corresponding t-stats. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, 
respectively. 
 Full Sample  Non UK-Domestic Sample 
 (3)  (4) 
 Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled  Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled 
Intercept 
-0.08476  -0.29854  -0.08476   0.61569 -0.16990  0.61569  
(-0.17)  (-0.47)  (-0.17)   (0.59) 
 
(-0.17)  (0.59)  
D_Post-IFRS 
  -0.21379      -0.78559  
  (-0.27)    
 
  (-0.54)  
 
           
Relative Target Size 
0.32377  -0.89581  0.32377   0.75046 ** -0.64028  0.75046 ** 
(0.74)  (-1.26)  (0.74)   (2.25) 
 
(-0.62)  (2.25)  
D_Relative Target Size 
  
-1.21958      -1.39074  
  (-1.46)       (-1.27)  
 
           
Focused Deal 
-0.82080
 -0.14965  -0.82080   -1.20135  0.52475  -1.20135  
(-1.42)  (-0.20)  (-1.42)   (-1.53)  (0.67)  (-1.53)  
D_Focused Deal 
  0.67115       1.72609  
  (0.72)       (1.55)  
 
           
Eurozone 
0.00406
 0.85378  0.00406   -0.58702  0.37486  -0.58702  
(0.01)  (0.97)  (0.01)   (-0.64) 
 
(0.40)  (-0.64)  
D_Eurozone 
  0.84972      0.96188  
  (0.80)    
 
  (0.74)  
            
Cross-Border 
0.78213  1.08037  0.78213   0.38383 0.90955  0.38383  
(1.06)  (1.21)  (1.06)   (0.43) 
 
(1.00)  (0.43)  
D_Cross-Border 
  0.29825      0.52572  
  (0.26)     
  (0.41)  
 
             
              
N 333  130  463   149  59  208  
F-Statistics 0.74  0.91  0.67   0.90  0.38  0.62  
R2 (%) 0.90  2.84  1.31   2.44  2.76  2.74  
Adjusted R2 (%) -0.31  -0.27  -0.65   -0.27  -4.45  -1.68  
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Appendix 3: Multivariate Framework: IFRS, Cross-border and Mode of Payment (-1, +1) 
The table presents the regression results of acquirers based and listed within the European Union during the period from 01.01.1989 
to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 3-days cumulative abnormal return (−1, +1) to European bidders and is regressed a set 
of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The pre-IFRS regressions contain all M&A deals from 01.01.1989 to 
31.12.2005 and the post-IFRS regressions all deals from 01.01.2006 to 31.12.2011. The pooled regressions contain interactive post-
IFRS dummies of the respective variable. These IFRS-change dummies are denoted as ‘D_’. The set of explanatory variables 
includes the relative target size, a dummy variable representing the business relation between bidder and target (focus versus 
diversifying deals). Further, the models include a dummy if the acquirer and target are from a €-currency country, as well as, a 
dummy if the deal is a cross-border M&A. Two dummies represent the mode of payment proxies, cash and stock offers. The 
intercept represents the average abnormal return to bidders after controlling for the effects of the explanatory variables. Regression 
(5) includes the full sample and regression (6) excludes UK-domestic M&A announcements. In parentheses are the corresponding t-
stats. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full sample  Non UK-Domestic Sample 
 (5)  (6) 
 Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled  Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled 
Intercept 
-0.46943 -1.38882  -0.46943  1.08107 0.19870  1.08107  
(-0.72)
 
(-1.44)  (-0.72)
 
 (0.86)
 
(0.16)  (0.86)  
D_Post-IFRS 
  -0.91939    -0.88236  
 
 (-0.79)
 
 
 
 (-0.50)  
  
  
 
 
  
Relative Target Size 
0.47647 -0.72968  0.47647  0.78925** -0.97126  0.78925 ** 
(1.14)
 
(-0.95)  (1.14)
 
 (2.29)
 
(-0.97)  (2.29)  
D_Relative Target Size 
  -1.20615    -1.76050 * 
 
 (-1.38)
 
 
 
 (-1.67)  
  
  
 
 
  
Focused Deal 
-1.31975** 0.27471  -1.31975**  -1.32096* 0.16141  -1.32096 * 
(-2.24)
 
(0.38)  (-2.24)
 
 (-1.72)
 
(0.20)  (-1.72)  
D_Focused Deal 
  1.59446*    1.48236  
 
 (1.71)
 
 
 
 (1.32)  
  
  
 
 
  
Eurozone 
0.33732 1.14168  0.33732  -0.43802 0.48778  -0.43802  
(0.54)
 
(1.26)  (0.54)
 
 (-0.49)
 
(0.52)  (-0.49)  
D_Eurozone 
  0.80437    0.92579  
 
 (0.73)
 
 
 
 (0.71)  
  
  
 
 
  
Cross-Border 
0.78720 0.90866  0.78720  0.10706 0.90210  0.10706  
(1.01)
 
(1.00)  (1.01)
 
 (0.12)
 
(0.97)  (0.12)  
D_Cross-Border 
  0.12146    0.79505  
 
 (0.10)
 
 
 
 (0.61)  
  
  
 
 
  
Cash Offer 
1.49450** 1.48173  1.49450**  -0.39602 -0.11180  -0.39602  
(2.16)
 
(1.54)  (2.16)
 
 (-0.42)
 
(-0.11)  (-0.42)  
D_Cash Offer 
  -0.01276    0.28421  
 
 (-0.01)
 
 
 
 (0.20)  
  
  
 
 
  
Stock Offer 
-0.14468 0.23517  -0.14468  -0.99693 0.42401  -0.99693  
(-0.19)
 
(0.20)  (-0.19)
 
 (-0.89)
 
(0.34)  (-0.89)  
D_Stock Offer 
  0.37986    1.42093  
 
 (0.27)
 
 
 
 (0.85)  
       
       
       
       
N 334 130  464   146  58  204  
F-Statistics 2.11* 1.07  1.44   0.89  0.27  0.64  
R2 (%) 3.74 4.95  4.00   3.71  3.03  4.18  
Adjusted R2 (%) 1.97 0.32  1.22   -0.45  -8.37  -2.37  
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Appendix 4: Multivariate Framework: IFRS (-5, +5) 
The table presents the regression results of acquirers based and listed within the European Union during the period from 01.01.1989 
to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 11-days cumulative abnormal return (−5, +5) to European bidders and is regressed 
against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The variables includes the relative target size, a dummy variable 
representing the business relation between bidder and target (focus versus diversifying deals). Further, the models include a dummy 
if the acquirer and target are from a €-currency country. A post-IFRS dummy includes all deals announced after the 01.01.2006. The 
intercept represents the average abnormal return to bidders after controlling for the effects of the explanatory variables. Regression 
(1) includes the full sample and regression (2) excludes UK-domestic M&A announcements. In parentheses are the corresponding t-
stats. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Non UK-Domestic Sample 
 (1)  (2) 
Intercept 
0.11560 
 
1.51967 
(0.17)
 
 (1.35) 
  
  
Relative Target Size 
0.97106 
 
0.32662 
(1.42)
 
 (0.47) 
  
  
Focused Deal 
-1.58752** 
 
-2.06462** 
(-2.27)
 
 (-2.10) 
  
  
Eurozone 
0.37093 
 
-0.49733 
(0.51)
 
 (-0.5) 
  
  
Post-IFRS 
1.05133 
 
1.14768 
(1.35)
 
 (1.11) 
  
   
   
   
N 469 
 213  
F-Statistics 2.07*  1.48  
R2 (%) 1.75 
 2.76  
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.90 
 0.89  
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Appendix 5: Multivariate Framework: IFRS and Cross border (-5, +5) 
The table presents the regression results of acquirers based and listed within the European Union during the period from 01.01.1989 
to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 11-days cumulative abnormal return (−5, +5) to European bidders and is regressed are 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The pre-IFRS regressions contain all M&A deals from 
01.01.1989 to 31.12.2005 and the post-IFRS regressions all deals from 01.01.2006 to 31.12.2011. The pooled regressions contain 
interactive post-IFRS dummies of the respective variable. These IFRS-change dummies are denoted as ‘D_’. The set of explanatory 
variables includes the relative target size, a dummy variable representing the business relation between bidder and target (focus 
versus diversifying deals). Further, the models include a dummy if the acquirer and target are from a €-currency country, as well as, 
a dummy if the deal is a cross-border M&A. The intercept represents the average abnormal return to bidders after controlling for the 
effects of the explanatory variables. Regression (3) includes the full sample and regression (4) excludes UK-domestic M&A 
announcements. In parentheses are the corresponding t-stats. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, 
respectively. 
 Full Sample  Non UK-Domestic Sample 
 (3)  (4) 
 Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled  Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled 
Intercept 
0.52516 0.34207  0.52516  0.68978 2.95692 0.68978 
(0.69)
 
(0.27)  (0.69) 
 
 (0.48) 
 
(1.97) 
 
(0.48)
 
D_Post-IFRS 
  -0.18308    2.26714 
 
 (-0.12) 
 
  
 
 
 
(1.09)
 
  
         
Relative Target Size 
0.74448 1.02646  0.74448  0.99711 -4.01860 ** 0.99711 
(1.1)
 
(0.52)  (1.1) 
 
 (1.42) 
 
(-2.34) 
 
(1.42)
 
D_Relative Target Size 
  0.28199    -5.01571*** 
 
 (0.13) 
 
  
 
 
 
(-2.70)
 
  
         
Focused Deal 
-2.40203*** -1.41502  -2.40203 ***  -2.36765 * -2.89877 * -2.36765* 
(-2.82)
 
(-1.14)  (-2.82) 
 
 (-1.95) 
 
(-1.99) 
 
(-1.95)
 
D_Focused Deal 
  0.98701    -0.53112 
 
 (0.66) 
 
  
 
 
 
(-0.28)
 
  
         
Eurozone 
-0.3896 1.43207  -0.3896  -0.89800 0.53596 -0.89800 
(-0.42)
 
(1.05)  (-0.42) 
 
 (-0.71) 
 
(0.36) 
 
(-0.71)
 
D_Eurozone 
  1.82166    1.43396 
 
 (1.10) 
 
  
 
 
 
(0.73)
 
           
Cross-Border 
1.93777* 1.26582  1.93777 *  1.82564 2.45891 1.82564 
(1.78)
 
(0.80)  (1.78) 
 
 (1.46) 
 
(1.54) 
 
(1.46)
 
D_Cross-Border 
   -0.67195    0.63327 
 
  (-0.35) 
 
  
 
 
 
(0.31)
 
  
           
             
N 342 129  471   153  60  213  
F-Statistics 2.69** 0.81  1.67 *  1.77  2.00  1.62  
R2 (%) 3.10 2.55  3.16   4.58  12.68  6.71  
Adjusted R2 (%) 1.95 -0.60  1.27   2.00  6.33  2.57  
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Appendix 6: Multivariate Framework: IFRS, Cross-border and Mode of Payment (-5, +5) 
The table presents the regression results of acquirers based and listed within the European Union during the period from 01.01.1989 
to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 11-days cumulative abnormal return (−5, +5) to European bidders and is regressed a set 
of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The pre-IFRS regressions contain all M&A deals from 01.01.1989 to 
31.12.2005 and the post-IFRS regressions all deals from 01.01.2006 to 31.12.2011. The pooled regressions contain interactive post-
IFRS dummies of the respective variable. These IFRS-change dummies are denoted as ‘D_’. The set of explanatory variables 
includes the relative target size, a dummy variable representing the business relation between bidder and target (focus versus 
diversifying deals). Further, the models include a dummy if the acquirer and target are from a €-currency country, as well as, a 
dummy if the deal is a cross-border M&A. Two dummies represent the mode of payment proxies, cash and stock offers. The 
intercept represents the average abnormal return to bidders after controlling for the effects of the explanatory variables. Regression 
(5) includes the full sample and regression (6) excludes UK-domestic M&A announcements. In parentheses are the corresponding t-
stats. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Non UK-Domestic Sample 
 (5)  (6) 
 Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled  Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled 
Intercept 
0.17123 -2.22114  0.17123  2.04049 4.55885  2.04049 
(0.17)
 
(-1.14)  (0.17)
 
 (1.11)
 
(2.36)  (1.11) 
D_Post-IFRS 
   -2.39237     2.51836 
 
  (-1.10)
 
 
 
  (0.94) 
  
   
 
 
   
Relative Target Size 
1.01773 1.78989  1.01773  0.84899 -3.61342 ** 0.84899 
(1.52)
 
(0.95)  (1.52)
 
 (1.15)
 
(-2.02)  (1.15) 
D_Relative Target Size 
   0.77216     -4.46241** 
 
  (0.39)
 
 
 
  (-2.31) 
  
   
 
 
   
Focused Deal 
-2.50668*** -0.24991  -2.50668***  -2.84765** -3.35229 ** -2.84765** 
(-2.93)
 
(-0.19)  (-2.93)
 
 (-2.30)
 
(-2.04)  (-2.30) 
D_Focused Deal 
   2.25676     -0.50464 
 
  (1.43)
 
 
 
  (-0.25) 
  
   
 
 
   
Eurozone 
0.10039 1.55676  0.10039  -0.50566 0.11551  -0.50566 
(0.11)
 
(1.12)  (0.11)
 
 (-0.41)
 
(0.08)  (-0.41) 
D_Eurozone 
   1.45637     0.62117 
 
  (0.87)
 
 
 
  (0.32) 
  
   
 
 
   
Cross-Border 
1.39940 2.22883  1.39940  0.99895 2.29615  0.99895 
(1.30)
 
(1.48)  (1.30)
 
 (0.80)
 
(1.40)  (0.80) 
D_Cross-Border 
   0.82944     1.29721 
 
  (0.45)
 
 
 
  (0.63) 
  
   
 
 
   
Cash Offer 
1.14324 2.03224  1.14324  -0.55613 -1.97605  -0.55613 
(0.48)
 
(1.30)  (0.48)
 
 (-0.38)
 
(-1.10)  (-0.38) 
D_Cash Offer 
   0.88900     -1.41992 
 
  (1.14)
 
 
 
  (-0.61) 
  
   
 
 
   
Stock Offer 
-1.17875 0.48817  -1.17875  -1.97497 -1.47601  -1.97497 
(-1.06)
 
(0.26)  (-1.06)
 
 (-1.23)
 
(-0.64)  (-1.23) 
D_Stock Offer 
   1.66691     0.49896 
 
  (0.77)
 
 
 
  (0.18) 
       
 
 
   
 
       
 
 
   
 
N 343 127  470  153 60  213  
F-Statistics 2.56** 1.12  1.73*  1.43 1.51  1.30  
R2 (%) 4.36 5.29  4.71  5.56 14.60  7.85  
Adjusted R2 (%) 2.66 0.56  1.99  1.68 4.94  1.83  
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Appendix B: 
Robustness Tests for Chapter 5 
(Industry Prospects) 
Appendix 7 to Appendix 21 presents robustness tests for the 5. Chapter ‘Industry 
Prospects and the Impact on Acquirers’ Gains’. The event study is recalculated using a 
3-days (-1, +1) and an 11-days (-5, +5) event window. 
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Appendix 7: Multivariate Framework: Industry Prospects (Full Sample, Growing Industry Prospects Variable) (-2, +2) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 5-days abnormal returns (-2, +2) to US acquirers and is regressed 
against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. For the prospect classification, moving medians over 9 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving 
median and the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is 
classified as a declining industry. Growing is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a growing industry and 0 if it is announced in a declining industry. A Relatively Large Target is the group 
of the largest relative target size ratios, which was split into three equally-weighted groups. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a target publicly listed on a 
stock exchange. Private Target is held by private investors. Market Value is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal is indicated as a hostile 
takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
3.50119***  3.49521*** 3.44706***  4.69509*** 6.93692***  2.27060*** 3.64613***  3.20443*** 4.84993*** 
(<.0001)   (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0002)  (<.0001) (0.0010) 
               
Growing 
0.42175***  0.52074*** 0.28579  0.89970*** 0.57106  0.29672 0.57277*  0.32834 0.62956 
(0.0026)
 
 (0.0021)
 
(0.2514)  (0.0063) (0.3001)  (0.2883) (0.0514)  (0.3503) (0.3364) 
              
Focused 
-0.03241             
(0.8047)             
Large Target 
0.56034***  0.40109** 0.84196***     1.37473*** -0.58983*  1.63227*** -0.38037 
(0.0002)
 
 (0.0276)
 
(0.0025)     (<.0001) (0.0946)  (0.0006) (0.6232) 
Cash 
0.05831  -0.26288 0.62041***  0.35710 1.19448**       
(0.6801)
 
 (0.1384)
 
(0.0083)  (0.3106) (0.0203)       
Stock 
-0.30738*  -0.66164*** 0.46793  -1.05649*** -0.03020       
(0.0731)
 
 (0.0009)
 
(0.1623)  (0.0035) (0.9670)       
Public Target 
-2.68408***  -2.87016*** -2.31149***  -4.31908*** -4.11093***  -0.93708*** -3.56206***  -1.66550*** -2.39107** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0023) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0250) 
Private Target 
-0.44289***  -0.63944*** -0.13529  -0.83866** -0.73120  -0.43136* -0.63868  -0.33699 0.22794 
(0.0044)
 
 (0.0013)
 
(0.5894)  (0.0425) (0.2048)  (0.0998) (0.3958)  (0.3284) (0.8175) 
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Appendix 7 Continued 
 
     Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 
Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 
(1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Market Value 
-0.26008***  -0.20902*** -0.34342 ***  -0.26620*** -0.70980***  -0.15006 ** -0.23020**  -0.26182*** -0.44429 *** 
(<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0025) (<.0001)  (0.0402) (0.0147)  (0.0060) (0.0124) 
Cross-Border 
0.03531   0.35714  -0.56142 *  0.97458* -1.39450**  -0.08915 -0.26942  -0.04704 -3.20380 *** 
(0.8582)   (0.1633)  (0.0699)  (0.0797) (0.0478)  (0.7792) (0.7244)  (0.9000) (0.0004) 
Hostile 
0.69480   1.43665  -0.14148  1.75335 1.24394  2.05955 -3.90111*  -1.70336** 2.00423 
(0.2583)   (0.1643)  (0.8363)  (0.1883) (0.1935)  (0.1075) (0.0756)   (0.0470) (0.5973) 
                       
                       
N 16,202  10,513 5,689  3,627  1,774  3,507 2,949   2,140 1,109 
F-Statistics 47.33***  37.95*** 17.96 ***  35.54*** 15.55***  7.75 *** 22.38***  9.72*** 6.54 *** 
R2 (%) 2.84  3.15 2.77  7.29  6.59  1.53 5.06   3.09 3.99 
Adjusted R2 (%) 2.78  3.07 2.61  7.08  6.16  1.33 4.83   2.77 3.38 
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Appendix 8: Industry Prospects: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-1, +1)  
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are calculated 3-
days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP 
index for day t. For the industry prospects, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are used. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcement is above the moving median over the specific period quarters and the 
standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcement is below the moving median over the specific period quarters less the standard deviation then 
the industry is classified as a declining industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the 
test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  
5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Prospects 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
Growing 
 
3,502 1.2831*** <.0001 
 
4,041 1.1867 *** <.0001 
 
4,192 1.2618*** <.0001 
Neutral 
 
10,571 0.9727*** <.0001 
 
10,025 1.0003 *** <.0001 
 
10,073 0.8989*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
2,129 0.6011*** <.0001 
 
2,136 0.5767 *** 0.0001 
 
1,937 0.8834*** <.0001 
Growing vs. Declining 
  
0.6820*** 0.0010 
  
0.6099 * 0.0564 
  
0.3784*** 0.0003 
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Appendix 9: Industry Prospects and Corporate Diversification: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-1, +1) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are calculated 3-days 
surrounding the announcement (-1, +1) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day 
t. For the industry classification, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving median and the standard deviation then the industry is 
classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining industry. Otherwise, the industry is 
classified as neutral. A deal is considered as focused if the first 2-digit SIC of the acquirer and target match, otherwise diversifying. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance 
of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Prospects and Industry Relation 
      5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Industry Prospects   N Mean p   N Mean p   N Mean p 
Focused 
Growing   2,351 1.1340*** <.0001   2,677 1.1717*** <.0001   2,724 1.2702 *** <.0001 
Declining 
 
1,409 0.4485** 0.0143 
 
1,411 0.3268* 0.0707 
 
1,285 0.6106 *** 0.0026 
Growing vs. Declining     0.6855*** 0.0025     0.8449*** 0.0001     0.6596 *** 0.0061 
Diversifying 
Growing 
 
1,151 1.5874*** <.0001   1,364 1.2160*** <.0001   1,468 1.2461 *** <.0001 
Declining 
 
720 0.8996*** 0.0010 
 
725 1.0631*** 0.0001 
 
652 1.4210 *** <.0001 
Growing vs. Declining     0.6879** 0.0422     0.1529 
0.6451     -0.1749  0.6171 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Relation and Industry Prospects 
   
5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Prospects Industry Relation 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
Growing 
Focused 
 
2,351 1.1340*** <.0001  2,677 1.1717*** <.0001  2,724 1.2702 *** <.0001 
Diversifying 
 
1,151 1.5874*** <.0001  1,364 1.2160*** <.0001  1,468 1.2461 *** <.0001 
Focused vs. Diversifying 
 
 0.4534* 0.0673   0.0443 0.8421   0.0241 0.9119 
Declining 
Focused 
 
1,409 0.4485** 0.0143  1,411 0.3268* 0.0707  1,285 0.6106 *** 0.0026 
Diversifying 
 
720 0.8996*** 0.0010  725 1.0631*** 0.0001  652 1.4210 *** <.0001 
Focused vs. Diversifying 
 
 0.4511 0.1688   0.7363** 0.0256   0.8104 ** 0.0262 
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Appendix 10: Industry Prospects, Corporate Diversification and Relative Target Size: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-1, +1) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are 
calculated 3-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-
weighted CRSP index for day t. For the industry classification, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are used. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving median and the standard 
deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining 
industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. A deal is considered as focused if the first 2-digit SIC of the acquirer and target match, otherwise diversifying. The relative target is calculated as the ratio of the 
deals size to the acquirer’s market capitalisation. The ratios within the specific deal type are split by the size into three equally-weighted groups. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine 
the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
        5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Relative Target Size Industry Prospects   N Mean  p   N Mean p   N Mean p 
Focused 
Large 
Growing   784 1.3113*** <.0001   892 1.4835*** <.0001   908 1.6146*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
470 0.6823* 0.0768 
 
470 0.3142  0.4158 
 
428 0.6612  0.1177 
Growing vs. Declining   
 
0.6290  0.1808   
 
1.1693** 0.0107   
 
0.9534* 0.0556 
Medium 
Growing 
 
784 1.3463*** <.0001 
 
893 1.2116*** <.0001 
 
908 1.3129*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
470 0.1889  0.5287 
 
471 0.3221  0.2585 
 
429 0.4632  0.1602 
Growing vs. Declining   
 
1.1574*** 0.0018   
 
0.8895*** 0.0091   
 
0.8498** 0.0284 
Small 
Growing 
 
783 0.7440*** 0.0003 
 
892 0.8200*** <.0001 
 
908 0.8831*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
469 0.4744* 0.0597 
 
470 0.3441  0.1757 
 
428 0.7077** 0.0151 
Growing vs. Declining   
 
0.2696  0.4110   
 
0.4759  0.1471   
 
0.1754  0.6145 
Diversifying 
Large 
Growing 
 
384 2.3380*** <.0001   455 1.8564*** <.0001   489 1.6415*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
240 2.0695*** 0.0009 
 
242 2.0652*** 0.0007 
 
217 2.4880*** 0.0002 
Growing vs. Declining   
 
0.2685  0.7219   
 
0.2088  0.7716   
 
0.8465  0.2666 
Medium 
Growing 
 
384 1.5841*** <.0001 
 
455 1.1716*** 0.0002 
 
490 1.2441*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
240 0.2098  0.5948 
 
242 0.4793  0.2531 
 
218 0.8129* 0.0829 
Growing vs. Declining   
 
1.3743*** 0.0093   
 
0.6923  0.1897   
 
0.4312  0.4209 
Small 
Growing 
 
383 0.8383*** 0.0009 
 
454 0.6186*** 0.0092 
 
489 0.8527*** 0.0003 
Declining 
 
240 0.4193  0.2324 
 
241 0.6430* 0.0856 
 
217 0.9650** 0.0163 
Growing vs. Declining   
 
0.4189  0.3303   
 
0.0244  0.9560   
 
0.1123  0.8087 
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Appendix 11: Industry Prospects, Corporate Diversification and Mode of Payment: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-1, +1) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are 
calculated 3-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-
weighted CRSP index for day t. For the industry classification, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are used. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving median and the standard 
deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining 
industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. A deal is considered as focused if the first 2-digit SIC of the acquirer and target match, otherwise diversifying. Cash are deals with cash only offers and are deals 
with stock only offers are stock. A combination of both is considered as mixed. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of 
the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Relation, Mode of Payment and Industry Prospects 
        5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Payment Method Industry Prospects   N Mean p   N Mean p   N Mean  p 
Focused 
Cash 
Growing   691 1.6836*** <.0001   774 1.6815*** <.0001   755 1.9449*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
473 1.1336*** <.0001 
 
518 0.9882*** 0.0002 
 
481 1.3246*** <.0001 
Growing vs. Declining     0.5500  0.1261   
 
0.6933** 0.0431     0.6204* 0.0919 
Mixed 
Growing 
 
835 1.8140*** <.0001 
 
946 1.6269*** <.0001 
 
1,063 1.5702*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
582 0.8464*** 0.0062 
 
540 0.6080* 0.0561 
 
486 0.6815* 0.0535 
Growing vs. Declining     0.9677  0.3307   
 
1.0190  0.8391     0.8887  0.5461 
Stock 
Growing 
 
825 -0.0145  0.9497 
 
957 0.3095  0.1463 
 
906 0.3560  0.1257 
Declining 
 
354 -1.1210*** 0.0023 
 
353 -1.0737*** 0.0033 
 
318 -0.5777  0.1680 
Growing vs. Declining     1.1065** 0.0131   
 
1.3832*** 0.0090     0.9337** 0.0301 
Diversifying 
Cash 
Growing 
 
376 1.4557*** <.0001   442 1.1730*** <.0001   450 1.1804*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
265 0.9801** 0.0131 
 
300 1.0798*** 0.0045 
 
270 1.4612*** 0.0002 
Growing vs. Declining     0.4756* 0.0736   
 
0.0931  0.5278     0.2808  0.8894 
Mixed 
Growing 
 
508 1.5499*** <.0001 
 
623 1.1733*** <.0001 
 
687 1.2585*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
322 0.6171  0.1409 
 
299 0.8286* 0.0778 
 
265 1.1752** 0.0296 
Growing vs. Declining     0.9328*** 0.0094   
 
0.3446*** 0.0009     0.0833** 0.0443 
Stock 
Growing 
 
267 1.8444*** 0.0003 
 
299 1.3686*** 0.0042 
 
331 1.3097*** 0.0030 
Declining 
 
133 1.4231* 0.0533 
 
126 1.5796** 0.0237 
 
117 1.8851** 0.0122 
Growing vs. Declining     0.4214  0.6344   
 
0.2110  0.8055     0.5754  0.5032 
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Appendix 11 Continued 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Relation, Industry Prospects and Mode of Payment 
        5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Industry Prospects Payment Method   N Mean p   N Mean p   N Mean  p 
Focused 
Growing 
Cash   691 1.6836*** <.0001  774 1.6815*** <.0001  755 1.9449*** <.0001 
Stock 
 
825 -0.0145 0.9497  957 0.3095  0.1463  906 0.3560  0.1257 
Cash vs. Stock    1.6981*** <.0001   1.3720*** <.0001   1.5889*** <.0001 
Declining 
Cash 
 
473 1.1336*** <.0001  518 0.9882*** 0.0002  481 1.3246*** <.0001 
Stock 
 
354 -1.1210*** 0.0023  353 -1.0737*** 0.0033  318 -0.5777  0.1680 
Cash vs. Stock    2.2546*** <.0001   2.0619*** <.0001   1.9023*** 0.0002 
Diversifying 
Growing 
Cash 
 
376 1.4557*** <.0001  442 1.1730*** <.0001  450 1.1804*** <.0001 
Stock 
 
267 1.8444*** 0.0003  299 1.3686*** 0.0042  331 1.3097*** 0.0030 
Cash vs. Stock    0.3887 0.5073   0.1956 0.7178   0.1293 0.7981 
Declining 
Cash 
 
265 0.9801** 0.0131  300 1.0798*** 0.0045  270 1.4612*** 0.0002 
Stock 
 
133 1.4231* 0.0533  126 1.5796** 0.0237  117 1.8851** 0.0122 
Cash vs. Stock    0.4430 0.5934   0.4998 0.5258   0.4239 0.6134 
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Appendix 12: Multivariate Framework: Industry Prospects (Growing and Declining Industry Prospects) (-1, +1) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 3-days abnormal returns (-1, +1) to US acquirers and is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. For the prospect classification, moving medians over 9 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above 
the moving median and the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the 
industry is classified as a declining industry. Growing is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a growing industry and 0 if it is announced in a declining industry. A Relatively Large 
Target is the group of the largest relative target size ratios, which was split into three equally-weighted groups. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a 
target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private Target is held by private investors. Market Value is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal 
is indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
3.09975***  3.10451*** 3.03101*** 
 
3.91784*** 6.91968 *** 
 
2.04269 ** 2.19357* 
 
2.37851 ** 3.80223* 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0180) 
 
(0.0901)
 
 (0.0278) 
 
(0.0571)
 
     
 
  
 
  
 
  
Growing 
0.61466***  0.89896*** 0.11303  1.48303*** -0.40313  0.63149 * 0.99638**  0.10889 -0.23232 
(0.0008)
 
 (<.0001) (0.7285)  (0.0007) (0.5802)  (0.0652) 
 
(0.0147)
 
 (0.8091) 
 
(0.7808)
 
     
 
  
 
  
 
  
Focused 
-0.09492             
(0.6113)
 
        
  
  
  
Large Target 
0.70524***  0.42488* 1.24228***     1.37244 *** -0.01703  1.40212 * 1.77168 
(0.0014)
 
 (0.0955) (0.0033)     (0.0047) 
 
(0.9699)
 
 (0.0577) 
 
(0.1522)
 
Cash 
0.38592*  0.16359 0.75596**  0.64133 0.73840       
(0.0583)
 
 (0.5196) (0.0276)  (0.2298) (0.3552)   
  
  
  
Stock 
-0.21206  -0.70204*** 0.93379**  -0.54833 1.84874 *       
(0.3535)
 
 (0.0075) (0.0416)  (0.2699) (0.0781)   
  
  
  
Public Target 
-2.51930***  -2.71692*** -2.09778***  -4.56591*** -5.13850 ***  -1.36467 *** -2.48081***  -1.44442 *** -3.19893** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0015) 
 
(0.0098)
 
 (0.0082) 
 
(0.0372)
 
Private Target 
-0.37882*  -0.69802** 0.10755  -0.82718 -0.42244  -0.11625 0.01146  0.31278 -0.41030 
(0.0911)
 
 (0.0139) (0.7687)  (0.1691) (0.6289)  (0.7600) 
 
(0.9904)
 
 (0.5419) 
 
(0.7571)
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Appendix 12 Continued 
     Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Market Value 
-0.30126***  -0.25962*** -0.37632 ***  -0.28052** -0.61072***  -0.16839 -0.26777**  -0.19886 -0.23853 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0194)  (0.0047)  (0.1240) (0.0234)   (0.1126) (0.3654) 
Cross-Border 
-0.26207  -0.40893 -0.13467  0.04990  -0.99776  0.03091 -2.31225***  -0.45472 0.53309 
(0.3349)  (0.2241) (0.7699)  (0.9471)  (0.3387)  (0.9427) (0.0061)   (0.3625) (0.7408) 
Hostile 
0.21870  0.91138 -0.68574  1.09736  1.30874  2.21417 * -2.09167   1.94348 -3.60407 
(0.8086)  (0.5096) (0.4560)  (0.5596)  (0.3497)  (0.0672) (0.4871)   (0.2342) (0.1506) 
                       
                       
N 6,177  4,088 2,089  1,405  614  1,292 1,310   742 425 
F-Statistics 26.52***  22.15*** 10.17 ***  18.87*** 9.36***  4.72 *** 11.72***  3.65*** 2.70 *** 
R2 (%) 4.12  4.66 4.22  9.76  11.02  2.51 5.93   3.36 4.33 
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.97  4.45 3.80  9.24  9.84  1.98 5.42   2.44 2.73 
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Appendix 13: Multivariate Framework: Industry Prospects (Full Sample, Growing Industry Prospects Variable) (-1, +1) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 3-days abnormal returns (-1, +1) to US acquirers and is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. For the prospect classification, moving medians over 9 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above 
the moving median and the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the 
industry is classified as a declining industry. Growing is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a growing industry and 0 if it is announced in a declining industry. A Relatively Large 
Target is the group of the largest relative target size ratios, which was split into three equally-weighted groups. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a target 
publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private Target is held by private investors. Market Value is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal is 
indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
3.19138***  2.89937*** 3.45870***  4.40837*** 6.65241***  2.19378*** 2.21648***  3.32898*** 4.69356 *** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0039)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001) 
 
     
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Growing 
0.35374***  0.51561*** 0.09442  0.98714*** 0.20725  0.42976* 0.58425**  0.05069 0.31039 
(0.0030)
 
 (0.0004)
 
(0.6501)
 
 (0.0008)
 
(0.6584)
 
 (0.0736)
 
(0.0226)
 
 (0.8623)
 
(0.5652) 
 
     
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Focused 
-0.11327          
 
 
 
 
(0.3042)
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Large Target 
0.56879***  0.39931** 0.86908***     1.19797*** -0.49740  1.33001*** 0.72471 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0104)
 
(0.0003)
 
 
  
 (<.0001)
 
(0.1075)
 
 (0.0014)
 
(0.2911) 
 
Cash 
0.25999**  0.09265 0.55485***  0.53191* 1.02412**    
 
 
 
 
(0.0292)
 
 (0.5329)
 
(0.0054)
 
 (0.0828)
 
(0.0254)
 
 
     
Stock 
-0.38105***  -0.76554*** 0.47829*  -1.11583*** 0.81772       
(0.0086)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0849)
 
 (0.0005)
 
(0.1833)
 
 
     
Public Target 
-2.36148***  -2.52514*** -1.95443***  -3.88906*** -3.81886***  -1.06742*** -2.63176***  -0.89613** -2.74149 *** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0114)
 
(0.0015) 
 
Private Target 
-0.40588***  -0.51609*** -0.25556  -0.61799* -1.12467**  -0.34402 -0.12738  -0.10041 -0.40055 
(0.0017)
 
 (0.0017)
 
(0.2259)
 
 (0.0791)
 
(0.0256)
 
 (0.1231)
 
(0.8269)
 
 (0.7264)
 
(0.6100) 
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Appendix 13 Continued 
     Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Market Value 
-0.25679***  -0.18702*** -0.36686 ***  -0.31062*** -0.66466***  -0.14271 ** -0.17050**  -0.32249*** -0.42470 *** 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0194) 
 
(0.0404)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0047) 
 
Cross-Border 
-0.15224  0.05019 -0.56164 **  0.68204 -1.42127***  -0.11905 -0.64307  -0.42950 -1.56062 * 
(0.3636)  (0.8167) (0.0336) 
 
 (0.1814)
 
(0.0243)
 
 (0.6517) 
 
(0.3509)
 
 (0.1398)
 
(0.0825) 
 
Hostile 
0.31539  1.04360 -0.54597  1.67829 0.48441  2.29140 ** -3.73625  -1.36966** 0.76458 
(0.5641)  (0.2667) (0.3335) 
 
 (0.1593)
 
(0.5488)
 
 (0.0379) 
 
(0.1532)
 
 (0.0450)
 
(0.7849) 
 
                       
                       
N 16,202  10,512 5,690  3,625  1,776  3,507 2,954   2,138 1,105 
F-Statistics 57.25***  45.98*** 22.30 ***  42.74*** 16.49***  9.92 *** 20.67***  10.83*** 7.09 *** 
R2 (%) 3.42  3.79 3.41  8.64  6.95  1.95 4.68   3.44 4.33 
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.36  3.71 3.26  8.44  6.52  1.75 4.45   3.12 3.72 
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Appendix 14: Multivariate Framework: Industry Prospects (Full Sample, Growing and Declining Industry Prospects Variable) (-1, +1) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 3-days abnormal returns (-1, +1) to US acquirers and is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. For the prospect classification, moving medians over 9 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above 
the moving median and the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the 
industry is classified as a declining industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. Growing is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a growing industry and 0 otherwise. 
Declining is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a declining industry and 0 otherwise. A Relatively Large Target is the group of the largest relative target size ratios, which was split 
into three equally-weighted groups. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private target is held by private 
investors. Market value is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Cross-border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal is indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-
values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
3.23714***  2.9698*** 3.45975***  4.55575*** 6.56749***  2.24916 *** 2.27335 ***  3.33433*** 4.56805*** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001) 
 
(0.0029) 
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0002)
 
     
 
  
 
  
 
  
Growing 
0.29566**  0.42733*** 0.09321  0.85456*** 0.30963  0.37586 0.48464 *  0.04304 0.43229 
(0.0154)
 
 (0.0042)
 
(0.6602)
 
 (0.0045)
 
(0.5161)
 
 (0.1246) 
 
(0.0695) 
 
 (0.8851)
 
(0.4322)
 
Declining 
-0.33307**  -0.49411** -0.00726  -0.70941* 0.62879  -0.28764 -0.56967  -0.0431 0.78121 
(0.0405) 
 
 (0.0112)
 
(0.9801)
 
 (0.0629)
 
(0.3294)
 
 (0.3179) 
 
(0.1501) 
 
 (0.9151)
 
(0.2881)
 
     
 
  
 
  
 
  
Focused 
-0.11017             
(0.3178)
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Large Target 
0.57105***  0.40486*** 0.86907***     1.19414 *** -0.49517  1.33055*** 0.72864 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0094)
 
(0.0003)
 
 
  
 (<.0001) 
 
(0.1093) 
 
 (0.0014)
 
(0.2876)
 
Cash 
0.26311**  0.09882 0.55488***  0.52616* 1.01633**       
(0.0273)
 
 (0.5061)
 
(0.0054)
 
 (0.0861)
 
(0.0265)
 
 
  
 
  
Stock 
-0.38212***  -0.76556*** 0.47823*  -1.11851*** 0.82658       
(0.0084)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0849)
 
 (0.0005)
 
(0.1783) 
 
 
  
 
  
Public Target 
-2.35502***  -2.51428*** -1.95432***  -3.88249*** -3.83716***  -1.06207 *** -2.59249 ***  -0.89622** -2.71984*** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
 
 (0.0114)
 
(0.0016)
 
Private Target 
-0.40417***  -0.51132*** -0.25558  -0.61715* -1.13104**  -0.34583 -0.10333  -0.10064 -0.36069 
(0.0018)
 
 (0.0019)
 
(0.2259)
 
 (0.0797)
 
(0.0244)
 
 (0.1212) 
 
(0.8595) 
 
 (0.7259)
 
(0.6462)
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Appendix 14 Continued 
     Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Market Value 
-0.25595***  -0.18591*** -0.36684 ***  -0.31353*** -0.66629***  -0.14301 ** -0.16878**  -0.32216*** -0.42916 *** 
(<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0191) 
 
(0.0425)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0041) 
 
Cross-Border 
-0.14077  0.06814 -0.56141 **  0.68662 -1.43160**  -0.11194 -0.60683  -0.42897 -1.56947 * 
(0.4011)  (0.7530) (0.0340) 
 
 (0.1780)  (0.0236)
 
 (0.6713) 
 
(0.3799)
 
 (0.1406)
 
(0.0806) 
 
Hostile 
0.33227  1.11229 -0.54623  1.78782  0.50726  2.35197 ** -3.54092  -1.3726** 0.83191 
(0.5441)  (0.2374) (0.3334)  (0.1362)  (0.5300)
 
 (0.0334) (0.1852)
 
 (0.0451)
 
(0.7685) 
 
                       
                       
N 16,202  10,512 5,690  3,625  1,776  3,507 2,954   2,138 1,105 
F-Statistics 52.47***  42.08*** 20.07 ***  38.43*** 14.78***  8.82 *** 18.35***  9.47*** 6.34 *** 
R2 (%) 3.44  3.85 3.41  8.73  7.00  1.98 4.75   3.44 4.42 
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.38  3.76 3.24  8.51  6.53  1.75 4.49   3.07 3.72 
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Appendix 15: Industry Prospects: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-5, +5) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are calculated 11-
days surrounding the announcement (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP 
index for day t. For the industry prospects, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are used. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcement is above the moving median over the specific period quarters and the 
standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcement is below the moving median over the specific period quarters less the standard deviation then 
the industry is classified as a declining industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the 
test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  
5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Prospects 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
Growing 
 
3,503 2.0287*** <.0001  4,041 1.9201*** <.0001  4,186 1.9217*** <.0001 
Neutral 
 
10,583 1.6004*** <.0001  10,029 1.6354*** <.0001  10,087 1.5219*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
2,116 0.6167*** <.0001  2,132 0.5567** 0.0163  1,929 1.0119*** <.0001 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 1.4120*** 0.0023   1.3634*** <.0001   0.9098*** <.0001 
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Appendix 16: Industry Prospects and Corporate Diversification: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-5, +5) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are calculated 11-days 
surrounding the announcement (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day 
t. For the industry classification, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving median and the standard deviation then the industry is 
classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining industry. Otherwise, the industry is 
classified as neutral. A deal is considered as focused if the first 2-digit SIC of the acquirer and target match, otherwise diversifying. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance 
of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Prospects and Industry Relation 
      5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Industry Prospects   N Mean p   N Mean p   N Mean p 
Focused 
Growing   2,360 1.8328*** <.0001  2,683 1.7999*** <.0001  2,726 1.8669*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
1,405 0.5655** 0.0435  1,410 0.5207* 0.0668  1,278 0.9196*** 0.0030 
Growing vs. Declining    1.2674*** 0.0002   1.2792*** 0.0002   0.9474*** 0.0093 
Diversifying 
Growing 
 
1,143 2.4330*** <.0001  1,358 2.1577*** <.0001  1,460 2.0240*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
711 0.7178* 0.0748  722 0.6270  0.1183  651 1.1933*** 0.0067 
Growing vs. Declining    1.7152*** 0.0008   1.5307*** 0.0018   0.8307  0.1081 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Relation and Industry Prospects 
   
5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Prospects Industry Relation 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
Growing 
Focused 
 
2,360 1.8328*** <.0001  2,683 1.7999*** <.0001  2,726 1.8669*** <.0001 
Diversifying 
 
1,143 2.4330*** <.0001  1,358 2.1577*** <.0001  1,460 2.0240*** <.0001 
Focused vs. Diversifying 
 
 0.6002  0.1076   0.3578  0.2999   0.1571  0.6379 
Declining 
Focused 
 
1,405 0.5655** 0.0435  1,410 0.5207* 0.0668  1,278 0.9196*** 0.0030 
Diversifying 
 
711 0.7178* 0.0748  722 0.6270  0.1183  651 1.1933*** 0.0067 
Focused vs. Diversifying 
 
 0.1524 0.7541   0.1063 0.8281   0.2737 0.6090 
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Appendix 17: Industry Prospects, Corporate Diversification and Relative Target Size: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-5, +5) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are calculated 
11-days surrounding the announcement (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP 
index for day t. For the industry classification, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are used. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving median and the standard deviation then the 
industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining industry. Otherwise, the 
industry is classified as neutral. A deal is considered as focused if the first 2-digit SIC of the acquirer and target match, otherwise diversifying. The relative target is calculated as the ratio of the deals size to the acquirer’s market 
capitalisation. The ratios within the specific deal type are split by the size into three equally-weighted groups. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal 
returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
    
5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Relative Target Size Industry Prospects 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
 
N Mean p 
Focused 
Large 
Growing 
 
787 2.7316*** <.0001  894 2.6460*** <.0001  909 2.7442 *** <.0001 
Declining 
 
468 0.3807 0.4690  470 0.0937 0.8665  426 0.2377 0.6899 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 2.3510*** 0.0003   2.5523*** 0.0001   2.5064 *** 0.0003 
Medium 
Growing 
 
787 1.4617*** <.0001  895 1.2553*** 0.0001  909 1.3088 *** 0.0001 
Declining 
 
469 1.0908** 0.0300  470 1.0604** 0.0264  426 1.7511 *** 0.0009 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 0.3708  0.5431   0.1949 0.7337   0.4423  0.4713 
Small 
Growing 
 
786 1.3045*** 0.0001  894 1.4989*** <.0001  908 1.5475 *** <.0001 
Declining 
 
468 0.2237 0.5961  470 0.4079 0.3475  426 0.7698 0.1135 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 1.0808** 0.0438   1.0910** 0.0415   0.7776  0.1691 
Diversifying 
Large 
Growing 
 
381 3.0796*** <.0001  453 2.8949*** <.0001  487 2.1569 *** <.0001 
Declining 
 
237 1.5253* 0.0854  241 1.7126* 0.0504  217 1.4783 0.1143 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 1.5543  0.1490   1.1824 0.2518   0.6786  0.5259 
Medium 
Growing 
 
381 2.9662*** <.0001  453 2.0240*** 0.0001  487 2.2227 *** <.0001 
Declining 
 
237 -0.2412 0.6815  241 0.0240 0.9699  217 0.4536 0.5247 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 3.2074*** <.0001   2.0001** 0.0153   1.7691 ** 0.0400 
Small 
Growing 
 
381 1.2532*** 0.0058  452 1.5527*** 0.0005  486 1.6919 *** 0.0001 
Declining 
 
237 0.8695 0.1314  240 0.1425 0.7884  217 1.6480 *** 0.0062 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 0.3837  0.5994   1.4102** 0.0412   0.0438  0.9525 
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Appendix 18: Industry Prospects, Corporate Diversification and Mode of Payment: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-5, +5) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The bidders’ returns are 
calculated 11-days surrounding the announcement (-5, +5 using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the rate of return for the value-
weighted CRSP index for day t. For the industry classification, moving medians over 5, 9 and 13 quarters are used. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above the moving median and the standard 
deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a declining 
industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. A deal is considered as focused if the first 2-digit SIC of the acquirer and target match, otherwise diversifying. Cash are deals with cash only offers and are deals 
with stock only offers are stock. A combination of both is considered as mixed. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of 
the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Relation, Mode of Payment and Industry Prospects 
        5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Payment Method Industry Prospects   N Mean p   N Mean p   N Mean  p 
Focused 
Cash 
Growing   690 2.1456*** <.0001  772 2.0379*** <.0001  751 2.3535*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
469 1.1592*** 0.0070  516 1.1109*** 0.0073  477 1.7146*** 0.0002 
Growing vs. Declining 
 
 0.9864* 0.0667   0.9269* 0.0760   0.6389 0.2488 
Mixed 
Growing 
 
840 2.5484*** <.0001  949 2.5591*** <.0001  1065 2.2916*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
580 1.3949*** 0.0036  538 1.0549** 0.0391  485 1.2315** 0.0285 
Growing vs. Declining    1.1535* 0.0553   1.5042** 0.0147   1.0601  0.1001 
Stock 
Growing 
 
830 0.8486** 0.0123  962 0.8599*** 0.0060  910 0.9683*** 0.0041 
Declining 
 
356 -1.5681*** 0.0033  356 -1.1422** 0.0391  316 -0.7593  0.2073 
Growing vs. Declining    2.4168*** 0.0001   2.0021*** 0.0011   1.7276** 0.0102 
Diversifying 
Cash 
Growing 
 
377 1.8131*** 0.0001  442 1.8143*** <.0001  448 1.8000*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
263 1.1634** 0.0477  301 0.3595  0.5094  272 0.8849  0.1200 
Growing vs. Declining    0.6496  0.3733   1.4548** 0.0348   0.9151  0.1825 
Mixed 
Growing 
 
501 2.6267*** <.0001  615 1.9617*** <.0001  682 1.7577*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
314 0.1688  0.7748  293 0.4860  0.4587  261 0.7102  0.3378 
Growing vs. Declining    2.4579*** 0.0015   1.4757* 0.0585   1.0475  0.2158 
Stock 
Growing 
 
265 2.9488*** 0.0001  301 3.0624*** <.0001  330 2.8786*** <.0001 
Declining 
 
134 1.1299  0.3302  128 1.5788  0.1578  118 2.9726** 0.0150 
Growing vs. Declining    1.8189  0.1773   1.4835  0.2504   0.0940  0.9434 
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Appendix 18 Continued 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Relation, Industry Prospects and Mode of Payment 
        5 Quarters 
 
9 Quarters 
 
13 Quarters 
Industry Relation Industry Prospects Payment Method   N Mean p   N Mean p   N Mean  p 
Focused 
Growing 
Cash 
 
690 2.1456*** <.0001  772 2.0379*** <.0001  751 2.3535*** <.0001 
Stock 
 
830 0.8486** 0.0123  962 0.8599*** 0.0060  910 0.9683*** 0.0041 
Cash vs. Stock 
 
 1.2970*** 0.0064   1.1780*** 0.0092   1.3852*** 0.0037 
Declining 
Cash 
 
469 1.1592*** 0.0070  516 1.1109*** 0.0073  477 1.7146*** 0.0002 
Stock 
 
356 -1.5681*** 0.0033  356 -1.1422** 0.0391  316 -0.7593 0.2073 
Cash vs. Stock 
 
 2.7273*** <.0001   2.2532*** 0.0011   2.4739*** 0.0010 
Diversifying 
Growing 
Cash 
 
377 1.8131*** 0.0001  442 1.8143*** <.0001  448 1.8000*** <.0001 
Stock 
 
265 2.9488*** 0.0001  301 3.0624*** <.0001  330 2.8786*** <.0001 
Cash vs. Stock 
 
 1.1357 0.1988   1.2481 0.1274   1.0786 0.1668 
Declining 
Cash 
 
263 1.1634** 0.0477  301 0.3595 0.5094  272 0.8849 0.1200 
Stock 
 
134 1.1299 0.3302  128 1.5788 0.1578  118 2.9726** 0.0150 
Cash vs. Stock 
 
 0.0335 0.9794   1.2193 0.3257   2.0876 0.1187 
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Appendix 19: Multivariate Framework: Industry Prospects (Growing and Declining Industry Prospects Only) (-5, +5) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 11-days abnormal returns (-5, +5) to US acquirers and is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. For the prospect classification, moving medians over 9 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above 
the moving median and the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the 
industry is classified as a declining industry. Growing is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a growing industry and 0 if it is announced in a declining industry. A Relatively Large 
Target is the group of the largest relative target size ratios, which was split into three equally-weighted groups. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a 
target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private Target is held by private investors. Market Value is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal 
is indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
4.03311***  3.47225*** 4.79032***  4.03242*** 10.13224***  0.72135 0.75283  3.19791* 7.21464** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0023)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.5909)
 
(0.6925)
 
 (0.0773)
 
(0.0201)
 
              
Growing 
1.33405***  1.35876*** 1.35631***  3.01297*** 0.73039  0.95876* 1.53095**  1.38713** 1.38078 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0054)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.4849)
 
 (0.0693)
 
(0.0136)
 
 (0.0436)
 
(0.2825)
 
              
Focused 
-0.08174             
(0.7749)
             
Large Target 
0.83922***  0.72798* 1.03881*     2.44707*** 0.58966  0.18038 1.84803 
(0.0096)
 
 (0.0593)
 
(0.0777)
 
 
  
 (0.0005)
 
(0.3824)
 
 (0.8572)
 
(0.2753)
 
Cash 
-0.01375  -0.32370 0.65096  0.88243 -0.60482       
(0.9651)
 
 (0.4132)
 
(0.2137)
 
 (0.2484)
 
(0.5801)
       
Stock 
-0.18612  -1.04517** 1.86297***  -0.77396 2.34409       
(0.5959)
 
 (0.0101)
 
(0.0074)
 
 (0.2715)
 
(0.1276)
       
Public Target 
-2.97097***  -2.96583*** -2.78795***  -5.00331*** -5.13279***  -0.85539 -2.11210  -2.45052*** -5.37639** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0004)
 
 (0.2253)
 
(0.1438)
 
 (0.0041)
 
(0.0376)
 
Private Target 
-0.84878**  -0.95815** -0.67896  -1.14299 -0.65285  -0.54367 1.09141  -0.60952 -2.80776 
(0.0149)
 
 (0.0278)
 
(0.2416)
 
 (0.1951)
 
(0.6145)
 
 (0.3582)
 
(0.4448)
 
 (0.4486)
 
(0.2200)
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Appendix 19 Continued 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Market Value 
-0.38334***  -0.23688** -0.63607***  -0.28722 * -1.19202 ***  0.01527 -0.18362  -0.31147 -0.41020
(<.0001)  (0.0188) (<.0001)  (0.0994) (0.0002)  (0.9262) (0.3302)  (0.1327) (0.2503)
Cross-Border 
-0.20147  -0.12152 -0.5235  -0.26486 -0.13362  0.41891 -2.26672  -0.02271 -2.32298
(0.6390)  (0.8171) (0.4803)  (0.8010) (0.9356)  (0.5238) (0.1035)  (0.9780) (0.3396)
Hostile 
-0.14450  0.32644 -1.04791  0.71101 0.76386  -0.05454 -7.68991***  2.49949 -1.04280
(0.8843)  (0.8172) (0.3933)  (0.7009) (0.5931)  (0.9762) (0.0044)  (0.2853) (0.7301)
                       
                       
N 6,173  4,093 2,080  1,401 611  1,288 1,318  743 429
F-Statistics 16.19***  11.41*** 9.04***  13.18 *** 7.63 ***  3.13 *** 7.46***  2.56** 2.17** 
R2 (%) 2.56  2.45 3.78  7.04 9.20  1.68 3.83  2.38 3.48
Adjusted R2 (%) 2.40  2.24 3.36  6.51 8.00  1.15 3.32  1.45 1.88
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Appendix 20: Multivariate Framework: Industry Prospects (Full Sample, Growing Industry Prospects Variable) (-5, +5) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 11-days abnormal returns (-5, +5) to US acquirers and is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. For the prospect classification, moving medians over 9 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above 
the moving median and the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the 
industry is classified as a declining industry. Growing is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a growing industry and 0 if it is announced in a declining industry. A Relatively Large 
Target is the group of the largest relative target size ratios, which was split into three equally-weighted groups. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a 
target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private Target is held by private investors. Market Value is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal 
is indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
4.14665***  3.43657*** 4.91667***  4.91640*** 9.79839***  3.19830*** 2.34027**  4.54192*** 7.15496*** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0490)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
     
 
  
 
  
 
  
Growing 
0.54258***  0.61166*** 0.46418  1.60770*** 0.82552  0.36638 0.34561  0.22024 0.96943 
(0.0030)
 
 (0.0056)
 
(0.1520)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.2250)
 
 (0.3169)
 
(0.3633)
 
 (0.6435)
 
(0.2344)
 
     
 
  
 
  
 
  
Focused 
-0.20689          
 
  
(0.2238)
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Large Target 
0.71454***  0.71816*** 0.65315**     1.47372*** 0.07935  0.71939 -0.32641 
(0.0002)
 
 (0.0019)
 
(0.0610)
 
 
  
 (0.0003)
 
(0.8600)
 
 (0.2218)
 
(0.7418)
 
Cash 
0.21356  -0.02084 0.69454**  0.59567 0.40021    
 
  
(0.2457)
 
 (0.9284)
 
(0.0217)
 
 (0.1805)
 
(0.5282)
 
 
     
Stock 
-0.02001  -0.56195** 1.17970***  -0.80975* 0.47824       
(0.9279)
 
 (0.0290)
 
(0.0060)
 
 (0.0760)
 
(0.5864)
 
 
     
Public Target 
-2.74517***  -2.78234*** -2.64257***  -4.45809*** -4.32752***  -0.70077* -2.67591***  -1.98331*** -3.26817** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0836)
 
(0.0047)
 
 (0.0002)
 
(0.0207)
 
Private Target 
-0.50684**  -0.68309*** -0.21538  -0.72640 -1.00067  -0.81453** 0.51108  -0.26022 -0.04471 
(0.0127)
 
 (0.0079)
 
(0.5164)
 
 (0.1680)
 
(0.1713)
 
 (0.0208)
 
(0.5855)
 
 (0.5677)
 
(0.9729)
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Appendix 20 Continued 
     Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Market Value 
-0.31124***  -0.18811 *** -0.50878***  -0.25765** -1.11360***  -0.22355** -0.14585  -0.37960*** -0.61376*** 
(<.0001)  (0.0021) (<.0001)  (0.0191) (<.0001)  (0.0211) (0.2390)  (0.0019)  (0.0038)
Cross-Border 
-0.17430  0.24270 -0.95160**  0.41559 -1.87270*  0.06108 -0.51205  -0.20526  -2.81650** 
(0.5043)  (0.4629) (0.0247)  (0.5455) (0.0605)  (0.8798) (0.6086)  (0.6707)  (0.0394)
Hostile 
0.18031  0.13727) 0.34002  0.48052 1.74400*  -0.50969 -9.75369***  -0.15087  4.04025
(0.8155)  (0.9210) (0.6344)  (0.7862) (0.0795)  (0.8073) (<.0001)  (0.8780)  (0.1364)
                       
                       
N 16,202  10,509 5,673  3,627 1,774  3,505 2,951  2,134  1,104
F-Statistics 31.12***  21.10 *** 16.87***  24.28*** 15.26***  5.58*** 12.53***  5.97*** 5.88*** 
R2 (%) 1.89  1.77 2.61  5.09 6.47  1.10 2.89  1.93  3.62
Adjusted R2 (%) 1.83  1.69 2.46  4.88 6.04  0.91 2.66  1.60  3.01
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Appendix 21: Multivariate Framework: Industry Prospects (Full Sample, Growing and Declining Industry Prospects Variable) (-5, +5) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2011. The dependent variable is the 5-days abnormal returns (-2, +2) to US acquirers and is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. For the prospect classification, moving medians over 9 quarters are calculated. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is above 
the moving median and the standard deviation then the industry is classified as a growing industry. If the quarter of the corresponding M&A announcements is below the moving median less the standard deviation then the 
industry is classified as a declining industry. Otherwise, the industry is classified as neutral. Growing is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a growing industry and 0 otherwise. 
Declining is a binary variable, which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is announced in a declining industry and 0 otherwise. A Relatively Large Target is the group of the largest relative target size ratios, which was split 
into three equally-weighted groups. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private Target is held by private 
investors. Market Value is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal is indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-
values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
4.27622 ***  3.56257*** 5.06729***  5.26790 *** 9.80668***  3.32619*** 2.51065**  4.71340*** 7.17642 *** 
(<.0001) 
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001) 
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0342)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001) 
 
                 
Growing 
0.37522 **  0.45309** 0.28415  1.28832 *** 0.81492  0.24135 0.07755  -0.03520 0.94789 
(0.0447) 
 
 (0.0448)
 
(0.3902)
 
 (0.0021) 
 
(0.2390)
 
 (0.5188)
 
(0.8441)
 
 (0.9422)
 
(0.2561) 
 
Declining 
-0.96137 ***  -0.88856*** -1.08495**  -1.70765 *** -0.06544  -0.66923 -1.51567**  -1.43293** -0.13614 
(0.0001) 
 
 (0.0039)
 
(0.0115)
 
 (0.0022) 
 
(0.9435)
 
 (0.1413)
 
(0.0114)
 
 (0.0157)
 
(0.9081) 
 
                 
Focused 
-0.19823               
(0.2436) 
               
Large Target 
0.72158 ***  0.72847*** 0.65231*     1.46567*** 0.08340  0.74151 -0.32720 
(0.0002) 
 
 (0.0017)
 
(0.0613)
 
  
  
 (0.0003)
 
(0.8527)
 
 (0.2069)
 
(0.7415) 
 
Cash 
0.22400  -0.00942 0.70281**  0.58206 0.40139        
(0.2233) 
 
 (0.9676)
 
(0.0199)
 
 (0.1904) 
 
(0.5267)
        
Stock 
-0.01992  -0.55921** 1.17429***  -0.81048 * 0.47749        
(0.9282) 
 
 (0.0297)
 
(0.0062)
 
 (0.0752) 
 
(0.5873)
        
Public Target 
-2.72660 ***  -2.76477*** -2.62152***  -4.44969 *** -4.32476***  -0.69045* -2.58331***  -1.98037*** -3.26955 ** 
(<.0001) 
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001) 
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0884)
 
(0.0062)
 
 (0.0002)
 
(0.0206) 
 
Private Target 
-0.50238 **  -0.67669*** -0.21458  -0.73489 -0.99963  -0.81873** -0.81873  -0.26295 -0.04955 
(0.0135) 
 
 (0.0086)
 
(0.5178)
 
 (0.1630) 
 
(0.1723)
 
 (0.0201)
 
(0.5483)
 
 (0.5634)
 
(0.9699) 
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Appendix 21 Continued 
      Large Targets  Focused  Diversifying 
 Full Sample  Focused Diversifying  Focused Diversifying  Cash Stock  Cash Stock 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Market Value 
-0.30865***  -0.18598*** -0.50554***  -0.26342** -1.11344***  -0.22413 ** -0.14172  -0.36799*** -0.61318*** 
(<.0001)  (0.0023) (<.0001)   (0.0165) (<.0001)  (0.0208) (0.2521)  (0.0026) (0.0039)
Cross-Border 
-0.14075  0.27521 -0.91656**  0.43787 -1.87119*  0.07710 -0.41665  -0.18975 -2.81427** 
(0.5898)  (0.4053) (0.0306)   (0.5232) (0.0611)  (0.8487) (0.6768)  (0.6936) (0.0397)
Hostile 
0.22904  0.26156 0.29949   0.74369 1.74115*  -0.36702 -9.23474***  -0.25418 4.02857
(0.7667)  (0.8502) (0.6733)   (0.6764) (0.0800)  (0.8611) (0.0003)  (0.8002) (0.1371)
                       
                       
N 16,202  10,529 5,673   3,627 1,774  3,505 2,951  2,134 1,104
F-Statistics 29.86***  19.94*** 15.86***  22.81*** 13.55***  5.18 *** 11.83***  6.03*** 5.14*** 
R2 (%) 1.99  1.86 2.73   5.37 6.47  1.17 3.12  2.22 3.62
Adjusted R2 (%) 1.92  1.77 2.55   5.14 5.99  0.94 2.85  1.85 2.92
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Appendix C: 
Robustness Tests for Chapter 6 
(Investor Sentiment) 
Appendix 22 to Appendix 35 show robustness tests for 6. Chapter ‘Investor Sentiment 
and the Impact on Acquirers’ Gains’. The calculations include a 3-days (-1, +1) and an 
11-days (-5, +5) event window, as well as, the full Sentiment Change index as the 
underlying benchmark. Further, the Investor Sentiment Level index is used to check the 
robustness of the test. 
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Appendix 22: Investor Sentiment: Multivariate Framework (Increasing and Declining Sentiment Deals Only) (-1, +1) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The dependent variable is the 3-days abnormal returns (-1, +1) to US acquirers and is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite 
investor sentiment change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. The examined sentiment index period matches the 
sample period. Increasing Sentiment is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is taking place in an increasing sentiment environment and 0 if the deal is announced in a declining sentiment. A Relative Target 
Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value to acquirer’s market value. Focused is a binary variable which takes on 1 if the acquirers and target’s 2-digit SIC code match, otherwise 0. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-
only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private Target is held by private investors. Acquirer Size is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. 
Acquirer’s B/M is the natural logarithm of acquirer’s book-to-market ratio. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal is indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-
values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer Undervalued Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
3.17748***  5.46153 2.66406***  1.34432 * 4.13215***  0.27606 1.80680***  2.68201*** 2.93199 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0034)
 
 (0.0952) 
 
(0.0005)
 
 (0.6525)
 
(0.0002)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.1111)
 
               
Increasing Sentiment 
0.72999***  0.99111*** 0.04644  0.93888 *** 0.76798***  0.85473*** 0.58007**  0.78806*** 0.00080 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0043)
 
(0.8527)
 
 (0.0001) 
 
(0.0075)
 
 (0.0059)
 
(0.0158)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.9989)
 
               
Cash 
0.42732**     0.29727 0.90924**  1.03214*** 0.23844  0.33945* 0.70492 
(0.0230)
 
 
  
 (0.2966) 
 
(0.0142)
 
 (0.0052)
 
(0.4042)
 
 (0.0865)
 
(0.2567)
 
Stock 
-0.64795***     -0.28023 -1.11435***  0.22858 -0.76218**  -0.55899** -1.76593* 
(0.0044)
 
 
  
 (0.3816) 
 
(0.0018)
 
 (0.5807)
 
(0.0377)
 
 (0.0162)
 
(0.0883)
 
Public Target 
-2.59624***  -3.36583*** -1.41516***     -3.69938*** -2.22264***  -2.65870*** -2.33549*** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
  
  
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0043)
 
Private Target 
-0.66539***  -1.21627 -0.57237*     -1.00498*** -0.87887***  -0.61731*** -1.02237 
(0.0014)
 
 (0.1273)
 
(0.0553)
 
  
  
 (0.0082)
 
(0.0078)
 
 (0.0047)
 
(0.1417)
 
Acquirer Size 
-0.26900***  -0.35914*** -0.24438***  -0.15087 -0.43279***     -0.21556*** -0.42454** 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0047)
 
(0.0056)
 
 (0.1086) 
 
(<.0001)
 
 
  
 (0.0001)
 
(0.0408)
 
Acquirer’s B/M 
-0.55128**  -0.42053 -0.53281  -1.03461 *** 0.54647  0.07065 -0.89978*    
(0.04640
 
 (0.5587)
 
(0.2902)
 
 (0.0079) 
 
(0.3507)
 
 (0.8727)
 
(0.0665)
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Appendix 22 Continued 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer Undervalued Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Relative Target Size 
0.19429**  -0.23833 0.49203***  0.52920*** -0.84400***  0.76843*** -0.40643***  0.12133 0.63412** 
(0.0169)   (0.1842) (0.0004)  (0.0002) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0006)  (0.1498) (0.0274)
Focused 
-0.09842   -1.27343*** 0.14269  -0.27180 -0.23460  -0.65448* 0.55700**  -0.10478 0.01742
(0.5730)   (0.0030) (0.5861)  (0.2955) (0.4938)  (0.0530) (0.0287)  (0.5651) (0.9774)
Cross-Border 
-0.64940**  -1.99143*** -0.20500  -0.80171** -0.64250  -0.74524 -0.40998  -0.59553** -0.88798
(0.0110)   (0.0061) (0.5185)  (0.0454) (0.1806)  (0.1872) (0.2362)  (0.0239) (0.3924)
Hostile 
0.22425   -3.68068 1.48336  -11.39990 1.49642  0.64774 -0.39172  -0.39631 2.95083
(0.8124)   (0.2457) (0.2368)  (0.1422) (0.1157)  (0.7989) (0.5982)  (0.6516) (0.3915)
                       
                       
N 6,601   1,681 2,212  3,099 1,780  2,200 2,200  6,061 540
F-Statistics 27.65***  12.57*** 7.17***  6.87*** 12.08***  9.57*** 13.03***  27.01*** 3.85*** 
R2 (%) 4.41   6.34 2.85  1.96 5.79  4.19 5.62  4.27 6.79
Adjusted R2 (%) 4.25   5.84 2.45  1.68 5.31  3.75 5.19  4.12 5.03
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Appendix 23: Investor Sentiment: Multivariate Framework (Full Sample, Increasing and Decreasing Sentiment Variable) (-1, +1) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The dependent variable is the 3-days abnormal returns (-1, +1) to US acquirers and is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite 
investor sentiment change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. The examined sentiment index period matches the 
sample period. Increasing Sentiment is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is taking place in an increasing sentiment environment and 0 otherwise. Declining Sentiment is a dummy which takes on the value of 
1 if the deal is taking place in a declining sentiment environment and 0 otherwise. A Relative Target Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value to acquirer’s market value. Focused is a binary variable which takes on 1 if 
the acquirers and target’s 2-digit SIC code match, otherwise 0. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private 
Target is held by private investors. Acquirer Size is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Acquirer’s B/M is the natural logarithm of acquirer’s book-to-market ratio. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-
US. Hostile is if the deal is indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer Undervalued Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
3.16966***  4.61334*** 2.30168***  1.45418*** 3.72248***  0.73544* 1.84240***  2.58838*** 2.81094** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0068)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0760)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0323)
 
              
Increasing Sentiment 
0.34954***  0.23042 0.19722  0.36835* 0.17476  0.40091 -0.02622  0.32736** 0.57341 
(0.0087)
 
 (0.3975)
 
(0.3408)
 
 (0.0659)
 
(0.4628)
 
 (0.1237)
 
(0.8907)
 
 (0.0180)
 
(0.2495)
 
Decreasing Sentiment 
-0.37347***  -0.77960*** 0.15209  -0.57533** -0.59377**  -0.42781* -0.58943***  -0.45403*** 0.55443 
(0.0054)
 
 (0.0093)
 
(0.4469)
 
 (0.0044)
 
(0.0145)
 
 (0.0951)
 
(0.0039)
 
 (0.0011)
 
(0.2639)
 
              
Cash 
0.36536***     0.27834 1.11139***  0.70158*** 0.12567  0.27254** 0.77942* 
(0.0033)
 
 
  
 (0.1340)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0039)
 
(0.5082)
 
 (0.0366)
 
(0.0726)
 
Stock 
-0.54139***     -0.04653 -0.90627***  0.07938 -0.55361**  -0.47104*** -1.12407 
(0.0003)
 
 
  
 (0.8269)
 
(0.0002)
 
 (0.7755)
 
(0.0235)
 
 (0.0023)
 
(0.1421)
 
Public Target 
-2.31931***  -2.70234*** -0.96979***     -3.16079*** -1.86158***  -2.38804*** -2.05791*** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 
  
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0002)
 
Private Target 
-0.41553***  -0.36721 -0.24625     -0.57168** -0.31484  -0.36913*** -0.70057 
(0.0023)
 
 (0.4659)
 
(0.1856)
 
 
  
 (0.0228)
 
(0.1370)
 
 (0.0089)
 
(0.1654)
 
Acquirer Size 
-0.24498***  -0.29767*** -0.22754***  -0.12002* -0.37321***     -0.18766*** -0.47106*** 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0003)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0525)
 
(<.0001)
 
 
  
 (<.0001)
 
(0.0008)
 
Acquirer’s B/M 
-0.74895***  -0.08421 -0.83699***  -1.06192*** 0.29512  -0.28810 -1.14224***    
(<.0001)
 
 (0.8598)
 
(0.0089)
 
 (0.0001)
 
(0.4357)
 
 (0.3565)
 
(0.0003)
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Appendix 23 Continued 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer Undervalued Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Relative Target Size 
0.24501***  -0.18469 0.56348***  0.59437*** -0.6578***  0.73850*** 0.02040***  0.19405*** 0.48695 ** 
(<.0001)  (0.1341) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0007) (0.0198) 
Focused 
-0.13504  -1.00547*** 0.00586  -0.17510 -0.21417  -0.54357** 0.30485*  -0.15330 -0.02242 
(0.2380)  (0.0003) (0.9720)  (0.3025) (0.3465)  (0.0146) (0.0654)  (0.1956) (0.9598) 
Cross-Border 
-0.28351*  -1.32415** -0.16282  -0.39134 -0.05527  -0.66965* 0.18204  -0.18872 -1.40100 ** 
(0.0976)  (0.0152) (0.4339)  (0.1356) (0.8788)  (0.0649) (0.4438)  (0.2850) (0.0429) 
Hostile 
0.30868  -1.47739 0.26136  -8.62382 1.17969*  -0.04570 -0.04064  0.05943 1.25005 
(0.6104)  (0.4524) (0.7371)  (0.1281) (0.0568)  (0.9776) (0.9443)  (0.9192) (0.5645) 
                       
                       
N 13,896  3,464 4,986  6,577 3,642  4,631 4,632  12,874 1,022 
F-Statistics 46.79***  21.80*** 14.14***  11.25*** 18.22***  14.35*** 18.91***  44.90*** 6.03 *** 
R2 (%) 3.89  5.94 2.76  1.69 4.78  3.31 4.31  3.70 6.17 
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.80  5.66 2.57  1.54 4.52  3.08 4.08  3.62 5.14 
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Appendix 24: Investor Sentiment: Multivariate Framework (Increasing and Declining Sentiment Deals Only) (-5, +5) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The dependent variable is the 11-days abnormal returns (-5, +5) to US acquirers and is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite 
investor sentiment change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. The examined sentiment index period matches the 
sample period. Increasing Sentiment is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is taking place in an increasing sentiment environment and 0 if the deal is announced in a declining sentiment. A Relative Target 
Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value to acquirer’s market value. Focused is a binary variable which takes on 1 if the acquirers and target’s 2-digit SIC code match, otherwise 0. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-
only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private Target is held by private investors. Acquirer Size is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. 
Acquirer’s B/M is the natural logarithm of acquirer’s book-to-market ratio. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation is non-US. Hostile is if the deal is indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-
values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer Undervalued Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
3.32304***  4.82133** 3.23182**  0.31863 7.45726***  0.41337 1.90515***  2.63129*** 2.87417 
(0.0001)
 
 (0.0187) (0.0181)  (0.8054) (<.0001)  (0.6785) (0.0092)  (0.0016) (0.3132) 
               
Increasing Sentiment 
1.37005***  1.90522*** 0.08334  2.03866*** 0.11328  2.13512*** 0.36282  1.40766*** 0.94253 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0003) (0.8310)  (<.0001) (0.7938)  (<.0001) (0.3326)  (<.0001) (0.3119) 
               
Cash 
0.13179     -0.22633 0.91897  0.45877 0.15567  -0.00127 0.82651 
(0.6571)
 
    (0.6209) (0.1077)  (0.4264) (0.7275)  (0.9968) (0.3958) 
Stock 
-0.31603     0.61785 -1.46351***  -0.23643 -0.37085  -0.11297 -2.94228* 
(0.3670)
 
    (0.2250) (0.0055)  (0.7106) (0.5073)  (0.7521) (0.0913) 
Public Target 
-2.74199***  -3.54363*** -1.00458*     -2.72565*** -2.26461***  -3.07507*** 0.19099 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0044) (0.0542)     (0.0007) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.8822) 
Private Target 
-0.48715  -0.04367 -0.70954     -0.40528 0.00854  -0.53913 0.06361 
(0.1397)
 
 (0.9710) (0.1336)     (0.4947) (0.9868)  (0.1186) (0.9537) 
Acquirer Size 
-0.24552***  -0.23171 -0.27878**  0.06436 -0.69925***     -0.17822** -0.42542 
(0.0038)
 
 (0.2152) (0.0389)  (0.6681) (<.0001)     (0.0390) (0.1873) 
Acquirer’s B/M 
-0.81230*  -1.72082 -0.82110  -1.22068* 0.06159  -0.05159 -2.23777***    
(0.0642)
 
 (0.1121) (0.2653)  (0.0583) (0.9474)  (0.9405) (0.0023)    
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Appendix 24 Continued 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer Undervalued Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Relative Target Size 
0.22058*  -0.06858 0.52025**  0.64938*** -1.05246 ***  0.70403*** -0.10375  0.15778 0.57181 
(0.0723)
 
 (0.7917) (0.0156)  (0.0028) (<.0001)  (0.0033) (0.5487)  (0.2158) (0.1915) 
Focused 
0.01623  -1.20687 * 0.10842  -0.58568 0.50751  -0.76853 0.87702 **  0.10250 -0.88111 
(0.9528)
 
 (0.0630) (0.7880)  (0.1642) (0.3143)  (0.1419) (0.0283)  (0.7194) (0.3611) 
Cross-Border 
-0.56398  -2.37276 ** 0.30639  -1.15061* -1.06351  -1.73909* 0.11076  -0.29085 -4.73101** 
(0.1771)
 
 (0.0371) (0.5505)  (0.0967) (0.1693)  (0.0699) (0.8365)  (0.4943) (0.0125) 
Hostile 
1.20826  -7.64323 2.17912  -2.84213 2.19447 *  1.96245 -0.15941  0.92164 0.61544 
(0.2854)
 
 (0.1405) (0.1396)  (0.4418) (0.0811)  (0.4355) (0.9038)  (0.4615) (0.8150) 
                       
                      
N 6,603  1,676 2,203  3,091 1,796  2,201 2,201  6,065 538 
F-Statistics 12.51***  9.27 *** 2.95***  5.55*** 7.79 ***  4.70*** 5.88 ***  13.27*** 2.02** 
R2 (%) 2.04  4.77 1.20  1.60 3.78  2.10 2.61  2.14 3.69 
Adjusted R2 (%) 1.88  4.25 0.79  1.31 3.29  1.66 2.17  1.98 1.86 
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Appendix 25: Investor Sentiment: Multivariate Framework (Full Sample, Increasing and Decreasing Sentiment Variable) (-5, +5) 
The table presents the regression results of M&A announcements to US firms during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The dependent variable is the 11-days abnormal returns (-5, +5) to US acquirers and is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables in a multivariate framework. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite 
investor sentiment change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. The examined sentiment index period matches the 
sample period. Increasing Sentiment is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the deal is taking place in an increasing sentiment environment and 0 otherwise. Declining Sentiment is a dummy which takes on the value 
of 1 if the deal is taking place in a declining sentiment environment and 0 otherwise. A Relative Target Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value to acquirer’s market value. Focused is a binary variable which takes on 
1 if the acquirers and target’s 2-digit SIC code match, otherwise 0. Cash is if the payment offer is cash-only. Stock is if the payment offer is stock-only. Public Target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. 
Private Target is held by private investors. Acquirer Size is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values. Acquirer’s B/M is the natural logarithm of acquirer’s book-to-market ratio. Cross-Border is if the target’s nation 
is non-US. Hostile is if the deal is indicated as a hostile takeover. In parentheses are the corresponding p-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer Undervalued Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Intercept 
3.97589***  5.38702*** 2.88423 ***  2.09210 ** 4.95060*** 1.49423** 2.01170 *** 3.23597*** 5.21246*** 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001) (0.0010)  (0.0144) 
 
(<.0001)
 
(0.0226)
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001)
 
(0.0065)
 
               
Increasing Sentiment 
0.82258***  1.17393*** 0.12797  1.19808 *** 0.24021 0.82736** 0.21633 0.85358*** 0.36132 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0057) (0.6864)  (0.0002) 
 
(0.4956)
 
(0.0420)
 
(0.4789) 
 
(<.0001)
 
(0.6517)
 
Decreasing Sentiment 
-0.54314***  -0.70661 0.03831  -0.82517 ** 0.14464 -1.30487*** -0.11105 -0.54920** -0.57154 
(0.0092)
 
 (0.1092) (0.9046)  (0.0109) 
 
(0.6913)
 
(0.0011)
 
(0.7153) 
 
(0.0114)
 
(0.4449)
 
               
Cash 
0.19743     -0.02212 1.14279*** 0.31082 0.07773 0.06961 0.93911 
(0.3088)
 
    (0.9401) 
 
(0.0025)
 
(0.4041)
 
(0.7931) 
 
(0.7330)
 
(0.1453)
 
Stock 
-0.32672     0.36711 -0.95957*** 0.04220 -0.44018 -0.23761 -1.23009 
(0.1588)
 
    (0.2708) 
 
(0.0069)
 
(0.9212)
 
(0.2276) 
 
(0.3154)
 
(0.2940)
 
Public Target 
-2.64837***  -2.94598*** -1.08681 ***    -3.11103*** -2.04501 *** -2.81921*** -1.40294* 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0004) (0.0011)   
  
(<.0001)
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001)
 
(0.0921)
 
Private Target 
-0.51845**  0.00795 -0.53932 *    -0.62034 -0.19057 -0.50129** -0.55644 
(0.0160)
 
 (0.9922) (0.0655)   
  
(0.1163)
 
(0.5682) 
 
(0.0255)
 
(0.4617)
 
Acquirer Size 
-0.29468***  -0.34406*** -0.25074 **  -0.12067 -0.52409***   -0.22115*** -0.66330*** 
(<.0001)
 
 (0.0048) (0.0039)  (0.2126) 
 
(<.0001)
  
 
 
(<.0001)
 
(0.0016)
 
Acquirer’s B/M 
-0.77881***  -1.39768* -0.63492  -1.28371 *** 0.18081 -0.02365 -1.44478 ***   
(0.0082)
 
 (0.0527) (0.1830)  (0.0038) 
 
(0.7549)
 
(0.9607)
 
(0.0024) 
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Appendix 25 Continued 
 Full Sample  Stock Cash  Private Targets Listed Targets  Small Acquirer Large Acquirer  Overvalued Acquirer Undervalued Acquirer 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Relative Target Size 
0.29566***  0.00951 0.56738***  0.67170*** -0.75146***  0.78217*** -0.10862  0.25664 *** 0.38897 
(0.0003)
 
 (0.9565) 
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(<.0001)
 
 (<.0001)
 
(0.3569) 
 
 (0.0026) 
 
(0.1810)
 
Focused 
-0.06215  -0.88834 ** 0.01080  -0.45109* 0.40088  -0.65156* 0.43946 *  -0.04551 -0.46708 
(0.7271)
 
 (0.0349) 
 
(0.9664)
 
 (0.0952)
 
(0.2303)
 
 (0.0581)
 
(0.0855) 
 
 (0.8056) 
 
(0.4837)
 
Cross-Border 
-0.17239  -1.72392 ** 0.19230  -0.67802 -0.21148  -0.74559 0.28032  -0.02784 -2.28349* 
(0.5290)
 
 (0.0376) 
 
(0.5635)
 
 (0.1122)
 
(0.7013)
 
 (0.2203)
 
(0.4326) 
 
 (0.9210) 
 
(0.0546)
 
Hostile 
-0.05477  -3.83937 -0.97581  -2.34307 0.91495  0.87658 -0.47567  -0.44371 1.38672 
(0.9492)
 
 (0.1951) 
 
(0.4689)
 
 (0.3547)
 
(0.2996)
 
 (0.5860)
 
(0.6501) 
 
 (0.6402) 
 
(0.4481)
 
                 
                 
N 13,896  3,454  4,974  6,555  3,669   4,632  4,632   12,875  1,021 
F-Statistics 25.05***  14.06 *** 6.45***  8.44*** 9.70***  7.65*** 8.81 ***  24.68 *** 3.08*** 
R2 (%) 2.12  3.92  1.28  1.27  2.58   1.79  2.05   2.07  3.25 
Adjusted R2 (%) 2.03  3.65  1.08  1.12  2.32   1.56  1.82   1.98  2.19 
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Appendix 26: Investor Sentiment: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Entire Sentiment Change Index) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal 
returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Investor Sentiment N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Increasing 3,622 1.3450*** <.0001  3,613 1.6666*** <.0001  3,618 2.3528*** <.0001 
Neutral 8,564 1.0035*** <.0001  8,583 1.2284*** <.0001  8,560 1.5525*** <.0001 
Decreasing 3,641 0.6397*** <.0001  3,631 0.7933*** <.0001  3,649 0.9052*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.7053*** <.0001   0.8733*** <.0001   1.4476*** <.0001 
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Appendix 27: Investor Sentiment and Mode of Payment: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Entire Sentiment Change Index) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. Cash are deals with cash only offers and are deals with stock only offers are stock. A combination of both is 
considered as mixed. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has 
been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Mode of Payment Investor Sentiment N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Cash 
Increasing 1,140 1.3926*** <.0001  1,137 1.5475*** <.0001  1,137 1.9159*** <.0001 
Neutral 3,104 1.2218*** <.0001  3,109 1.3222*** <.0001  3,103 1.6897*** <.0001 
Decreasing 1,197 1.3626*** <.0001  1,197 1.4735*** 0.0006  1,195 1.7531*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.0300 0.9055   0.0740 0.8047   0.1628 0.6808 
Mixed 
Increasing 1,529 1.7710*** <.0001  1,526 2.0496*** <.0001  1,525 2.8464*** <.0001 
Neutral 3,270 1.2756*** <.0001  3,275 1.6616*** <.0001  3,274 1.8725*** <.0001 
Decreasing 1,547 0.6366*** 0.0004  1,544 0.7169*** 0.0006  1,557 0.6484** 0.0183 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  1.1344*** <.0001   1.3327*** <.0001   2.1980*** <.0001 
Stock 
Increasing 953 0.6046** 0.0151  950 1.1940*** 0.0001  956 2.0852*** <.0001 
Neutral 2,190 0.2879** 0.0434  2,199 0.4508*** 0.0071  2,183 0.8774*** <.0001 
Decreasing 897 -0.3198 0.2243  890 0.0112 0.9700  897 0.2215 0.5531 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.9244** 0.0106   1.1828*** 0.0050   1.8637*** 0.0006 
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Appendix 28: Investor Sentiment and Target Listing Status: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Entire Sentiment Change Index) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. Public target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private target is held by private investors. Subsidiary is 
if the target is labelled as a subsidiary by SDC Platinum. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in 
means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Target Listing Status Investor Sentiment N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Public 
Increasing 963 -0.5366** 0.0105  965 -0.5712** 0.0182  970 -0.3008 0.3317 
Neutral 2,187 -0.6897*** <.0001  2,191 -0.6976*** <.0001  2,199 -0.4495** 0.0110 
Decreasing 933 -1.1957*** <.0001  934 -0.9848*** 0.0001  942 -0.3107 0.3249 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.6591** 0.0274   0.4136 0.2316   0.0099 0.9821 
Private 
Increasing 1,733 1.8708*** <.0001  1,728 2.2478*** <.0001  1,728 3.2250*** <.0001 
Neutral 4,099 1.4719*** <.0001  4,108 1.7486*** <.0001  4,088 2.0460*** <.0001 
Decreasing 1,732 0.9815*** <.0001  1,720 1.2742*** <.0001  1,724 1.1377*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.8893*** 0.0003   0.9736*** 0.0008   2.0873*** <.0001 
Subsidiary 
Increasing 926 2.3178*** <.0001  920 2.9223*** <.0001  920 3.5126*** <.0001 
Neutral 2,278 1.7864*** <.0001  2,284 2.1405*** <.0001  2,273 2.6016*** <.0001 
Decreasing 976 1.7876*** <.0001  977 1.6465 <.0001  983 1.6629*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.5302* 0.0862   1.2758*** 0.0005   1.8497*** 0.0001 
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Appendix 29: Investor Sentiment and Acquirer’s Size: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Entire Sentiment Change Index) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. Acquirer’s size is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values, sorted by size and split into three equally-sized 
groups. The upper group is categorised as large, the middle group as medium and the lowest group as small. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal 
returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Acquirer’s Size Investor Sentiment N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Large 
Increasing 1,207 0.3152* 0.0671  1,204 0.5456*** 0.0070  1,206 1.0030*** 0.0003 
Neutral 2,855 0.3164*** 0.0014  2,861 0.3925*** 0.0006  2,853 0.6051*** <.0001 
Decreasing 1,214 -0.1689 0.3414  1,210 0.0494 0.8063  1,216 0.4742* 0.0666 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.4841* 0.0502   0.4962* 0.0818   0.5288 0.1633 
Small 
Increasing 1,207 2.1371*** <.0001  1,204 2.3265*** <.0001  1,206 3.3250*** <.0001 
Neutral 2,854 1.7622*** <.0001  2,861 2.1672*** <.0001  2,853 2.6139*** <.0001 
Decreasing 1,213 1.4081*** <.0001  1,210 1.3995*** <.0001  1,216 1.5003*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.7290** 0.0222   0.9270** 0.0128   1.8247*** 0.0002 
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Appendix 30: Investor Sentiment and Acquirer’s Valuation: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Entire Sentiment Change Index) 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. The acquirer’s valuation is book-to-market ratio of the previous reported quarter. If the book-to-market is smaller 
than 1 then the acquirer is categorised as overvalued, if smaller than 1 then the acquirer is categorised as undervalued. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the 
abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Acquirer’s Valuation Investor Sentiment N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Overvalued 
Increasing 2,903 1.1134*** <.0001  2,898 1.4736*** <.0001  2,906 2.0881*** <.0001 
Neutral 7,039 0.9208*** <.0001  7,047 1.1313*** <.0001  7,034 1.4173*** <.0001 
Decreasing 2,932 0.4056*** <.0001  2,926 0.5971*** <.0001  2,935 0.7672*** <.0001 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.7078*** <.0001   0.8765*** <.0001   1.3209*** <.0001 
Undervalued 
Increasing 258 1.6631*** <.0001  259 1.6302*** <.0001  252 2.1568*** 0.0021 
Neutral 496 1.0211*** <.0001  497 1.4366*** <.0001  499 2.2179*** <.0001 
Decreasing 268 1.5815*** <.0001  269 1.5214*** <.0001  270 1.5282** 0.0187 
Increasing vs. Decreasing  0.0816 0.8919   0.1088 0.8822   0.6286 0.5074 
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Appendix 31: Investor Sentiment Level: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal 
returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Sentiment Level N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
High 3,596 0.68914*** <.0001  3,585 1.02322*** <.0001  3,591 1.47547*** <.0001 
Neutral 9,463 1.10369*** <.0001  9,467 1.26580*** <.0001  9,464 1.61643*** <.0001 
Low 2,768 1.03773*** <.0001  2,775 1.36728*** <.0001  2,772 1.62647*** <.0001 
High vs. Low  0.34859** 0.0376   0.34406* 0.0833   0.15100 0.5566 
   
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 C
 
2
6
6
Appendix 32: Investor Sentiment Level and Mode of Payment: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. Cash are deals with cash only offers and are deals with stock only offers are stock. A combination of both is 
considered as mixed. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has 
been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.  
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Mode of Payment Sentiment Level N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Cash 
High 815 1.31369*** <.0001  812 1.70365*** <.0001  810 2.49899*** <.0001 
Neutral 3,566 1.30072*** <.0001  3,571 1.33326*** <.0001  3,562 1.64790*** <.0001 
Low 1,060 1.22834*** <.0001  1,060 1.40511*** <.0001  1,063 1.52644*** <.0001 
High vs. Low  0.08535 0.7638   0.29854  0.3801   0.97255** 0.0321 
Mixed 
High 1,958 0.86569*** <.0001  1,955 1.05726*** <.0001  1,962 1.18529*** <.0001 
Neutral 3,386 1.41313*** <.0001  3,385 1.67959*** <.0001  3,394 2.10365*** <.0001 
Low 1,002 1.38131*** <.0001  1,005 1.91457*** <.0001  1,000 2.01542*** <.0001 
High vs. Low  0.51562** 0.0479   0.85731*** 0.0063   0.83013** 0.0391 
Stock 
High 823 -0.34939 0.2264  818 0.26643 0.4294  819 1.15838*** <.0001 
Neutral 2,511 0.40662*** 0.0033  2,511 0.61203*** 0.0002  2,508 0.91239*** <.0001 
Low 706 0.26391 0.2996  710 0.53611* 0.0616  709 1.22784*** <.0001 
High vs. Low  0.61330 0.1110   0.26968 0.5420   0.06946 0.9028 
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Appendix 33: Investor Sentiment Level and Target Listing Status: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. Public target is if a target publicly listed on a stock exchange. Private target is held by private investors. Subsidiary is 
if the target is labelled as a subsidiary by SDC Platinum. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in 
means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Target Listing Status Sentiment Level N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Public 
High 968 -0.88605*** <.0001  970 -0.63834*** 0.0074  977 0.15279  0.6171 
Neutral 2,379 -0.69623*** <.0001  2,384 -0.73592*** <.0001  2,395 -0.54649*** 0.0027 
Low 736 -0.85142*** 0.0003  736 -0.85016*** 0.0008  739 -0.55950* 0.0663 
High vs. Low  0.03463 0.9122   0.21182** 0.0417   0.71229** 0.0462 
Private 
High 1,664 1.10107*** <.0001  1,654 1.40451*** <.0001  1,654 1.69389*** 0.0000 
Neutral 4,675 1.55413*** <.0001  4,673 1.80561*** <.0001  4,658 2.14872*** 0.0000 
Low 1,225 1.53259*** <.0001  1,229 2.03287*** <.0001  1,228 2.51450*** 0.0000 
High vs. Low  0.43152* 0.0902   -0.62836  0.5419   -0.82061* 0.0987 
Subsidiary 
High 964 1.55980*** <.0001  961 2.04408*** <.0001  960 2.44527*** 0.0000 
Neutral 2,409 2.00707*** <.0001  2,410 2.19921*** <.0001  2,411 2.73662*** 0.0000 
Low 807 2.00949*** <.0001  810 2.37225*** <.0001  805 2.27854*** 0.0000 
High vs. Low  0.44969 0.1315   -0.32817 0.3649   0.16673 0.7225 
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Appendix 34: Investor Sentiment Level and Acquirer’s Size: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. Acquirer’s size is the natural logarithm of acquirers’ market values, sorted by size and split into three equally-sized 
groups. The upper group is categorised as large, the middle group as medium and the lowest group as small. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the abnormal 
returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Acquirer’s Size Sentiment Level N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Large 
High 1,199 -0.29786 0.1174  1,195 0.13596  0.5453  1,197 0.66837** 0.0243 
Neutral 3,154 0.35795*** 0.0002  3,156 0.41437*** 0.0002  3,155 0.74831*** <.0001 
Low 923 0.30849* 0.0705  925 0.41088** 0.0312  924 0.48874* 0.0503 
High vs. Low  0.60635** 0.0176   0.27492  0.3508   0.17963  0.6429 
Small 
High 1,198 1.52895*** <.0001  1,195 2.05452*** <.0001  1,197 2.73472*** <.0001 
Neutral 3,154 1.93331*** <.0001  3,155 2.07344*** <.0001  3,154 2.46078*** <.0001 
Low 922 1.65544*** <.0001  925 2.19528*** <.0001  924 2.72536*** <.0001 
High vs. Low  0.12649 0.6950   0.14076 0.7142   0.00936 0.9850 
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Appendix 35: Investor Sentiment Level and Acquirer’s Valuation: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) of M&A announcements to US firms in growing, neutral and declining industries during the period from 01.01.1980 to 31.12.2010. The acquirers’ returns are 
calculated 3-, 5- and 11-days surrounding the announcement (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) using an adjusted market model: Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t as of equation (3.3), where Ri,t is the rate of return of stock i at day t and Rm,t is the 
rate of return for the value-weighted CRSP index for day t. The upper 50 per cent of positive changes and lower 50 per cent of negative changes of the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly composite investor sentiment 
change index are categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘decreasing’ investor sentiment. The remainder are pooled as ‘neutral’ investor sentiment changes. To determine in which sentiment environment a deal is announced, the 
month of the deal announcement was matched with the investor sentiment group of the previous month. The acquirer’s valuation is book-to-market ratio of the previous reported quarter. If the book-to-market is smaller 
than 1 then the acquirer is categorised as overvalued, if smaller than 1 then the acquirer is categorised as undervalued. p-values of mean equal to zero versus not equal to zero is applied to examine the significance of the 
abnormal returns. For the test statistics of the differences in means, the equality of variances has been taken into account. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  (-1, +1)  (-2, +2)  (-5, +5) 
Acquirer’s Valuation Sentiment Level N CAR p  N CAR p  N CAR p 
Overvalued 
High 2,592 0.53032 *** 0.0001  2,585 0.93406*** <.0001  2,583 1.41872 *** <.0001 
Neutral 8,026 0.92876 *** <.0001  8,022 1.06891*** <.0001  8,031 1.38022 *** <.0001 
Low 2,256 0.91933 *** <.0001  2,264 1.32535*** <.0001  2,261 1.56555 *** <.0001 
High vs. Low  0.38901 ** 0.0360   0.39129*  0.0792   0.14683 0.6098 
Undervalued 
High 401 0.83651 *** 0.0055  401 1.01157*** 0.0057  399 1.65959 *** 0.0003 
Neutral 426 1.99152 *** <.0001  427 1.99617*** <.0001  426 2.32922 *** <.0001 
Low 195 0.90024 * 0.0605  197 1.45905** 0.0135  196 2.08403 *** 0.0057 
High vs. Low  0.06373 0.9100   0.44748 0.5164   0.42444 0.6261 
 
